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"DIRECT REFERENCE, COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE AND FREGEAN SENSE"
This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. 
The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to non- 
empty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of 
utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those 
aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to 
singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance 
of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue 
about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences 
constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) 
failures of substitutivity $alva veritate of co-referential singular terms in 
propositional-attitude contexts.
The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I 
argue that "notational variance" claims recently advanced on both sides of the 
dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with 
separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does 
not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive 
significance; and hence that a framework of singular senses is Indispensable to 
deal with such problems in an adequate way. I also discuss the problem of 
Cognitive Dynamics, i.e. the issue of attitude-retention and persistence of mental 
content, in connection with the individuation of indexical thought. I argue that 
the standard Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts might be reasonably 
extended to the diachronic case, allowing thus the possibility of discriminating 
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This essay is concerned with certain problems in the philosophy of 
singular reference and singular thought. In particular, I take as central the 
following question: What kind of role is to be assigned to non-empty, syntacti- 
cally simple and used singular terms (e.g. ordinary proper names, demonstratives 
and other indexicals) in fixing the semantic contents of, or the propositions 
expressed by, utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur?
My aim is to discuss certain aspects of the current dispute between a 
directly referential account, which I take as being mainly represented in the 
Millian version advanced by theorists such as David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, 
and a neo-Fregean account, which I take as being mainly represented in the De 
Re conception of singular senses expounded by theorists such as Gareth Evans 
and Christopher Peacocke. The aspects in question are related to issues about 
the cognitive significance of language use, and I single out the following two as 
crucial: (i)- the Informativeness Problem, i.e. the issue about (alleged) potential 
differences in informative value between utterances of pairs of sentences 
constructed out of co-referential singular terms; (ii)- the Substitutivity Problem, 
i.e. the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co- 
referential singular terms in prepositional-attitude contexts.
I pay special attention to "notational variance" arguments which have 
recently been adduced in both directions. On the neo-Fregean side, the claim 
has been made that a Millian account of singular reference, In its attempt to 
accommodate certain facts about cognitive significance, might be regarded as a 
notational variant of a neo-Fregean account. On the Millian side, the claim has 
also been made that a neo-Fregean account of indexical reference based upon 
De Re singular senses might be regarded as a notational variant of a Millian
Iv
account.
The general direction of my arguments Is as follows. On the one hand, I 
argue that the neo-Fregean Notational Variance claim and Its Millian counterpart 
are both unsound (though for different reasons); and hence that one is really 
confronted with separate theories of singular reference, Irreducible to one 
another. On the other hand, I argue that a Millian account is far from providing 
us with satisfactory solutions to the problems about cognitive significance 
mentioned above; and hence that a framework of singular modes of presentation 
is indispensable to deal with such problems in an adequate way.
I have divided this work into three chapters. Chapter I, "Sense and 
Cognitive Significance", contains the theoretical background to the issues which 
concern us; the essentials of Frege's theory of sense and reference are given, 
the relationship holding between the notion of a singular mode of presentation 
and the notion of cognitive significance is delineated, and the nature of the 
controversy between Fregeanism and Millianism over the semantics of singular 
reference is characterized. Chapter II, "Direct Reference and Cognitive 
Significance", contains an assessment of various interesting attempts recently 
made by Millian theorists to deal with the problems of Informatlveness and 
substitutivity in connection with ordinary proper names and syntactically simple 
indexicals and demonstratives. The upshot is that Millianism, even if supple- 
mented with a framework of guises or ways of apprehending neo-Russellian 
contents, is unable to account for the phenomena of cognitive significance in a 
satisfactory way; on the other hand, notational variance arguments adduced on 
both sides are also considered and eventually rejected. Chapter III, "Cognitive 
Dynamics and Cognitive Significance", contains a positive contribution to the 
study of attitude-retention and content-retention in connection with issues about 
the Individuation of indexical and demonstrative thought. I put forward what I 
take to be an admissible diachronic generalization of Evans's Intuitive Criterion 
of Difference for thoughts; and I discuss a number of constraints that should
be Imposed upon the notion of retention on which the envisaged principle 
depends. I also give an outline of the leading ideas of a neo-Fregean approach 
to the central problem of Cognitive Dynamics (as introduced by Kaplan in his 
influential paper 'Demonstratives'); Kaplan's and Evans's views are critically 
examined and a solution is sketched in terms of the notion of a memory-based 





SENSE AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this Chapter is to set out the theoretical and 
historical background which appears to be relevant to our subsequent discussion 
of the problem of singular reference in connection with the issue of cognitive 
significance.
In Section 1, I give an outline of the sort of general approach to the 
semantics of extensional (declarative) sentences which is due to Gottlob Frege, 
in particular his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung for such sentences and for the 
different categories of expression out of which they are seen as being composed. 
In Section 2, I offer a representation of an argument originally devised by 
Frege to support the sense/reference distinction as applied to his category of 
Proper Names. In Section 3, I identify three central problems about cognitive 
significance which are motivated by the Fregean argument and upon which our 
reflection will be centred.' Such problems are labelled the In format! veness 
Problem, the Problem of Cognitive Value, and the Problem of Epistemlc Modal 
Valuer, and I take it to be a constraint one should impose on any acceptable 
semantic theory of singular reference that it offer satisfactory solutions to them. 
Finally, in Section 4, I try to characterize what is at issue In the dispute 
between Fregeanism and Millianism over the semantics of singular reference.
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SECTION 1 - SENSE AND REFERENCE
1.1 Extenslonal sentences are those sentences which do not contain any 
occurrences of what could be somehow regarded as intenslonal operators; among 
these one might count modal phrases such as 'necessarily* and 'possibly', 
psychological verbs such as 'to desire' or 'to hope', epistemic verbs such as 'to 
know' or 'to believe', and so on. Hence, we shall be dealing (for the time being) 
either with so-called atomic sentences, i.e. sentences whose general form is 
pft'Ctj,...,^)"!, where    is an n-place predicate (with n>1) and each t| is a 
singular term; or with a certain type of molecular sentences, namely those which 
one might obtain from given atomic sentences by means of certain non- 
intensional sentential operators, such as the usual truth-functional connectives, 
the standard quantifiers, unary operators like 'It is true that', etc. Thus, 
employing a very broad notion of singular term (one which coincides with 
Frege's notion of El gen name), the following would all be instances of extensional 
sentences in the above sense: 'David Kaplan wrote Demonstrative^, 'My pants are 
on fire', 'If Hesperus is a planet so is Phosphorus', 'Afla is not Ateb', 'This is 
a well-formed formula', 'The author of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik held 
conservative views', 'Yesterday was fine', 'Every philosopher of language admires 
Frege', and so on. Of course, the semantic theorist will be interested, not in 
sentences of the above kind taken as certain syntactic items (or as sentence- 
types), but mainly in given utterances of particular tokens of them by given 
speakers in given contexts of use.
Now focusing exclusively on atomic sentences will provide us with an 
excellent starting-point for our subsequent reflection. For the general accounts 
of singular reference we shall be discussing throughout this essay, namely 
certain contemporary forms of Fregeanism and Milllanism, already diverge with
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respect to the correct way of assigning semantic (or prepositional) contents to 
utterances of certain sentences of such a sort in given contexts. And the kind 
of issues with which we shall be primarily concerned in our assessment of the 
dispute between those accounts, issues having to do with the cognitive value 
and the cognitive significance of our use of language, already arise In 
connection with atomic sentences, when one tries to figure out what sort of 
thoughts we may entertain and believe by uttering them on certain occasions of 
use.
1.2 As is well known, Frege put forward a two-tiered semantics for atomic 
declarative sentences (actually, the proposal applies without restriction to 
sentences and expressions of every type). The basic idea is that one should 
assign to every sentence fS"| - sharing the general form f^'Ctj,...,^)"] and 
uttered in a possible context of use c - two different sorts of semantic value 
(to use a neutral term). On the one hand, we have the sense (Sinn) expressed 
by [S~| with respect to c; on the other, we have the reference (Bedeutung) of 
fS~| with respect to c. The sense expressed by fS"| in c should be seen as 
being subject-relative^; since it is the sense attached to fS~| by some subject, 
for instance the agent of c2 . And Frege's suggestion here is that one should 
identify the sense of fS"] in c with a thought (Gedanke), this being typically the
There seems to be no conflict between saying that the sense of an utterance 
of a sentence (in a certain context) is subject-relative in the given sense, 
viz. in the sense that it is typically that sense which is expressed by the 
utterer (in the context), and Frege's doctrine according to which complete 
senses or thoughts are subject-independent self-subsistent entities.
Or the addressee of c, or both. Notice that there are cases in which an 
intersubjective variation in sense may arise since e.g. agent and addressee may 
attach different senses to the same sentence in the same context, so that the 
phrase we have employed - 'the sense of |~S~] in c' - should be regarded as being 




thought which is had or entertained by the agent of c, or the cognitive content 
of her utterance of [S~| in c. As to the reference of a sentence fsl wltn 
respect to a context c, Frege claims that it should be construed as being a 
truth-value; thus, assuming bivalence, the reference of fS~| in c will be either 
Truth or Falsehood. And the relation holding between the thought associated 
with a sentence as its sense - with respect to a possible context of use - and 
the truth-value associated with the sentence as its reference - in the context - 
is to the effect that the former is a mode of presentation, or a way of thinking, 
of the latter which has the important property of determining it (In some sense); 
thus, a given Fregean thought is said to have, or to bear, a certain truth-value 
in virtue of this being that truth-value which is determined by the thought in 
question.
To sum up, a declarative sentence fS~| is said to express a certain 
thought (relative to a given context of use) and to refer to a certain truth- 
value (in the context); the Reference-relation is thus the relative product of the 
other two relations: the Expressing-relation, holding between a sentence and a 
thought or cognitive content, and the Determining-relation, holding between a 
thought and its truth-value.
Frege might also be seen as subscribing to two Functionality Principles, 
one for sense and the other for reference3 . Roughly, the former principle is to 
the effect that the sense of a complex expression (in a given context) is a 
function of the senses assigned to Its constituent parts (in the context) together 
with the sort of way in which they are combined. Thus, let E be an expression 
constructed out of component expressions ej,e^,...,ey and let E' be the expression 
obtained from E by replacing (some or all occurrences of) any expression e; in
3 Frege 1964, 90. See also Frege 1979, 210, 255; and 'On Sense and Reference 1 
in Frege 1952, 56-78 (cf. 62, 64-5).
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E by an expression ek ; let us also represent the sense of an expression E by 
Sen(E). Then what the Principle of Functionality for sense states Is that If 
Sen(ep = Sen(ek ) then Sen(E) = Sen(E'). And an associated principle Is that If 
a certain subsententlal component lacks a sense (with respect to a context of 
use) then any complex expression, particularly any sentence, In which It might 
figure lacks a sense too (with respect to the context In question). Similarly, the 
Principle of Functionality for reference is to the effect that the reference of a 
complex expression (In a given context) is a function of the references assigned 
to Its constituent parts (in the context) together with the sort of way In which 
they are combined. Thus, this principle states that if Ref(ep = RefCe^) then 
Ref(E) = Ref(E') (where Ref(E) stands for the reference of E); and a related 
principle which parallels the one above given for sense also holds for reference. 
Accordingly, a distinction between sense and reference should also be 
drawn at the subsentential level, i.e. with respect to the different categories of 
subsentential units which make up atomic sentences (to take the simplest case), 
namely singular terms and predicates of an arbitrary degree. Hence, any given 
singular term t| taken in a context of use c should be assigned, not only a 
certain reference with respect to c, where this is just the object (if it exists) 
denoted by tj in c, but also a certain sense (with respect to c). The sense 
expressed by tj in c is construed as being a certain mode of presentation, or 
way of thinking, of the object referred to by tj in c. Again, such a mode of 
presentation should be seen as being subject-relative: typically, it is that 
particular way of thinking of an object which is associated with t^ in c by the 
agent of c, and which represents her particular cognitive perspective on (a 
certain fragment of) the world. And the relation holding between a singular mode 
of presentation and the object it presents is of the same sort as that holding 
between a thought and Its truth-value: a singular sense is said to determine (in
Page 6
SENSE AND REFERENCE
some sense) the object It Is a way of thinking of.
Concerning this feature of Fregean senses, one should note that sense may 
determine reference in a number of different ways; and Frege did not provide 
us with any definite view on the matter, his conception of sense being largely 
programmatic. Indeed, there are at least four senses in which one could say that 
a singular sense might determine a certain object as being its referent: (i)- it 
may determine an object in the functional sense, i.e. in the sense that there is 
a function which maps singular senses onto referents, so that the possibility of 
two distinct objects being presented by the same singular sense would be 
thereby excluded; (ii)- it may determine a referent in the (strictly) descriptivist 
sense, i.e. in the sense that such a referent is to be taken as that object (if it 
exists) which uniquely satisfies a certain set of context-independent and purely 
conceptual conditions; (iii)- it may determine a referent in the verificationist 
sense, in the sense of consisting in some sort of effective procedure for picking 
out (or identifying) a particular object (if there is one) as being the referent; 
(iv)- finally, it may determine a referent in the causal sense, i.e. in the sense 
that such a referent is to be taken as that object which happens to be the 
source of a certain amount of information (and misinformation) gathered by a 
thinker, e.g. information she acquires on the basis of perceptual encounters with 
the object. Of these possible construals of the Determining-relation, (i) seems to 
be the weakest - since it is presumably entailed by any of the others - and the 
least theoretically committed; maybe Frege just had in mind such a sort of 
construal, and not construal (ii) (as it has been often claimed), when he spoke 
of senses as reference-determiners. As to construal (iv), which one might 
associate with certain current so-called De Re conceptions of sense*, it is prima
* These are the neo-Fregean accounts of singular sense in which we shall be 
particularly interested in the present essay. The reason is that one of our 
concerns here is the issue of notational variance and the accounts in question
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facie incompatible with construal (ii) since it might be seen as entailing the 
Impossibility of there being a singular sense which would not present any 
object; and such an impossibility is not the case In the light of construal (II) 
for it might turn out that the conceptual conditions encapsulating a singular 
sense are not true of any object at all.
1.3 Let me now summarize Frege's treatment of predicative expressions and 
thus complete our exposition of the essentials of his semantic account of atomic 
sentences. Again, the basic idea is that one should assign to every n-place 
predicate ftHgj,..., ,)* - with respect to a possible context of use c - two 
different sorts of semantic value. On the one hand, we have the sense expressed 
by  *(Cj,...,^B ) in c; on the other, we have the reference of  > (5j,...,CB ) in c. 
Frege's suggestion8 is that one should identify the reference of <frn ( |,...,g fl ) (In 
c) with a certain incomplete entity which he calls a concept (Begriff). And a 
Fregean concept is basically a function from objects to truth-values, i.e. a 
function whose domain is some set of objects (the references of any singular 
terms which might be inserted in the argument places of a predicate) and whose 
range is the set of the two truth-values, Truth and Falsehood (the references
apparently bring Fregeanism closer to Millianism, paving thus the way for 
notational variance arguments in both directions; in Chapter II, Section 3, I 
consider the general structure of such arguments.
In Frege's notation the greek letter '£' is just a device to indicate an 
argument place, i.e. a place where a singular term might be inserted, and it 
should not be regarded as a proper constituent of the predicate. A Fregean 
predicate should thus be viewed as being something which is essentially 
incomplete in nature, something like a functional pattern which, for given 
singular terms as arguments, yields a plurality of sentences as its values for 
those arguments. Hence, the characteristic feature of a Fregean predicate lies 
in the fact that it always contains a certain number of gaps or empty places, 
i.e. in what Frege describes as its incomplete or unsaturated nature.
* See especially Frege's posthumously published paper 'Ausfiihrungen iiber Sinn 
und Bedeutung' in Frege 1979, 118-25.
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of any sentences which might result from such an Insertion). As to the sense 
expressed by a predicate *l (51 ,...,5fl ) (in c), it is to be construed as being a 
certain mode of presentation, or way of thinking, of the particular function from 
objects to truth-values which is assigned to the predicate ft'Cgj,...,^) as being 
its reference (in c); and, again, a predicative sense should be seen as 
determining (in some sense) the particular function of which it is a mode of 
presentation.
I should notice that one must sharply distinguish between the reference 
of an n-place predicate, i.e. a certain sort of n-ary function, and what is 
usually called the extension of the predicate, i.e. the set of all those (and only 
those) ordered n-tuples of objects which satisfy it. For simplicity, take the case 
of a unary predicate Y(£). Frege's idea is that the concept referred to by Y(£) 
is an entity whose nature is essentially incomplete or unsaturated, in the sense 
of being given in the process itself of mapping objects onto truth-values; thus, 
neither the objects which might occur as its possible arguments nor the truth- 
values it may determine as values for those arguments are part of the concept 
Y(C) itself. By contrast, the extension of 7(5) is a complete or saturated entity, 
viz. a certain sort of object (a set).
Frege's distinction between a concept and its extension is derived from 
a prior distinction he makes between a function and its course of values7 . In 
Frege's notation, the functional expression £[$( )] stands for that second-order 
unary function whose value for each first-order function f(£) as argument is 
what he calls the course of values (Werthverlauf) of the function f(£); in other 
words, the result of completing £[$(e)] with a first-order functional expression 
f({) inserted in its argument place $ is a certain kind of Proper Name, viz. the 
Name fe[f( >] of the course of values associated with the first-order function
G.Frege, 'Function and Concept* in G.Frege 1952, 21-41; cf. 30-32
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Now courses of values are governed by the following Identity principle: if 
and g(£) are first-order functions then their courses of values are 
Identical, i.e. 6[f(e)] = e[g(e)], If and only If f(£) and g(£) always determine the 
same objects as values for the same objects as arguments. Thus, the Fregean 
course of values £[f(e)] of a function f(£) could be represented as being a set 
S of ordered pairs <x,y> such that y = f(x), i.e. y is the value determined by 
f(£) for x as argument, and such that if both <a,b> and <a,c> belong to S then 
b = c. Applying this apparatus to the case of concepts, it turns out that the 
extension of a concept Y(£) is to be identified with the course of values £[7(6)3 
of the first-order unary function Y(£), i.e. with the set of all those ordered 
pairs <x,y> such that y is the truth-value determined by that function for each 
object x given as argument. The corresponding identity principle would then run 
as follows: (first-order) concepts T(£) and l~(£) are said to have the same 
extension if and only if £[Y( )] = £[!"( )]; and this amounts to requiring that 
every object which falls under 7(5) also falls under l~(£) and conversely.
1.4 Let us turn our attention to Frege's central argument for the distinction 
between the sense and the reference of a singular term. This is an argument in 
which a crucial appeal is made to the notion of cognitive significance as applied 
to a significant class of (utterances of) extensional sentences. As we shall see, 
Frege's argument will play an important role in our discussion, since it - or at 
least some reconstruction of it - is usually thought of as leading to conclusions 
which are conspicuously inconsistent with a strictly Millian account of singular 
reference. By linking the notion of singular sense to the notion of cognitive 
significance, the Fregean argument in question apparently establishes a very 
intimate connection between the semantics and the epistemology of singular 
reference; and that is the sort of connection which direct reference theorists
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are In general reluctant to admit.
To begin with, one should be aware of the fact that Frege's argument Is 
Intended to apply to any singular terms - and to any extensional sentences 
containing them - belonging to his own vast category of Proper Names 
(Eigennamer. And an expedient way of introducing such a category is by 
noticing that it Is essentially co-extensive with the syntactical category of term 
- or, to be precise, with that of closed term, i.e. a term containing no free 
variables - as recursively defined in standard first-order formalized languages. 
Thus, the following main kinds of expression might be counted as Fregean 
Proper Names: (i)- individual constants; (II)- complex terms formed by prefixing 
n-place functional symbols to ordered sequences of length n of any terms; and 
(iii)- descriptive terms, i.e. terms which are built up from open sentences by 
means of a description operator (which is taken as a primitive symbol in Frege's 
formal language). Hence, besides syntactically simple singular terms, Frege's 
category of Proper Names also includes definite descriptions and other 
syntactically complex singular terms.
The most conspicuous semantic feature of a Proper Name - one which plays 
a decisive role in guaranteeing a truth-value to any extensional sentence 
containing it - is that It designates, or at least purports to designate, a single 
object. As we have seen, Frege called such an object the reference (Bedeutung) 
of the Proper Name'. Accordingly, the name 'Fernando Pessoa' is said to stand 
for the well-known Portuguese poet, and this person is said to be its reference; 
furthermore, since Pessoa availed himself of a number of heteronyms and also
' I use capitals in order to distinguish Frege's category from ordinary proper 
names (which form a certain subset of it).
J G.Frege, 'On Sense and Reference' in Frege 1952, 56-78 (cf. 57); see also 
Frege 1979, 191.
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wrote under names such as 'Ricardo Reis', 'Alberto Caeiro' and 'Alvaro Campos', 
he is also said to be the reference of these names. Likewise, the descriptive 
terms 'the author of Summulae Logicales? and 'the Portuguese Pope' are both 
said to stand for the medieval logician Peter of Spain, who is said to be their 
common reference.
The case of descriptive terms deserves a closer examination. Thus, for any 
descriptive term (ix)'F(x) in a language L, if the open sentence T(x) is satisfied 
by exactly one object and the given description is proper, then the interpreta- 
tion of the descriptive term will be given by assigning to it the object in 
question as its reference. If, on the other hand, either no object or more than 
one object satisfy ¥(x) and the description (ix)¥(x) is improper, then a Fregean 
semantics10 for the language L will select an arbitrary individual in the domain 
as the common reference for all improper descriptive terms in L. Alternatively, 
if one wants to follow Frege's own procedure in Grundsetze der Arithmetik , 
the reference of any improper description (ix)T(x) will be the class of all those 
(and only those) objects that fall under the concept *F, i.e. either the null-class 
or a class containing at least two members. This is a natural consequence of 
Frege's demand that in every language logically in order each well-formed 
expression functioning as a Proper Name must be assigned a reference.
^ Such as the Fregean formal treatment of definite descriptions developed in 
Kalish, Montague and Mar 1980, 306-54.
11 Cf. Frege 1964, 49 ff.
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SECTION 2 - FREGE'S ARGUMENT
2.1 Frege holds that the semantic significance^ of a Proper Name - in the 
sense of its contribution to the semantic significance of any utterance of a 
sentence in which it may figure - cannot be equated with the reference of the 
Name (if it has one). Indeed, Frege clearly rejects the view according to which 
the function of a Proper Name in the language is exhaustively given by 
specifying a certain object as being the reference of the Name (where the mode 
of specification is taken to be semantically irrelevant); or, to use a different 
formulation, Frege clearly rejects the view according to which understanding a 
Proper Name (as taken in given contexts of use) consists merely in knowing of 
a certain object that it is the referent of the Name (in the contexts in question). 
His well-known argument towards such a result could be represented 
as taking the form of a reductio ad absurdum of the following kind. Suppose, 
for the sake of argument, -that we are dealing only with non-vacuous Proper 
Names . Suppose further that the semantic significance of a Proper Name is to
In formulating Frege's argument I use a deliberately broad and neutral notion, 
viz. semantic significance, to cover any sort of semantic property that Proper 
Names might have in the language (particularly those properties which are 
relevant to assign truth-values to sentences containing them). The argument 
might also be given with the help of notions such as Meaning or information 
value.
13 See 'On Sense and Reference' in Frege 1952, 57, 62; and also 'Function and 
Concept' in op. cit., 29. What follows is not intended as an exegesis of the 
passages where Frege puts forward his argument, but as a certain reconstruction 
of it, a reconstruction I take to be relevant for our discussion in the present 
essay. I have been particularly influenced by the sort of representation of 
Frege's argument one may find in Nathan Salmon's book 1986; I discuss Salmon's 
criticism of the argument in the next Chapter.
1* One might also attribute to Frege a different argument towards the same 
conclusion, an argument based on the existence in the language of empty Proper 
Names. Roughly, if the semantic significance of a Name is its referent - or 
consists in its standing for a certain object - then empty Names have no
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be reduced to its reference, or to its having the reference that it has. Then any 
two Proper Names a and b which are co-referential with respect to given 
contexts of use would be necessarily assigned the same semantic significance. 
Now take the rather plausible principle according to which the semantic 
significance of a sentence depends on the semantic significance of its component 
words and on the way they are put together in the sentence; call this Principle 
(S). Clearly, the conjunction of principle (S) with the above premisses entails 
the following result: any two sentences pSl and [S9] - having (respectively) the 
forms [...a..."I and [~...b...~|, where fS^ is thus obtained from fS"| by replacing 
one or more occurrences of a constituent Name a by a co-referential Name b - 
would be alike in semantic significance.
On the other hand, one might also assume that if a pair of declarative 
sentences have exactly the same semantic significance, then they will have 
exactly the same information content, i.e. the information contained in any of 
them will coincide with the information contained in the other (with respect to 
given contexts of use). Indeed, it is natural to think of declarative sentences 
as containing or expressing certain pieces of information, where such information 
is typically information about the world. And it is plausible to take the
semantic significance; and hence (assuming compositionality) every extensional 
sentences containing them lack semantic significance either, which is intended 
as a rather implausible conclusion. I will not consider such a line of reasoning 
here; and, in general, I will not take up the issue of empty Proper Names in the 
present essay. Taken as applying only to syntactically complex Names like 
definite descriptions (or, better, to descriptions considered in their 
attributive uses), the argument is surely convincing, in the sense that the 
above sort of result could hardly be made plausible. Yet, if one considers the 
case of syntactically simple singular terms - such as empty names (e.g. 
'Vulcan') and empty demonstratives (e.g. 'that' used in a context where the 
agent points to something which she just hallucinates) - then there are respect- 
able views on which that result is taken (with some qualifications) as 
plausible; indeed, both (certain brands of) Millianism and (certain brands of) 
neo-Fregeanism endorse - on different grounds - the claim that utterances of 
sentences containing such singular terms have no semantic content, and fail to 
express a proposition or a thought (with respect to a context of use).
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information content of any given sentence (relative to a given context of use) 
as being a function of the semantic significance which is in general assigned to 
the sentence; that is to say, any difference in information content between a 
pair of declarative sentences should be regarded as entailing some difference 
In semantic significance between the sentences in question.
One would then obtain, by means of the seemingly plausible assumptions 
stated above, the following as a consequence of the reductio hypothesis: our 
sentences f"S"| and fS"] - i.e. ["  a I and f ^  T» where a and b are co- 
referential Names - have precisely the same information content. Now apparent 
counter-examples to such a consequence are readily available. And the pattern 
under which these counter-examples fall might be described as follows. One 
introduces cases in which fS~| and pS*] clearly differ in information content; 
and the reason is that there will be some property F such that the information 
content of fS~] (whatever it might be) differs from the information content of 
fS'1 (whatever it might be), with respect to F. There are a number of choices 
of F which might be used in order to obtain the desired counter-instances. I 
select the following three as those which Frege had mainly in mind 15 : (I)- the 
information contents in question might differ with respect to informativeness, i.e. 
to the property a given information content may have of being informative (to 
a given subject and at a given time); (ii)- they might differ with respect to 
epistemic modal status, i.e. to properties such as being knowable a priori and 
being knowable a posteriori; and (iii)- they might differ with respect to 
cognitive value, in the sense that it might be possible for some reflective 
subject who understands both fS"] and [S'~| to give (at a given time) her 
sincere assent to an utterance of [S~], accepting (or believing) thus the 
Information content of fS~|, while sincerely dissenting (at that time) from an
15 See, for instance, Frege 1979, 255.
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utterance of ["S*], rejecting (or not believing) thus the Information content of 
[S'~\, One might group eplstemlc properties of the above kind under a single 
label and say that If a pair of information contents differ with respect to any 
of them, then they will differ in Cognitive Significance. It is important to note 
that cognitive significance is primarily a property attached to pieces of 
information, a property which is related to the role pieces of information play 
in our mental lives and in our behaviour, especially to our prepositional 
attitudes towards such pieces of information and their causal powers; though one 
could also think of cognitive significance as a property of declarative sentences, 
in the derivative sense of being a property which is passed on to them by the 
pieces of information they contain (with respect to given contexts of use).
2.2 Let us illustrate the foregoing remarks by instantiating our Proper Names 
a and b to 'Peter of Spain' and 'the Portuguese Pope' (respectively), and our 
sentences fS] and fS"] to
(1) Peter of Spain was Portuguese
(2) The Portuguese Pope was Portuguese
(respectively). There seems to be no plausible way in which one could consider 
such (true) sentences - or utterances of tokens of them in given contexts - as 
conveying the same piece of information. To begin with, it is easy to imagine a 
situation in which a speaker who fully understands (1) and (2) would assent at 
once to (an utterance of) (2), on the basis of Its tautological character, while 
dissenting from (an utterance of) (1), perhaps by regarding it as sort of self- 
contradiction; thus, the pieces of information contained in (1) and (2) differ in 
cognitive value. Secondly, assuming that there Is a unique Portuguese Pope, the 
information contained in (2) is trivially true or true solely in virtue of its 
logical structure; and a simple Inspection of the concepts involved and their
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mode of articulation would be enough to recognize such information as true. In 
other words, It is the sort of information which is knowable a prior/. By 
contrast, In order to recognize the information contained in (1) as true we 
surely need more than a mere grasp of its logical form and its component 
concepts (for one thing it seems to be false information or misinformation): we 
also need a certain amount of empirical knowledge. In other words, it is the sort 
of information which is knowable only a posteriori; thus, the pieces of 
information contained in (1) and (2) also differ in epistemic modal value. Finally, 
by being told that (1) is true, or by acquiring the information that Peter of 
Spain was Portuguese, one might come to learn something one did not know 
before, a piece of knowledge one could never acquire from sentence (2). (2) is 
uninformative: it clearly lacks the potential informative power that (1) 
undoubtedly possesses; thus, the pieces of information contained in (1) and (2) 
differ in Informativeness as well.
The above kind of case might be regarded as uncontroversial. Indeed, it 
turns on syntactically complex Proper Names, viz. a description ('the Portuguese 
Pope') and what one might perhaps take to be a quasi-descriptlon ('Peter of 
Spain'). And the (different) information they contribute can be directly extracted 
from the structure they display: while the latter Name contains information 
(which happens to be misleading) about a man whose first name was 'Peter* and 
who apparently was born in Spain, the former represents that man as having 
been the one and only Pope of Portuguese citizenship. Now on any reasonable 
semantic account of extensional sentences, including a Millian account, singular 
terms of such a sort would not be counted as having the same information value 
(i.e. as having the same contribution to information content), and hence they 
would not be counted as having the same semantic significance. Thus, the 
Fregean argument, or at least its conclusion that semantic significance cannot
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be assimilated to reference, appears to be beyond dispute when taken as an 
argument about syntactically complex singular terms.
2.3 Let us then consider a more interesting - in the sense of potentially 
controversial - sort of case, a case involving only syntactically simple Proper 
Names^. Let a and b be (respectively) 'Alvaro Campos' and 'Fernando Pessoa', 
and [S~\ and fS*] be (respectively) the (true) sentences
(3) Alvaro Campos wrote Ode Marftima
(4) Fernando Pessoa wrote Ode Maritime^.
And let us enter Mdrio de Sa Carneiro, a colleague of Fernando Pessoa at a firm 
in Lisbon, where they both work as accountants in the Early Twenties. Carneiro 
is a great admirer of Pessoa the poet and has read almost all his books. 
Carneiro also knows everything about Alvaro Campos's life and literary works, 
and he is specially enthusiastic about his well-known poem Ode Marftima. Besides 
being (obviously) acquainted with Pessoa, it turns out that Carneiro is even 
(perceptually) acquainted with Campos! For it happened once that Campos - that 
is to say, Pessoa disguised as Campos, a poet-engineer living in Tavira - was 
introduced to him at A Brasileira, a famous Cafe in Lisbon attended mainly by 
poets, accountants and poet-accountants. Naturally, although he knows both who 
the referent of 'Fernando Pessoa' is and who the referent of 'Alvaro Campos' is,
Maybe one should rather say logically simple Proper Names; for there might be 
a sense in which e.g. the personal names mentioned below would be taken as being 
syntactically complex. The case discussed is, of course, a variation on Frege's 
'Hesperus'/'Phosphorus' example.
" It is (perhaps) worth saying that, as^a matter of fact, Fernando Pessoa wrote 
the poem Ode Maritima under the name 'Alvaro Campos', so that (3) and (4) are 
indeed true. The rest of the ensuing story is largely fiction. Mario de Sa 
Carneiro was actually a poet and a friend of Pessoa, and he was fully aware that 
Pessoa and Campos were one and the same person (besides, Pessoa did not make any 
efforts to conceal such an identity); on the other hand, it is indeed true that 
Pessoa had a job as an accountant (or something of the sort).
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what Carneiro is ignorant of is that Campos is in fact his colleague Pessoa; 
hence, for instance, he would not be able to draw an inference on that basis 
from (3), which he knows to be true, to (4).
Now results which parallel those we have obtained with respect to complex 
singular terms seem to be forthcoming with respect to ordinary names (and 
other simple Proper Names). Thus, take utterances of tokens of (3) and (4) - or, 
better, of the Portuguese counterparts of (3) and (4) - made by a certain 
customer of A Brasileira in the course of a conversation with Carneiro. Given the 
above sort of circumstance, it is clear that Carneiro - a sophisticated speaker 
of Portuguese who fully understands (the Portuguese versions of) (3) and (4) 
and is fully competent in using the names involved - would promptly assent to 
the uttered token of (3); yet, it is also clear that he would vehemently dissent 
from the uttered token of (4). Of course, what Carneiro is here assenting to, and 
dissenting from, are not sentence-tokens taken as purely syntactic objects (e.g. 
as having a certain spelling or a certain number of words and letters), but 
sentence-tokens taken as conveying certain pieces of information (pieces of 
information which, in the light of our story, he fully grasps). Accordingly, on 
the one hand, one should say that Carneiro assents to the uttered token of (3) 
in the sense that he accepts (takes as correct) the information contained in (3), 
or simply that he believes that Alvaro Campos wrote Ode Marftima; and, on the 
other, one should also say that Carneiro dissents from the uttered token of (4) 
in the sense that he rejects (takes as misinformation) the information contained 
in (4), or simply that he does not believe that Fernando Pessoa wrote Ode 
Maritima. Hence, the pieces of information conveyed by (3) and (4) (with respect 
to the given contexts of use) may clearly differ in cognitive value. Furthermore, 
the result would be forthcoming that such pieces of information may also differ 
in informativeness (relative to some subject, e.g. Carneiro). Thus, whereas the
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information that Campos wrote Ode Marftima is uninformative to Carneiro (in the 
envisaged context), in the sense that it is already part of Carneiro's knowledge 
at the time, the information that Pessoa wrote Ode Marftima would be highly 
informative to him (in the context), in the sense that its acquisition would 
constitute a genuine extension of Carneiro's knowledge at the time; and one 
could imagine such an acquisition as being carried out as follows: after uttering 
(4), and after Carneiro's vehement disagreement, the mentioned customer of A 
Brasileira goes on to supply Carneiro with adequate evidence for the truth of 
the information contained in (4), so that Carneiro eventually accepts this. 
Carneiro's coming to believe and to know (in that way or other) that Pessoa 
wrote the poem in question would typically bring about significant changes in 
his mental life - i.e. in a certain network of doxastic and epistemlc states - and 
thus in his behaviour; and such changes would be left unexplained if one were 
to assume that (3) and (4) express precisely the same piece of information (with 
respect to the given contexts of use).
One is then apparently entitled to draw the conclusion that the information 
contents of sentences such as (3) and (4) should be taken as being distinct from 
one another; since they may differ in cognitive significance (in any of the above 
respects)^. Therefore, the sentences in question should be seen as differing 
in semantic significance. But, given that it is reasonable to take semantic 
significance as being governed by some such compositionality principle as (S), 
such a result is clearly inconsistent with the thesis that the semantic 
significance of any logically simple Proper Names - like the ordinary names 
occurring in (3) and (4) - is completely exhausted by their reference (or by
* 8 On the other hand, they do not diverge with respect to the sort of properties 
listed under (ii) above, for it seems plausible to say that they are both pieces 
of information which are knowable only a posteriori; this shows that such an 
aspect of cognitive significance should be separated from aspects (i) and (iii).
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their standing for certain objects). So, given the apparent plausibility of the 
above result, one concludes that it is this thesis which should be rejected as 
implausible.
2.4 Finally, I would like to emphasise the following two features of the 
Fregean argument we have just outlined.
First, contrary to the impression one gets from certain representations of 
it, the argument is not to be taken as being restricted to identity sentences - 
i.e. pairs of sentences fa=al anc* fa=^l» wnere a ar>d b are co-referential Names 
- and to pieces of information expressed by utterances of them in certain 
contexts of use; the examples we have used, all of them involving singular 
sentences (i.e. sentences of the subject-predicate form), are already evidence 
that there is no such a restriction. Although identity sentences undoubtedly 
have some intrinsic interest (I shall deal with them in the next Section), they 
only form a particular subset of the sort of sentences on which the argument 
turns. These are atomic sentences, i.e. any sentences of the form |"*B (tj,...,tn )"|; 
or, to be accurate, they are extensional sentences in general, for the Fregean 
argument can also be made to apply to molecular sentences: just consider pairs 
of sentences such as 'If Alvaro Campos wrote Ode Marftima then Alvaro Campos 
wrote Ode Marftima3 and 'If Alvaro Campos wrote Ode Marftima then Fernando 
Pessoa wrote Ode Marftima1 , or as 'Every logician who admires Ruth Barcan 
admires Ruth Barcan' and 'Every logician who admires Ruth Barcan admires Ruth 
Marcus'.
Second, and also contrary to the impression one gets from some 
representations of it, the argument is not to be taken as being restricted to 
true sentences either; though such a restriction surely holds for the special 
case of (certain pairs of) Identity sentences, in virtue of the requirement that
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the Names used be co-referential. Indeed, take the following pair of faJse 
sentences
(1)' Peter of Spain was Spanish
(2)' The Portuguese Pope was Spanish.
Clearly, an utterance of (1)' might be informative to someone, In the sense that 
it might convey interesting misinformation to her; whereas an utterance of (2)' 
is bound to be uninformative1', in the sense that it would convey uninteresting 
misinformation (misinformation a competent speaker could read off from the 
structure of the sentence). Moreover, an articulate and reflective subject might 
find herself in a position to have the false belief that Peter of Spain was 
Spanish, or to wonder whether Peter of Spain was Spanish, while not having at 
all the false belief that the Portuguese Pope was Spanish, or not wondering at 
all whether the Portuguese Pope was Spanish. (And similar remarks could be 
made with respect to certain pairs of false sentences containing only syntacti- 
cally simple singular terms).
Assuming, as we have been doing, that the description is proper.
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SECTION 3 - THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
I focus now my attention on three different aspects under which the 
general problem of cognitive significance might be seen, and I discuss their 
place in the philosophy of singular reference. In particular, some attention is 
devoted to the problem of cognitively significant identities.
3.1 Confining ourselves to syntactically simple singular terms a and b (i.e. to 
the controversial case), the general problem which is generated by the Fregean 
argument, and which I shall label the Problem of Cognitive Significance, may be 
formulated as follows. How can pairs of extensional sentences fS"| and fS'"| of 
the kind discussed - viz. [...a...] and f...b...] (where a and b are co-referential) 
- contain pieces of information which differ in cognitive significance? And from 
the proposed instances of cognitive significance one would get the following 
special cases of the problem. First, how can |~S] and fS*~] contain pieces of 
information which differ in informative value? I shall call this the Problem of 
Informativeness. Secondly, how can fS~| and fS*~| contain pieces of information 
which differ in epistemic modal value? I shall call this the Problem of Epistemic 
ModaJ Value. Finally, how can |~S~| and ["S 1"] contain pieces of information which 
differ in cognitive value? I shall call this the Problem of Cognitive Value. One 
should note that the latter problem is closely related to a problem with which 
I shall be especially concerned in this essay, and which is roughly this. How is 
it that a subject might come to believe (judge, suspect, hope, etc.) that ...a... 
(at a certain time), while not believing (judging, suspecting, hoping, etc.) that 
...b... (at the same time)? In other words, why is it that, prima fade, one is not 
in general allowed to interchange salva veritate co-referential (syntactically 
simple) singular terms a and b within the 'that'-clauses In prepositional-attitude
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ascriptions? I shall call this the Problem of Substitutivity.
Differences in cognitive significance of the above kinds are to be taken 
as basic facts about our use of language, facts we would be able to state on the 
basis of our pre-theoretical intuitions as competent language-users. Hence, a 
condition of adequacy one should impose on any semantic account of singular 
reference is that it should in some way or other accommodate the phenomena in 
question and solve the problem of cognitive significance. And the upshot of the 
Fregean argument is that any possible semantic account whose defining feature 
is given in the thesis that all there is to the semantic significance of a simple 
(and non-empty) singular term is its reference - or its standing for a certain 
object - should be deemed inadequate; for the simple reason that such a thesis, 
taken in conjunction with certain seemingly sound assumptions, entails results 
which are manifestly incompatible with our intuitions about cognitive signifi- 
cance, viz. the result that it is not possible for the information contents 
expressed by utterances of- sentences fS] and fS'~| of the kind discussed (with 
respect to given contexts of use) to differ in cognitive significance since they 
are one and the same piece of information (with respect to the contexts in 
question).
3.2 In spite of this, accounts of singular reference have been recently 
advanced by a number of philosophers of language20 which are grounded on 
some such idea as the one which seems to be undermined by the Fregean 
argument. And one is even caught up by the impression that such accounts, 
which one might call directly referential accounts, represent in these days the 
predominant view in the philosophy of singular reference. Thus, In the case of
^ I shall give the relevant references, as well as a more precise formulation 
of the defining thesis of the directly referential approach, in the next 
Section.
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proper names, the claim has been put forward that the semantic significance of 
a proper name is just the bearer of the name (relative to a context of use). And, 
in the case of indexicals (and demonstratives), the weaker claim has been put 
forward that an important part of the semantic significance of a (syntactically 
simple) indexical expression - namely that part which is given In the role played 
by the indexical in fixing the information content of a sentence containing it 
(relative to a context of use) - consists merely in the object referred to by the 
indexical (in the context). Of course, the relative weakness of the latter claim 
is due to the fact that indexicals are in general acknowledged to have linguistic 
meanings, I.e. their use is seen as being governed by certain conventional rules 
by means of which they are assigned a reference from given contexts of use.
As a result, it is no surprise that the Fregean argument, or rather that 
version of it which concerns simple singular terms, has been challenged by 
proponents of the directly referential approach. And a wide variety of 
argumentative strategies h.ave been devised to the effect. Without aiming at 
completeness, let me mention briefly three possible lines of attack on the 
Fregean argument; it is worth noticing that all of them have to do with the 
issue of what sort of connection, if any, should obtain between the notions of 
cognitive significance and information content.
A first possible line of attack might be described as follows. One should 
reject as unsound one of the crucial premisses in the Fregean argument, viz. 
the assumption that cognitive significance is a property which is to be in the 
first place ascribed to propositional or informational contents. Consequently, one 
would thereby be able to reject the claim that the pieces of Information 
contained in sentences fS"| and pS'~| of the envisaged sort differ from one 
another in virtue of their (possibly) differing in cognitive significance; for, it 
is alleged, it would be wrong - or it would not make sense - to say that they
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so differ. According to such a line of criticism21 , the main reason one has for 
giving up the above assumption (and hence the above claim) is that cognitive 
significance should be treated as a notion which belongs to the pre-semantics, 
and not to the semantics, of singular reference. Accordingly, it would not be 
part of the job of the semanticist to explain possible differences in 
Informativeness, or in cognitive value, between (utterances of) pairs of 
extenslonal sentences f"S"] and fS*] built up in the same way from co-referential 
(and syntactically simple) singular terms. The phenomena of cognitive signifi- 
cance are indeed to be accounted for, but not on the basis of the semantic 
machinery of a theory of reference. To take a particular version of the view in 
question, it Is claimed that some light might be thrown upon such phenomena 
(perhaps in a Wittgensteinian way) on the basis of a broader philosophical 
description of a certain network of social conventions and rules which constitute 
the general background against which the relevant aspects of our use of 
language take place. (Notice that under this sort of criticism the other crucial 
premiss in the Fregean argument - viz. the claim that informational content is 
in general a function of semantic significance - might still be preserved.)
Let me now introduce a second possible line of attack on the Fregean 
argument. According to it, one should reject the Fregean assumption that 
cognitive significance Is basically a feature of informational contents. Yet, one 
should do it on grounds which are substantially different from the ones 
appealed to above. And the right sort of grounds are (roughly) as follows22. 
Cognitive significance is indeed to be treated as a purely semantic (and not as 
a pre-semantic) property of utterances; and hence the associated problems are
^ This is the sort of strategy followed in Wettstein 1986. See also Taschek 
1987.
^ See, for instance, John Perry's paper 1988.
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indeed to be dealt with by means of the strictly semantic apparatus of a theory 
of reference. Still, it is not at the particular semantic level of prepositional 
content, or at the level of reference, that one should locate such a property; it 
should be located elsewhere. On such a view, it is normally assumed that the 
conceptual apparatus of a directly referential account of singular reference 
contains notions which may be put to use with a view to providing us with an 
adequate solution to the problems involving cognitive significance; in fact, and 
especially in the case of indexicais, attempts have been made to employ certain 
semantic notions - e.g. the notion of character - for such a purpose. (Notice 
that under this sort of criticism the Fregean premiss connecting semantic 
significance with information content would presumably be rejected.)
Finally, let me outline a third possible line of attack on the Fregean 
argument. The claim has been advanced 23 that, although the premiss that 
cognitive significance is primarily a property of information contents is to be 
taken as sound, what one.should rather reject is the (seemingly intuitively 
sound) additional claim that utterances of sentences fS~| and fSf "| of the 
envisaged kind (in given contexts of use) convey pieces of information which 
may differ from one another in cognitive significance; hence, the result would 
be blocked that such pieces of information are to be counted as distinct. Thus, 
for instance, the information contents expressed by utterances of (3) and (4) (in 
the envisaged contexts of use) should be regarded - contrary to what one would 
be intuitively inclined to think - as not differing at all in informativeness or in 
cognitive value; despite appearances to the contrary, such pieces of information 
are actually both uninformative (to our subject Carneiro at the time), and if one 
of them is believed, judged, etc. by someone (e.g. by Carneiro) then this is also 
necessarily true of the other. Of course, such an approach must then offer a
See Salmon 1986, especially Chapter 6.
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satisfactory explanation of why we have the strong intuitions (to the contrary) 
that we in fact have, and why such intuitions are not reliable; and it is claimed 
that it is on a pragmatic basis that the intuitions in question are to be 
explained away. (Notice that on this sort of view the Fregean premiss connecting 
semantic significance with information content would be accepted.)
3.3 A substantial part of the present essay will be devoted to an assessment 
of the soundness of the anti-Fregean approaches to cognitive significance - 
taken in its connection with singular reference - we have just delineated. The 
upshot of my discussion is to the effect that the lines of counter-argumentation 
adduced are far from providing us with good, solid or conclusive reasons to 
reject the Fregean argument; and I come to the conclusion that the distinct 
strategies proposed to tackle the problems involving cognitive significance 
should be rated as unsuccessful (for different sorts of reason, of course).
I focus my attention, mainly on what has been referred to above as the 
second and the third lines of attack on the Fregean argument. The reason is 
twofold. On the one hand, as far as I know, a sufficiently developed conception 
of cognitive significance along the pre-semantic lines alluded to in the first line 
of attack does not seem to be available for examination. On the other hand, and 
more important, I am inclined to assume from the outset that cognitive 
significance must at least be a matter of semantics (assuming thus that semantics 
is concerned, not only with the relationship between language and reality, but 
also with the relationship between language and people and their minds); so I 
am inclined to exclude from our consideration any views on which it Is not part 
of semantics to explain apparent differences In cognitive significance of the kind 
discussed.
In Chapter II, I take up the third anti-Fregean strategy mentioned above
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In connection with the semantics of ordinary proper names. And I discuss there, 
and also In Chapter III, certain aspects of the second anti-Fregean strategy in 
connection with the semantics of demonstrative and indexical expressions. I try 
to show that adequate and intuitively acceptable solutions to the problems of 
Informativeness and Cognitive Value (and, in particular, to the problem of 
Substitutivity) are not available In the light of either of those directly 
referential approaches.
3.4 Frege's main rationale for introducing a notion of Sinn for Proper Names, 
on top of his notion of Bedeutung, is undoubtedly that of accounting for the 
cognitive significance of a broad class of utterances of extensional sentences 
containing them. From a semantic viewpoint one might thus regard singular 
senses as being certain theoretical entities which are posited inter alia with a 
view to explaining possible differences in informativeness, or In cognitive value, 
or in epistemic modal value, between (the contents of) utterances of pairs of 
extensional sentences of the envisaged sort in given contexts of use.
Hence, in general, one might say that utterances u and u 1 of sentences 
fS~| and pS 1"] - i.e. f...a...~] and f...b..."| (where a and b are co-referential 
Proper Names) - in contexts c and c' may differ in cognitive significance - with 
respect to a given speaker x - because they may express different complete 
senses or Fregean thoughts in c and c'; and u and u' may express different 
thoughts because such thoughts may involve different singular senses: the 
speaker x may employ in thought distinct modes of presentation, or distinct 
ways of thinking, of the object referred to by the Names a and b (in c and c1 ). 
A Fregean thought might be regarded as playing a double role, or as arising out 
of a fusion of two kinds of content. On the one side, It Is an informational 
content, in the sense of being a guide to reality: Fregean thoughts are the
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primary bearers of truth-values; on the other side, It is also a cognitive 
content, In the sense of being a guide to how reality is presented to, or 
cognized by, a thinker: Fregean thoughts are the primary bearers of cognitive 
significance - they are the sort of things to which given thinkers stand in 
certain epistemic or psychological relations.
Potential differences in cognitive significance between sentences fS"| and 
fS'"| of the kind discussed are then to be accounted for in terms of the 
possibility of different singular senses being attached by some speaker to the 
constituent co-referential Names a and b. Frege often characterizes the sense 
of a Proper Name as containing the way of being given (die Art des Geg&ben- 
seins)" of the object which is the reference of the Name. Accordingly, the 
common reference of Proper Names a and b may be given to a speaker from 
disparate cognitive perspectives, or it may be seen by her under different 
aspects, so that she may fail to know of the objects thus presented that they 
are one and the same.
Now the Fregean senses attached to Proper Names may be conventional in 
nature; that is to say, there are cases in which the same mode of presentation 
of an object is by and large associated with a given Proper Name by the 
overwhelming majority of competent users of the Name. This surely holds with 
respect to most syntactically complex singular terms, e.g. definite descriptions 
such as the one occurring in (2), where the structure of the term provides us 
at once with a conventional way of identifying an object as its reference; but, 
presumably, it also holds with respect to certain ordinary proper names like 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', where the associated modes of presentation of 
Venus are somehow "public", and to certain syntactically simple indexlcals like
** G.Frege, 'On Sense and Reference* in op. cit., 57.
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'yesterday'. However, Fregean singular senses may also be non-conventionaJ in 
nature; that is to say, there are cases concerning which a Fregean account must 
make room for an Intersubjective variation in sense, cases in which different 
senses are thus attached to a given Proper Name by different (and competent) 
users of the Name. Presumably, this holds with respect to most ordinary proper 
names in use, prompting thus Frege's remark to the effect that, as far as 
proper names are concerned, we can hardly be described as strictly speaking 
the same language. And proper names such as the ones occurring in (3) and (4) 
exemplify that category of singular terms which do not have conventional senses 
attached to them. Indeed, a significant divergence is very likely to exist between 
the sense associated by Carneiro with the name 'Fernando Pessoa' - e.g. when 
he hears a token of sentence (4) uttered by the customer of A Braslleira 
mentioned in our story - and the sense associated by the utterer of (4) with the 
name in the same context; according to a certain construal of singular senses 
of the above sort, the distinct modes of presentation of Pessoa in question might 
be thought of as arising out of two different chains of information which happen 
to have the same person, viz. Pessoa, as their source (those chains being formed 
on the basis of certain cognitive transactions, including perceptual ones, with 
Pessoa). And such a distinctness in singular sense could be subsequently used 
to explain differences in cognitive significance, e.g. to explain why an utterance 
of (4) would be informative to Carneiro, but (comparatively) uninformative to his 
friend (with respect to our story). Of course, the Fregean theorist would have 
to offer a plausible account of communication, an account which ought to be 
made compatible with the acknowledged possibility of a variation in singular 
sense from speaker to speaker; for instance, she would have to explain how Is 
it possible that, in spite of the divergent non-conventional senses they attach 
to the name 'Fernando Pessoa', Carneiro and his friend succeed in communicating
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with each other by means of utterances of sentences such as (4) (as it is 
reasonable to assume they do). And sometimes this is thought of as constituting 
a serious objection to a Fregean semantics for ordinary names. Yet, there seems 
to be no reason to think that such an account could not be, in principle, 
given25 ; and in developing such an account one might explore in a fruitful way 
the idea that what successful communication requires are only "public" 
referents, not "public" senses.
However, the foregoing characterization of a Fregean approach to sense 
and cognitive significance might be in a sense misleading. Indeed, one might 
hold the view that it is not strictly necessary for the Fregean semanticist to 
take the notion of thought (and the notion of singular sense) as being 
conceptually prior to the notion of cognitive significance (and to the associated 
notions of informativeness, cognitive value, etc.), or as being the sort of notion 
which comes first in the order of explanation. In effect, nothing would prevent 
the Fregean semanticist from introducing the notions in question simultaneously 
into her account of singular reference and singular thought. The notions of 
thought and cognitive significance would be thus construed as notions which are 
to be explained by reference to one another, as well as by reference to certain 
other notions of which the Fregean theorist might naturally avail herself; and 
any possible charge of (vicious) circularity made against such an account (on 
that basis) would be unwarranted. Hence, in general, one might as well say that 
utterances u and u f of sentences fS"] and fS*] of the envisaged sort in contexts 
c and c' may express different Fregean thoughts in c and c1 - and the 
constituent Names a and b may express different singular senses in c and c 1 - 
because u and u f may differ in cognitive significance with respect to some
^ See, for instance, the account outlined by Graeme Forbes for the case of 
indexical senses in his article 1989b (especially 468-70).
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speaker who understands both fS"] and [3*]. Nevertheless, there is a sense In 
which the sort of formulation we have employed above may be regarded as 
Innocuous and as being perfectly acceptable. And that Is the sense in which one 
might see the notion of cognitive significance as being intuitively prior to the 
notion of a Fregean thought, or as the sort of notion which comes first in the 
order of intuition. In fact, relying merely on our untutored or pre-theoretical 
intuitions as competent language-users, we are indeed able to make a number 
of judgements and verdicts Involving cognitive significance, e.g. Judgements to 
the effect that certain utterances differ in informative value, or in cognitive 
value, with respect to some subject; sometimes intuitions of this sort are the 
only thing on which to rely when discussing certain issues in the semantics of 
singular reference, and so they should be assigned a central place in a Fregean 
account.
3.5 Let me close this Section by giving an outline of Frege's treatment of 
identity sentences as a special case of his general approach to reference and 
cognitive significance.
It is worth pointing out that there is some resemblance between Frege's 
problem in the opening paragraphs of his 'uber Sinn und Bedeutung1 , namely 
how are true and yet informative identity sentences possible, and Kant's problem 
in his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, namely how are synthetic a priori judgements 
possible. Indeed, both problems seem to fall under the same general pattern: the 
existence of a certain class of propositions is given as a matter of fact and the 
philosopher's task is to uncover their conditions of possibility.
The problems involving cognitive significance raised by the particular case 
of identity sentences might be stated as follows. How can utterances u and u* 
of true sentences of the form fa=al and ra=bl in contexts c and c', where c=c',
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contain information contents which may differ in informative value, or In 
cognitive value, or in epistemic modal value (with respect to c and cf and 
relative to a speaker who understands both sentences)?
Naturally, it is assumed that there are indeed such potential differences 
in cognitive significance, and such an assumption is taken as being legitimated 
on the basis of our pre-philosophical intuitions (at least as regards to 
informativeness and cognitive value). And, in the case of identity sentences, the 
intuitions we have to that effect seem to be even stronger. In the first place, 
utterances of sentences of the form fa=a"] are typically uninformative. In 
general, they do not convey pieces of information which one did not possess 
previously. And they seem to play a meagre role in our cognitive lives and 
behaviour: we hardly use them as premisses of useful inferences and we seldom 
act upon them. By contrast, utterances of sentences of the form fa=^l m*y be 
(and often are) informative; they may convey (and often convey) pieces of 
information which one did not possess previously. And they may play a 
significant role in our cognitive lives and behaviour. We often use them as 
premisses of useful inferences; for instance, in our story, if Carneiro comes to 
acquire the information that Pessoa is Campos then he will be able to deduce 
that Pessoa wrote Ode Marftima on the basis of his knowledge that Campos wrote 
Ode Marftima. And we often act upon them: detectives arrest people on the basis 
of certain informative identities involving ordinary proper names or (syntac- 
tically simple) demonstratives; and a single name for Venus - viz. 'Venus' - was 
introduced into our language as a result of the discovery that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus. In the second place, utterances of sentences of the form fa=a~| 
typically convey pieces of information which virtually everyone would agree to, 
or believe; whereas utterances of sentences of the form fa=bl may convey 
pieces of Information which some competent and reflective speaker would
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disagree with, or disbelieve, or simply fall to believe; and the discordant 
psychological attitudes one might take towards the kinds of piece of information 
in question surely have discordant causal powers with respect to our psycho- 
logical and behaviourial economy. In the third place, and In the light of any 
reasonable construal of the epistemic modalities, utterances of sentences of the 
form fa=al typically convey pieces of information which are knowable a priori] 
whereas utterances of sentences of the form [&=&] typically convey pieces of 
Information which are knowable only a posteriori.
One should notice that there are cases in which utterances of sentences 
of the form fa=a~], where we have two token singular terms of the same type 
flanking the identity symbol, may convey pieces of information which are 
genuinely informative (to some subject). Thus, consider the following modification 
of our previous story involving Carneiro and his cognitive transactions with 
Pessoa. Suppose that everything is as before except for the following important 
details. Suppose now that Carneiro is aware of the fact that Pessoa (the poet) 
is Campos, so that the information contents of (3) and (4) would be both 
(relatively) uninformative to him. This time what Carneiro is ignorant of is the 
fact that his colleague Fernando Pessoa is the same person as Fernando Pessoa 
the poet2*; and one might even assume that Carneiro, besides being perceptually 
acquainted with Pessoa the accountant, whom he sees everyday at work, Is also 
perceptually acquainted with Pessoa the poet: he has met him at A Brasilelra, a 
place where he would never dream of coming across his colleague Pessoa. Under 
these circumstances, an utterance of
(5) Fernando Pessoa is Fernando Pessoa 
might convey a piece of information which would be highly informative to
^ Incidentally, the Portuguese term for person is precisely 'Pessoa', so that 
the Portuguese counterpart of this sentence would turn out to be rather bizarre.
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Carneiro: just imagine (5) said by someone In such a way that her intention to 
refer with the first token of 'Fernando Pessoa' to Pessoa the poet and with the 
second to Pessoa the accountant would be made manifest to Carneiro; whereas 
an utterance of
(6) Fernando Pessoa is Alvaro Campos,
where 'Fernando Pessoa' is used with the intention to refer to Pessoa the poet, 
would convey (relatively) uninteresting information to Carneiro. Furthermore, the 
information contents of (5) and (6) in the envisaged contexts of use would 
clearly differ in cognitive value: Carneiro would be disposed to disagree with 
the former, but not with the latter (to which he would promptly agree). Yet, 
they would be alike in epistemic modal value, being both a posterior/ truths.
A general claim one might perhaps establish on the basis of a certain 
development of the above sort of case is this: not every difference in cognitive 
value between a given pair of pieces of information (relative to a given subject) 
is necessarily a difference jn informativeness (relative to the subject in ques- 
tion). If this claim holds then, given our previous result that given differences 
either in informativeness or in cognitive value do not in general entail 
corresponding differences In epistemic modal value, one would be in a position 
to see the three aspects of cognitive significance under consideration as 
involving notions which are not co-extensive; and this might turn out to be 
important for argumentative purposes. Thus, let us introduce to the effect a 
third version of our story about Carneiro, a version which results from the one 
given above simply by dropping from it the assumption that Carneiro is aware 
that Pessoa the poet is Campos (suppose that he is still Ignorant of this). Now 
utterances of (5) and (6) in the sort of contexts described before - where 
'Fernando Pessoa' in (6) is thus used to refer to Pessoa the poet - would both 
convey pieces of information which, in the above circumstances, turn out to be
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informative to Carneiro. Yet, it seems that one might still picture him as possibly 
standing in distinct cognitive relations to those pieces of information. Indeed, 
on the one hand, one might conceive Carneiro as emphatically rejecting the piece 
of information contained in (5), i.e. as disbelieving that Pessoa the poet is his 
colleague Pessoa (or as believing that Pessoa the poet is not Pessoa the 
accountant); but, on the other hand, one might as well conceive him as simply 
entertaining or considering (at the same time) the piece of information contained 
in (6), i.e. as just wondering whether Pessoa the poet might be Campos (after 
all, he knows that they are both poets). Therefore, if this is along the right 
lines then we are given an instance of a difference in cognitive value which is 
not a difference in informativeness.
Again, the Fregean claim is that the preceding sort of data concerning 
cognitively significant identities cannot be accommodated by a conception of 
singular reference whose constitutive feature is given in the thesis that the 
semantic significance of a syntactically simple singular term is just its bearer, 
or consists merely in its having a certain bearer (with respect to a context of 
use). And this is taken by the Fregean theorist as sufficient (if not conclusive) 
evidence that the conception in question is seriously flawed. According to such 
a conception, utterances u and u 1 of true sentences of the form fa=al ar| d 
fa=b~| in contexts c and c' are invariably assigned the same particular informa- 
tion content (with respect to c and c1 ), this being in both cases the uninterest- 
ing and truistic information that a certain object - the referent of a and b - 
is identical to itself27 . Hence, on that view, one would not be even allowed to
I think that it is incorrect to argue against the directly referential view 
on the basis of a description of such an information content as being the 
information that a certain object is self-identical. Indeed - as shown by Salmon 
in his article 'Reflexivity' in N.Salmon and S.Soames (eds.) 1988, 240-74 - the 
monadic property (or the attribute) of x being self-identical is not to be 
confused with the relational property of x being identical to x.
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say that utterances of fa=bl m*y nave information contents which are 
informative, or that they typically convey a posteriori truths. For it would be 
logically Impossible for an utterance of fa=b"| to contain a piece of information 
which might be valuable to someone, or whose acquisition might extend someone's 
knowledge; indeed, such a piece of Information is necessarily uninformative (to 
everyone) and knowable a priori (by everyone). Likewise, the piece of 
information contained in any utterance of [a=b~| is invariably alike in cognitive 
value to the piece of information contained In any utterance of fa=aT» sucn 
pieces of information having thus the same (meagre) cognitive role and causal 
powers.
Now I think that the Fregean claim is essentially correct. I believe that 
the general implausibility and counter-intuitiveness of results of the above sort, 
particularly those relative to the role played by singular pieces of information 
in thought and action, should be in the end regarded as a reductioof a directly 
referential conception of singular reference. Yet, one must admit that rather 
sophisticated and interesting theoretical developments have recently taken place 
on the direct reference side, either with a view to showing that our intuitions 
about cognitive significance can after all be semantically accommodated by, and 
made consistent with, a directly referential view; or with a view to showing that 
such intuitions have essentially pragmatic sources and can (and should) be 
challenged from a strictly semantic standpoint, the data to which they give rise 
being after all pseudo-data which need not be semantically accommodated by, or 
made consistent with, a directly referential account. I think that such 
developments constitute a stimulating challenge to someone who is inclined to 
hold a general view on singular reference which is broadly Fregean in nature; 
and so I start my critical examination of them in the next Chapter.
As to the sort of solution proposed by Frege to his problem about
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cognitively significant Identities, the general idea can be (briefly) sketched as 
follows. Utterances u and u f of true sentences fa=a"] and fa=b"| in contexts c 
and c' (with c=c') may convey pieces of information which differ in cognitive 
significance relative to some speaker (who understands both sentences) because 
the speaker may attach different singular senses to the singular terms a and 
b (with respect to c and c'); that Is to say, she may think of the object 
referred to by these terms under distinct modes of presentation, and hence she 
may entertain in c and c' distinct Fregean thoughts about the object in 
question. This would then give us a principled explanation of potential 
differences in informativeness, or in cognitive value, or in epistemic modal value, 
between the contents of identity sentences built up from co-referential singular 
terms.
Utterances of the form [a=b~| are typically informative because the piece 
of information they typically convey might be represented as being the Fregean 
thought that a certain object as presented under a certain mode is identical to 
itself as presented under a different mode; of course, a subject may not be 
aware that the objects presented to her in such distinct manners are in fact one 
and the same. And the possibility of utterances of sentences of the form fa=a~| 
being informative would be accommodated along the same lines within a Fregean 
framework of singular senses. Thus, an utterance of (5) in the envisaged context 
conveys a piece of information which would be informative to Carneiro because 
if he were to accept it then he would thereby accept a Fregean thought to the 
effect that Pessoa as presented to him under a certain mode is after all identical 
to Pessoa as presented to him under a distinct mode. And a possible way in 
which one might picture such different modes of presentation of Pessoa is as 
consisting in separate "mental files" formed in Carneiro's mind and containing 
distinct sorts of Information (and misinformation) which is causally related to
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Pessoa, information which Carneiro has gathered on the basis of his cognitive 
encounters with Pessoa (as his colleague and as the well-known poet).
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SECTION 4 - MILLIANISM VERSUS FREGEANISM
4.1 In order to assess the directly referential approach to singular reference, 
mainly in terms of its ability to handle the phenomena of cognitive significance, 
one must first have a more precise idea about the nature of such an approach 
and about the nature of the theoretical conflict holding between it and a 
Fregean account of singular reference.
With a view to stating what is normally taken to be the characteristic 
thesis of a direct reference theory, it is convenient to isolate a certain class, 
say M, of singular terms to which the range of application of that thesis is 
restricted and concerning which the dispute between Millianlsm and Fregeanism 
arises. The envisaged class is a proper part of Frege's category of Eigenname 
and it might be (crudely) introduced in the following way. M has as members all 
those (and only those) singular terms which are syntactically simple or 
unstructured. In addition, it; will also be assumed that such singular terms are 
taken in contexts where they occur as used (as opposed to mentioned).
Let tj be an arbitrary singular term in M (e.g. an ordinary proper name, 
or a one-word demonstrative or indexical expression). Then the Direct Reference 
Thesis, (DRT)28 , might be formulated as follows:
(DRT) t is directly referential: the propositional value of t M - i.e. its
** The directly referential approach, as represented in (DRT), has been 
subscribed to by a number of philosophers, e.g. David Kaplan, Joseph Almog, 
Howard Wettstein, Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames. See, for instance: Kaplan 
1988b; Salmon 1986; Soames 1987; Almog 1984; and Wettstein 1986. Furthermore, 
philosophers like Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan seem to be very sympathetic 
to (DET) (though they do not explicitly endorse it); see e.g. Kripke 1979 
(especially Section I) and Donnellan 1990.
^ In Kaplan's terminology, the content of t.; in Salmon's terminology, the 
information value of t^; in Soames's terminology, the semantic content of t-.
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contribution to fixing the proposition expressed by, or the information 
content of, any deciarative sentence containing it (with respect to a 
possible context of use) - Is the referent of tj (in the context).
The reason why (DRT) is not taken as being applicable to syntactically 
complex or mentioned singular terms is obvious. In the first case, it would be 
implausible to equate the prepositional value of e.g. a definite description with 
the object it picks out (if there is such an object). Thus, (attributively used) 
definite descriptions - even when they happen to be proper - are seen as 
contributing something other than their referents to the propositions expressed 
by utterances of sentences in which they may occur. On some directly 
referential accounts, they contribute complexes which are inter alia composed out 
of the properties semantically associated with, or the characteristic functions of, 
the constituent predicates. In some cases, e.g. 'The pupil of Plato', the 
prepositional value of a description may also include an individual (Plato) as a 
component part. But the individual picked out (Aristotle) is never the sole 
contribution of the description to prepositional content; notice that there are 
cases, e.g. 'The grandson of Aristotle's paternal grandfather'(assuming that this 
is a proper description), in which the individual singled out may be part of a 
description's propositional value. In the second case, if occurrences of singular 
terms within quotation marks (or similar devices) were allowed, then the absurd 
consequence would follow from (DRT) that sentences such as "Frege' has two 
vowels' and "Frege' denotes Frege' would respectively express (relative to given 
contexts of use) the singular proposition about the man Frege to the effect that 
he has two vowels and the singular proposition about the man Frege to the 
effect that he denotes himself.
I assume further that, besides being syntactically simple and used, the
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singular terms we shall be dealing with are also non-empty . The exclusion of 
empty terms from our consideration might appear to be ad hoc, indeed, It might 
be regarded as a way of evading a very delicate problem in the philosophy of 
singular reference, viz. the Non-Existence Problem (as one might call it). Grosso 
Modo, this is a problem which is in general posed by any sentences containing 
vacuous singular terms. And It seems to generate particularly serious difficulties 
for a directly referential approach. Thus, take the case of a sentence like 
'Vulcan orbits the Sun' as uttered by a certain astronomer who believed (some 
decades ago) that there is a tenth planet in the solar system, viz. Vulcan. 
According to (DRT), the name 'Vulcan' has no prepositional value; hence, 
assuming a principle of compositionality for propositions, it follows that the 
astronomer's utterance fails to express a proposition, or to have an information 
content (at least, it fails to express a complete proposition, or to have a 
complete information content); and the result that nothing definite would be said 
by means of such an utterance is, prima facie, intuitively implausible. Or take 
the case of a negative existential sentence like 'Vulcan does not exist' as uttered 
nowadays by some competent astronomer. There is a strong intuition to the 
effect that such an utterance is true, and hence to the effect that it must have 
a (complete) content. Yet, in the light of (DRT), the consequence is once more 
forthcoming that no (complete) content is available, for the name 'Vulcan' does 
not refer to anything; hence the astronomer's utterance cannot be counted as 
true (or as false, for that matter).
In general, I shall keep these three assumptions throughout the present essay. 
I shall also suppose that descriptive names in Gareth Evans's sense - i.e. 
syntactically simple names which are introduced into the language by means of 
certain descriptive stipulations (see Evans 1982, 31) - are not included among 
the singular terms with which we will be concerned. On the one hand, it is 
unclear whether (DRT) would apply to them (some proponents of (DRT) would deny 
that it does); on the other, they are unimportant to our subsequent discussion.
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However, It turns out that the Non-Existence Problem also generates 
serious difficulties for a certain (significant) range of neo-Fregean views on 
singular reference. In fact, problems which are similar to the ones sketched 
above with respect to a direct reference theory are very likely to arise with 
respect to those Fregean accounts which are in some way or other based on an 
essentially De Re construal of singular senses, a construal on which the 
existence of a singular mode of presentation depends on the existence of the 
thing (Res) it presents31 . Roughly, if there is no referent then there is no 
singular sense, and if there is no singular sense then there Is no complete 
sense either, i.e. no complete proposition or Fregean thought is available to be 
evaluated in terms of truth or falsity. Hence, results which parallel the 
preceding ones would be forthcoming on such neo-Fregean accounts. Thus, given 
that the Non-Existence Problem is a problem which arises both for Millianism and 
(certain important brands of) Fregeanism, and having in mind our general 
purpose, I will not consider it here.
4.2 Going back to thesis (DRT), it is important to distinguish it from certain 
related theses which have been often regarded as characterizing a directly 
referential semantics for singular terms. Since the doctrines associated with such 
theses have also been taken as falling under the general label "direct reference 
theory", I shall follow Salmon's suggestion 32 and call any theory of singular 
reference whose defining feature is given in (DRT) a "Millian" theory. Of the 
theses In question I single out two - the Non-Descriptivist Thesis, (NOT), and
31 See e.g. John McDowell's article 1984.
3* Salmon 1990, 216, footnote 3. An excellent discussion of the distinct doc- 
trines associated with the directly referential approach is offered by Michael 
Devitt in his recent article 1989, Sections 1 and 2.
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the Rigid Designation Thesis, (RDT) - as being those which are more relevant to 
our immediate concerns; they might be represented as follows:
(NOT) tj is non-connotative: it does not express a purely descriptive sense 
which determines its referent.
(RDT) tj is a rigid designator: it refers to the same object in every 
possible world (or counterfactual situation).
(NOT) is entailed by (DRT), as long as one assumes that the purely 
descriptive senses putatively expressed by singular terms are regarded as being 
entered into propositional content. But the converse entailment does not hold. 
Indeed, one is by no means compelled to face the following sort of dilemma: 
either the propositional value of a singular term tj is a strictly descriptive 
sense, or it is Just the referent of tj. In particular, a neo-Fregean theorist 
might have good reasons .to endorse (NOT) without these being reasons to 
endorse (DRT). For instance, she might introduce singular senses which combine 
the following two features. On the one hand, they determine their referents only 
with the help of certain contextual factors, in the sense that their availability 
is essentially dependent on the availability of certain causal relations holding 
between a thinker and items in her environment; hence they are not purely 
descriptive senses. On the other hand, they are partially descriptive in nature, 
in the sense that their specification is regarded as being adequately given by 
means of certain (conceptually impure, so as to speak) definite descriptions; 
hence they are not purely non-descriptive senses either33. Thus, if such a 
position can be plausibly developed, one is not compelled to face the following
33 This seems to be the sort of neo-Fregean conception of sense which one may 
find in writers such as Christopher Peacocke, especially in connection with 
indexical expressions; see his book 1983, Chapters 5 and 6.
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sort of dilemma either: a singular term tj expresses a sense which is either a 
strictly conceptual or a strictly non-conceptual representation of its referent. 
(NOT) represents the kind of result one might see as having been estab- 
lished by well-known arguments advanced by Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke and 
Keith Donnellan 3* against what they take to be the classical or orthodox 
conception of singular reference (a conception which has been unjustly 
attributed to Frege). In a recent paper35 Donnellan refers to what amounts to 
(NOT) as being the negative aspect of the directly referential approach, and to 
what amounts to (DRT) as being its positive aspect On the classical view, as 
characterized by those philosophers, the purely descriptive sense allegedly 
associated with a given singular term (in the envisaged class) is construed as 
being a purely conceptual and context-independent representation of the term's 
referent; such a representation is thought of as naturally assuming the form of 
a description (or a set of descriptions) - presumably free of indexicals and 
other context-sensitive expressions - which is (are) uniquely satisfied by a 
certain object, this object being then assigned to the term as its referent. Now 
there are reasons to think that such a doctrine has been severely damaged (if 
not conclusively refuted) by the arguments in question, whether one takes it as 
a view about the sort of prepositional values that singular terms are supposed 
to have, or simply as a view about the mechanism of reference involved (i.e. as 
an account of how the reference of a singular term is fixed). Indeed, in the case 
of proper names, it has been shown that in order to use competently a given 
name a speaker needs not possess the kind of identifying knowledge about the 
name's bearer which is required on the classical view. On the one hand, in a
3* See e.g.: H.Putnam, 'The Meaning of 'Meaning' 1 , reprinted in Putnam 1975; 
S.Kripke 1980; and K.Donnellan 1972.
^ Donnellan 1990, 201-2 (Donnellan's discussion is restricted to proper names).
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number of cases such knowledge Is not available at all; on the other, even In 
those cases where such knowledge happens to be available, It might just turn 
out that the embodying descriptions pick out the wrong object as being the 
name's bearer. And persuasive arguments have been mounted, e.g. by Kaplan 3*, 
to show that the classical view Is also implausible as a view about the reference 
of demonstrative and indexlcal expressions.
Now I am inclined to take for granted the sort of negative result 
associated with thesis (NOT) and sketched above; in other words, I am inclined 
to take as correct the so-called negative aspect of the directly referential 
approach. Yet, what follows from this is just that the particular picture of 
singular senses which underlies the classical view is wrong, and not that 
singular terms of the envisaged sort do not have any kind of Fregean senses 
attached to them (with respect to given occasions of use); in particular, it does 
not follow that one ought to embrace the so-called positive aspect of the directly 
referential approach.
As to thesis (RDT), it is also entailed by (DRT). In effect, it can be shown 
that if tj is a directly referential singular term then, given certain relatively 
uncontroversial assumptions, tj rigidly designates its referent . But, again, the 
converse entailment does not hold. One can always rigidify a given definite 
description by prefixing the Actuality operator to it; thus, for instance, one may 
turn the flexible 'The Portuguese Pope' into the rigid 'The actual Portuguese 
Pope'. Now suppose that every proper name is assigned some rigidlfied 
description of the above kind as its sense; and suppose further that such a
35 Kaplan 1988a.
3' See Kaplan 1988b, especially 569-71. Kaplan distinguishes between obstinately 
rigid and non-obstinately rigid designators; (RDT) is formulated in terms of the 
former notion, but the distinction is irrelevant to our concerns.
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description is taken to be the name's prepositional value. Then proper names 
would rigidly refer to their bearers (via the associated descriptions); yet, they 
could not be counted as directly referring to their bearers (in the sense of 
(DRT)). This sort of consideration could also be employed to show that (NOT) is 
not entailed by (RDT) (though some argument could presumably be mounted to 
obtain (RDT) from (NOT)). Indeed, if proper names were subjected to the above 
sort of treatment then they would come out both rigid and connotative (i.e. as 
expressing purely descriptive senses)3*. Needless to say, a neo-Fregean theorist 
could certainly endorse (RDT) and introduce singular senses which rigidly 
present their referents, while obviously rejecting (DRT).
4.3 Let me finish these preliminary remarks by stating what, lacking a better 
designation, I shall call the Indirect Reference Thesis, (IRT). The doctrine 
associated with this thesis might be regarded as constituting the neo-Fregean 
alternative to the Millian doctrine represented by (DRT)39 ; thus, I shall call any 
account of singular reference whose defining feature is given in (IRT) a 
"Fregean" account. Let tj be any singular term in M; then (IRT) might be 
formulated as follows:
(IRT) tj is indirectly referential: the prepositional value of t^ - I.e. its 
contribution to fixing the proposition expressed by, or the information 
content of, any declarative containing it (with respect to a possible 
context of use) - necessarily includes some mode of presentation of the
3' In order to get this result one would have to assume that, pace David Lewis, 
the Actuality operator is not a context-sensitive expression.
^ Of course, I do not mean to imply that a rejection of (DRT) would be eo ipso 
a vindication of (IRT), i.e. that the latter doctrine should be seen as the only 
alternative to the former doctrine.
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object referred to by tj (In the context).
Notice that, strictly speaking, (IRT) does not amount to the negation of 
(DRT). Of course, If (IRT) were true then (DRT) would be false; and so they are 
Inconsistent claims. But they might both be false. Indeed, if (IRT) were false 
then it would not follow that (DRT) would come out true; for there would always 
be room for an account of a singular term's propositional value which, though 
rejecting the conflation of propositional value and reference, would invoke some 
theoretical construction other than singular modes of presentation.
In formulating (IRT) I have deliberately left open the following two 
questions. First, how are the singular modes of presentation supposedly 
associated with singular terms of the envisaged kind to be conceived? Second, 
what exactly is contributed by such singular terms to propositional content?
As to the latter Issue, (IRT) makes room for at least two positions 
concerning the sort of propositional value which is to be assigned to a singular 
term t^: it might be thought of as being exhausted by a mode of presentation 
of the referent of tj (and this would be the standard Fregean view); or it might 
be thought of as being something like an ordered pair consisting of the referent 
of ^ itself and some mode of presentation of it. Concerning the former Issue, 
(IRT) naturally allows for a number of choices, either actually available or 
merely possible, about the specific nature of singular senses. However, there are 
two basic constraints that one should impose upon the general notion of a 
singular mode of presentation. The first relates to the role of singular senses 
as reference-determiners; accordingly, the notion of a singular mode of 




(D) Necessarily, if m is a mode of presentation of object o and of object 
o' then 0=0'.
In other words, it is impossible for the same singular sense to present distinct 
objects. The second constraint relates to the sort of connection holding between 
the notion of a singular mode of presentation and the notion of cognitive value 
(as Introduced before); it might be given by means of the following kind of 
principle . 
(F) Necessarily, if a rational subject x believes an object o to be F at a 
time t and x disbelieves o to be F at t, then there are modes of 
presentation m and m' of o such that m*m' and x believes o to be F at t 
under m and x disbelieves o to be F at t under m'.
® Stephen Schiffer calls this principle Frege's Constraint} see Schiffer 1978, 
180. Instead of belief and disbelief, other pairs of conflicting propositional 






DIRECT REFERENCE AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
INTRODUCTION
The central issue I discuss in this Chapter is the issue about the potential 
cognitive significance which our use of sentences containing syntactically simple 
singular terms apparently has. I examine two current mutually conflicting sorts 
of approach to the semantics of singular terms in connection with the problem 
of cognitive significance: the Millian view and the Fregean view. And I consider 
several interesting developments which have been lately carried out by Millian 
theorists with a view to coping with the phenomena of cognitive significance. 
The result of my assessment of such developments is essentially negative in that 
they should be counted as being, in general, unsound; on the other hand, a 
neo-Fregean approach seems to contain the sort of theoretical ingredients which 
I take to be necessary for a satisfactory account of singular reference and 
cognitive significance.
In Section 1, I consider certain versions of a Millian approach to the 
Informativeness problem in connection with ordinary proper names. I discuss 
Nathan Salmon's ingenious (alleged) refutation of Frege's Puzzle and his general 
policy of explaining away differences in informative value on pragmatic grounds; 
the general upshot is that Millianism does not yield an adequate answer to the 
issue about informativeness. In Section 2, I consider certain versions of a Millian 
approach to the problems of Cognitive Value and Substitutivity in connection 
with proper names, particularly Salmon's analysis of belief-reports in terms of 
his notion of a guise. I argue that Millianism about attitude-reports should be 
rejected on the grounds that it is manifestly incompatible with some of our basic 
pre-theoretical intuitions, these intuitions being perfectly sound; but, on the 
other hand, I also reject a claim made on the neo-Fregean side to the effect that 
Millianism should be seen as a mere terminological variant of a neo-Fregean
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account on the grounds that it is bound to invoke sense-like entities. The 
remainder of the Chapter Is devoted to the topic of Indexicality in relation to 
the problem of cognitive significance. I undertake a critical examination of what 
I call the Mi/lian Notational Variance Claim-, this is the claim that those versions 
of a neo-Fregean semantics for demonstratives and other Indexicals which rest 
upon the notion of a De Re sense are eventually notational variants of a directly 
referential conception of indexicality. In Section 3, I begin with some brief 
considerations about the structure of notational variance arguments proposed by 
theorists on both sides of the dispute; then I spell out certain lines of 
reasoning that might be pursued by the Millian theorist with a view to 
establishing the Millian Notational Variance Claim. In Section 4, I try to show 
that such lines of reasoning are inconclusive, and hence that the Millian claim 
is in general unsound. The problem of cognitive significance is tackled in 
connection with those categories of indexicals concerning which neo-Fregeanism 
and Millianism are alleged tayield similar results, viz. temporal indexicals, spatial 
indexicals, and perceptual demonstratives; and I argue towards the conclusion 
that the notions the Millian theorist might invoke to accommodate the phenomena 
of cognitive significance in this area of indexicality are hardly adequate to the 
effect.
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SECTION 1 - NAMING AND INFORMATIVENESS
In this Section I would like to address the following two (closely related) 
questions. First, how does a directly referential approach to the semantics of 
proper names fare with respect to the Informativeness Problem? And what should 
one say about current claims to the effect that such a problem is Indeed 
soluble' within the framework of a direct reference theory? Secondly, how is 
one to assess certain arguments recently adduced by some Mlllian philosophers 
towards the conclusion that the Fregean argument introduced in Chapter I - or, 
better, a form of it confined to ordinary proper names and to the property of 
informativeness - should be deemed unsound?
1.1 Nathan Salmon's provocative book Frege's Puzzl£ contains a powerful 
attack against a classical argument to the effect that the propositional value of 
a syntactically simple and used singular term cannot be equated with the object 
referred to by the term. The argument criticized by Salmon, and labelled by him 
"Frege's Puzzle", is basically a variation on the sort of Fregean argument about 
cognitive significance discussed in the preceding Chapter, though it depends on 
fewer premisses and is thus potentially more effective. The conclusion of the 
argument is strictly inconsistent with thesis (DRT). Therefore, if Frege's Puzzle 
is sound, then (DRT) is false and Millianism is wrong; and, given the nature of 
the premisses employed, Frege's Puzzle might be seen as indirectly supporting 
thesis (IRT) and hence a Fregean approach. On the other hand, If Salmon's
* I count certain Millian attempts to show that the problem is non-existent - 
i.e. that there are no relevant differences in informative value of the kind 




counter-arguments are sound, then what is commonly viewed as one of the most 
serious objections to Millianism would be discarded, and the way would be paved 
for taking (DRT) as the right sort of basis for an account of singular reference. 
It is therefore of importance to assess in some detail the soundness of 
Salmon's alleged dissolution of Frege's Puzzle and, by implication, the tenability 
of the Millian strategy adopted to tackle the Informativeness Problem. The reason 
why I have picked out Salmon's approach in particular is that it is perhaps the 
most comprehensively developed and cogently argued genuinely Millian account 
of cognitive significance currently available. I begin by displaying the structure 
of Frege's Puzzle (as represented by Salmon); then I consider his counter- 
arguments and discuss what I take to be their fundamental flaws.
For convenience, let us once more confine ourselves to sentences of the 
form (" '(tj,...,^"!, where  " is an n-ary simple predicate and each t^ a singular 
term of the envisaged kind. Concerning the semantics for such sentences, there 
are a number of theoretical, principles which Salmon takes for granted and also 
regards as being in general accepted by his Fregean opponents*; the following 
selection Is sufficient for our purposes:
(P1) The information content of a sentence [" "(tp'J, with respect to a 
context of use c, is an Intensional entity called a proposition; the 
reference of [" '(tj)"], Ref[4R(tj)], in c is a truth-value. 
(P2) The proposition expressed by f"**(tj)~| in c is composed out of the 
information value of the predicate *B , Inf[*"], in c and the Information 
value of each term tj, Inf[tj], in c4; and the mode of composition is that
3 Cf. Salmon 1990, 234-5.
* The information value of each sentence-component is just its contribution to 
fixing the information value of the sentence, which as a limiting case is the 
sentence's information content.
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which can be read off from the sentence.
(P3) Inf[*'] is an intensional entity called an attribute (a property if n=1);
and Ref[*B] is a function mapping n-tuples of objects onto truth-values.
One might agree that (P1)-(P3) represent claims which a Fregean theorist 
would be prepared to endorse; indeed, ignoring terminological Issues, there 
would be no substantial disagreement over their content (she would welcome In 
particular the proposed analysis of sentences and predicates as having two 
distinct sorts of semantic value). The disputed claim, which is an essential 
ingredient in Salmon's Modified Naive Theory of Information Content5, Is of 
course thesis (DRT); or, to be precise, the following version of (DRT):
(P4) InfCtj] = RefCtj].
According to Salmon's representation, Frege's Puzzle is an argument the 
conclusion of which is precisely the contradictory of (P4). This conclusion is 
viewed as being drawn from two premisses - labelled the major and the minor - 
together with an additional assumption about compositionality obtained from (P2). 
This assumption can be stated as follows:
(P5) If propositions p and q have the same mode of composition and the 
same constituents, then p = q. 
And the major premiss, (PM), of Frege's Puzzle is this:
(PM) If p = q then p is informative if and only if q is informative. In the 
linguistic mode: if the information content expressed by a sentence [S~\ 
(in c) is the same as the information content expressed by a sentence 
f"S f"| (in c'), then the former is informative if and only if the latter Is; 
thus, fS"] is informative (In c) if and only if ("S'] is Informative (in c'). 
Informativeness Is here taken as a property which is primarily applicable to
Salmon 1986, especially Chapter 2.
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information contents or propositions; it may also be applied to sentences, but 
only in a derivative sense: a sentence is said to be informative If its information 
content is informative. Information contents are thus cognitive contents, I.e. the 
proper bearers of cognitive significance. Accordingly, (PM) emerges as a logical 
truth, viz. a consequence of the Principle of Indiscernlbllity of Identicals, and 
hence as an unassailable premiss.
As to the minor premiss, (Pm), it consists in the construction of a pair of 
sentences fS"| and pS*] such that: (i)- the only difference between them is that 
they are composed out of (possibly) distinct, but co-referential, singular terms 
tj and tj of the envisaged kind; (ii)- they (or, better, their information contents) 
differ In informative value: e.g., whereas fS"] is (potentially) informative, f$'l 
is plainly uninformative (or vice-versa). The paradigmatic case Is that of a pair 
of sentences of the form fa=a"| and fo=b~\, where a and b are proper names, e.g. 
'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus is Hesperus'; but, as we have seen, 
identity sentences are inessential to the argument.
Now Frege's Puzzle runs as follows. Since (Pm) contradicts the consequent 
of (PM), one derives by Modus Tollens the result that |~S] and fS1"] have 
different information contents. Then, by (P5) and Modus Tollens again, one 
concludes that, since the information contents in question have the same mode 
of composition, such a difference in content cannot but be a difference in 
information value between the constituent singular terms, i.e. one gets the result 
that Inf[tj] * InfC^]. As tj and tk are ex hypothesi co-referential, the information 
value of a singular term of the envisaged kind cannot be its referent, i.e. one 
gets the general result that Inf[tj] * Ref[tj].
1.2 There are two main lines of reasoning that Salmon pursues in order to 
obtain the desired refutation of Frege's Puzzle. He also considers a variant
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which turns on prepositional attitudes such as belief and thus involves the 
notion of cognitive value; I take up such a variant of Frege's Puzzle in the next 
Section.
Salmon's first line of attack can be described as taking the shape of a 
reductio of the following kind. If Frege's Puzzle - subjected to a certain sort 
of generalization - were a sound argument, then any substantive theory about 
prepositional value, including a Fregean theory of senses itself, would be in 
principle impossible (since it would be readily refuted by the generalized 
Puzzle). The upshot is that something is wrong with Frege's Puzzle. And, since 
the argument is undoubtedly valid, the flaw must lie on one of the premisses. 
But the major premiss is beyond dispute; and the compositionality principle 
seems to be compelling. Thus, the second sort of counter-argument consists in 
Salmon's bold claim that the minor premiss is false, in the sense that a sentence 
such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is not informative at all. To be precise, it is 
contended that the minor involves a sort of petitio prfncipif: it assumes that a 
sentence such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is informative in the relevant sense, 
i.e. in the sense which is in fact required by the major premiss (so that it 
might be regarded as a logical truth); but this is by no means clear and it is 
exactly what would have to be shown so that the first move - the use of Modus 
Toll ens - could be carried out.
I shall subsequently consider those two counter-arguments and examine 
them separately. Let me just point out en passant that I take Salmon's 
representation of the argument as being in general fair to the Fregean point of 
view; and I think that it would be wrong to dismiss his counter-arguments on 
the basis of some repudiation of such a representation.
Salmon's strategy consists in turning Frege's Puzzle Into an argument 
which would inter alia invalidate Frege's own identification of the prepositional
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value of a singular term with a mode of presentation of the object referred to 
by the term. Hence, if Salmon is right, Frege's Puzzle might even be used to 
undermine the Fregean thesis (IRT). This could be apparently achieved in two 
stages: (i)- first, generalize the original argument in such a way that it could 
be applied to any account of propositional value, and not only to the particular 
location of propositional value in reference; (ii)- then show that singular senses 
cannot play the role of propositional values.
With a view to generalizing Frege's Puzzle a function f is introduced 
which assigns to each expression E, i.e. to each semantically significant 
sentence-component, the information value of E. The particular nature of f is of 
course left unspecified; in the Fregean argument, f is just the Reference- 
function Ref. (Pm) could then be rewritten by substituting f for reference; i.e., 
one would have, for the singular terms tj and t^ occurring in fS"| and fSf "[ (e.g. 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'), f[tj = f[tk] instead of Ref[tJ = Ref[tk ]. Applying 
(PM) and (P5), which are left unchanged, one would get the general result that 
the information value of a singular term cannot be its f. According to Salmon, 
this kind of conclusion shows that something is Irremediably wrong with Frege's 
Puzzle, as long as it is also shown that fS~| and fS'~| may, under such 
circumstances, be kept informative and uninformative (respectively).
Salmon tries to discredit Frege's theory by letting f be the Sense-function 
and by making [S~| informative and pS*] uninformative, where fS"[ and fS'~| are 
sentences which only differ from one another in containing distinct predicates 
which allegedly have the same Fregean sense'; since the predicates in question 
are not co-referential, for they have different extensions, this would also 
undermine principle (D) (or, better, its analogue for predicative modes of 
presentation). Let us consider a speaker, say s, whose understanding of the
Cf. Salmon 1986, 74.
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English predicates 'elm 1 and 'beech 1 ' Is such that: (i)- s knows that they are 
true of certain trees, and that elm trees are in some way different from beech 
trees; (ii)- but s is not able to pick out any specific feature which would 
distinguish the species of trees in question. Hence, the purely conceptual 
representation that s associates with 'elm' (her concept of an elm) is the same 
as that which she associates with 'beech' (her concept of a beech). Therefore, 
in s's idiolect the predicates 'elm' and 'beech' express the very same Fregean 
sense. Yet, a sentence such as 'Elm wood is beech wood' would be informative 
to s: as she knows that elms are not beeches, it would be informative In the 
sense of conveying misinformation to her; while a sentence such as 'Elm wood 
is elm wood' would be utterly uninformative to s. Thus, applying the generalized 
Frege's Puzzle, it cannot be that the information value of 'elm' or 'beech' is the 
conceptual content or Fregean sense attached to the predicate8.
Now I think that, ingenious as it may be, the above argument is not quite 
convincing. First, it rests heavily on the claim that the Fregean sense attached 
by a speaker to a predicate (or, if one prefers, to a natural kind term) must be 
a purely conceptual representation of the predicate's extension (or of the 
species denoted by the term). Indeed, Salmon credits his Fregean opponent with 
a strictly descriptivist conception of predicative (or singular) sense; and the 
conclusion that 'elm' and 'beech' express the same sense in s's idiolect is drawn 
on that basis. Yet, as we have seen, such a conception is by no means
It is irrelevant to our discussion whether words like 'elm' and 'beech' are 
taken as (unary) predicates or as singular terms of a certain sort, viz. names 
of natural kinds.
' Salmon follows Putnam's intuitions about cases such as the 'beech'/'elm' case. 
We are entitled by ordinary standards to ascribe to someone like B prepositional 
attitudes such as the belief that elms are not beeches; and so the Fregean 
theorist is obliged to make sense of this. See Putnam's paper 'The Meaning of 
'Meaning", reprinted in Putnam 1975, 215-71.
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mandatory from a Fregean viewpoint. A proponent of thesis (IRT) might 
Introduce instead De Re predicative (or singular) modes of presentation, 
construed as being certain informational networks - possibly including 
interpersonal (or borrowed) information - which have certain properties (or 
certain natural species) at their origin; she could then be in a position to block 
the result that 'elm' and 'beech' have the same Fregean sense (in s's idiolect), 
and hence to resist Salmon's argument. Therefore, at most, what the argument 
shows is that predicates (or natural kind terms) cannot have purely descriptive 
Fregean senses as their propositional values; in other words, one could see 
Salmon's argument as being merely an argument for some such thesis as (NOT). 
However, I guess that even this claim is disputable. For the sake of 
argument, let us concede to Salmon the notion of Sinn (= purely conceptual 
content) he employs to rebut the Fregean view. Notice that the crucial Idea 
underlying Salmon's counter-argument is this: it is possible for some competent 
speaker, under certain circumstances, to associate the very same conceptual 
content with two different predicates P and Q and at the same time to know that 
the extensions of P and Q do not coincide, i.e. that there is at least one object 
of which P is true but Q is not true (or conversely). Now it seems to me that 
this idea is somehow internally incoherent, in the sense that It contains 
ingredients which could hardly be harmonized. And such an internal tension 
could be exploited in two distinct directions, giving rise to two Fregean 
rejoinders to Salmon's argument. Thus, concerning the above sort of case, either 
s's putative concepts of elm and beech are so defective that they could be 
neither assimilated to one another nor discriminated from one another, and hence 
one could not correctly describe s as knowing that elms are not beeches; or this 
piece of knowledge is legitimately ascribable to s, and hence it would be difficult 
to resist the conclusion that s's concept of an elm is after all different from s's
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concept of a beech. Let me expand on these two lines of reasoning.
On the one hand, a Fregean theorist might argue in the following way. 
From the sort of circumstance laid down in Salmon's case it does not follow 
that, in s's idiolect, the sense of 'elm' coincides with the sense of 'beech'. 
Indeed, s's putative concepts of elm trees and beech trees are actually so poor 
that it is doubtful whether one could appropriately say that they are one and 
the same concept (or, for that very reason, that they are different concepts). 
On the classical Fregean view, a sense attached by someone to a predicate is 
closely connected with the sort of knowledge one has of what it is for a given 
object to belong to the extension of the predicate; and, in Salmon's example, the 
amount of knowledge displayed by s practically reduces to nothing, so that it 
would not be intelligible to credit her with something like a Fregean sense 
representing elm trees or beech trees. The fact that everything s knows about 
the use of the predicates 'elm' and 'beech' is that they are English words that 
stand for certain species, of trees - which are supposed to be, in some 
essentially unspecifiable way, different from each other - is neither evidence 
that s associates the same sense with both predicates, nor that his concept of 
an elm differs from his concept of a beech. Rather, it would mean that his 
understanding of the predicates is so deficient, or that her grasp of the 
associated concepts is so imperfect, that one would not be entitled to describe 
her as attaching any Fregean senses to them at all. But if s does not possess 
adequate concepts of the species of trees in question then s cannot be 
attributed the sort of conceptual knowledge which seems to be required to know 
that elms are not beeches; that is to say, if s has an imperfect grasp of the 
concepts of elm and beech then s has an imperfect grasp of the extensions 
determined by these concepts as well. Hence, properly speaking, one could not 
say that s knows that elms are not beeches; maybe what one should say is that
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s knows that 'elms are not beeches 1 is true (in English), but does not know 
what it means.
On the other hand, a second Fregean rejoinder to Salmon's argument might 
be given along the following lines. Let us concede that our intuitions concerning 
cases like the 'elm'/'beech' story are to the effect that it is entirely correct to 
say of our speaker s that she knows that elms are not beeches (and, conversely, 
that beeches are not elms). Thus, given the way in which the case has been 
described, one might as well say that s knows that the extension of 'elm* is 
different from the extension of 'beech*. Hence, It appears that s knows that 'elm' 
and 'beech' stand for different species of trees. Now the pieces of knowledge 
which are being thus attributed to s seem to be substantive pieces of conceptual 
knowledge; and the sort of conceptual knowledge Involved might be plausibly 
thought of as being enough to establish the result that s's conceptual represen- 
tation of an elm tree is in the end different from s's conceptual representation 
of a beech tree, contradicting thus the initial supposition that the concepts in 
question are one and the same.
Even if one feels that the above rejoinders are not convincing and insists 
that Salmon should be granted his premiss that s's concept of elm wood is 
indiscernible from s's concept of beech wood, I am afraid that there Is a further 
problem with his anti-Fregean argument. And the objection I have in mind 
concerns the other premiss used in that argument, viz. the claim about the 
informative value assigned to the envisaged sentences |"S"| and [S*], Notice that, 
unless [S~] and fS^ - in the example, 'Elm wood is beech wood' and 'Elm wood 
is elm wood' - are construed as being informative and uninformative (respective- 
ly)! there is no progress In Salmon's alleged refutation of Fregean senses. The 
problem I would like to tackle now concerns the putative Informatlveness of a 
false sentence like 'Elm wood Is beech wood' with respect to our speaker s; that
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(an utterance of) such a sentence would be Informative to s Is something which 
Salmon takes for granted without further elucidation'. But In what sense, or 
under what sort of circumstances, could s regard 'Elm wood is beech wood* as 
Informative?
The only reason that Salmon seems to give for this is that false sentences 
can be as informative as true ones: they may be (mis)informatlve in the sense 
that, by knowing that they are false, one may acquire pieces of knowledge not 
previously available. I will not dispute this claim, though I have some reserva- 
tions concerning the sort of metalinguistic formulation adopted. Indeed, I take 
it that a false sentence fS"| is informative to a subject x at a time t if fsl 
conveys an interesting piece of misinformation to x at t, i.e. if x does not know 
at t that not-S; and fS~| is uninformative to a subject x at a time t if fS"] 
conveys an uninteresting piece of misinformation to x at t, i.e. if x knows at t 
that not-S. Now there obviously is a distinction to be made between the 
(typically) factual information that not-S and the metalinguistic information that 
fS~| is false (or that |~hot-S~| is true); in fact, x may be in a position to know 
at t that |"S"| is false without knowing at t that not-S: just suppose, for 
instance, that fS~| belongs to some language L which x does not understand at 
all and that a reliable speaker of L informs x that fS"| is false (In L). But let 
us employ, for the sake of argument, Salmon's notion of the informativeness of 
false sentences. The problem Is thus that of explaining how, given Salmon's 
assumptions about s's prior knowledge, 'Elm wood is beech wood' could be 
Informative to s. Suppose that someone tells s that 'Elm wood is beech wood' is 
false; since ex hypothesi s already knows that 'elm' and 'beech' are not co- 
extensive predicates (in English), she already knows that that sentence is false, 
and so she would not thereby extend her knowledge in any conceivable way.
5 Salmon 1986, 74-5.
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Hence, this cannot be the case intended by Salmon. On the other hand, suppose 
that someone, say u, sincerely and assertively utters a token of 'Elm wood Is 
beech wood' In front of s (or suppose that u asserts that that sentence is true 
in front of s). Of course, s would be surprised at u's ignorance and would 
perhaps try to correct her and tell her that she is wrong (incidentally, given 
Salmon's suppositions, it turns out that s would not be able to explain to u why 
she Is wrong). But it does not follow that u's utterance would be informative to 
s, or that the content of u's utterance would in any sense extend s's knowledge. 
(Sometimes one feels surprised when one comes across some hitherto unknown 
truth, but here s's surprise is rather directed at u's ignorance of a botanical 
truth which happens to be already known to s.) Hence, it is by no means clear 
how the sentence 'Elm wood is beech wood' could be counted as being 
informative to s. I would claim that such a sentence would be uninformative to 
s (perhaps as uninformative as 'Elm wood Is elm wood'); since s already knows 
that elms are not beeches, it would convey uninteresting (or trivial) misinforma- 
tion to her. Therefore, given that the anti-Fregean argument needs the premiss 
about informativeness to proceed, I conclude that it is not a sound argument.
1.3 Before considering Salmon's attack on the minor premiss of Frege's Puzzle, 
let me examine briefly a different and independent version of his argument by 
reductio towards the conclusion that the generalized Fregean strategy is 
flawed 10 . The new argument is stronger than the one just discussed, for it does 
not depend on any particular Instantiation of the Information Value function f.
Take a pair of strict synonyms In English, such as (presumably) 'ketchup' 
and 'catsup'. As these terms have the same meaning in all respects, It seems 
Indubitable that they have the same prepositional value with respect to every
10 Salmon 1990, 220-23.
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possible context of use. Now consider a speaker, Sasha, whose mother tongue Is 
not English and who learns the meanings of 'ketchup* and 'catsup 1 by means of 
ostensive definitions in the following way, not being told at the outset that they 
are straightforward synonyms. Sasha acquires the words by reading the labels 
on the bottles in which ketchup (or catsup) is served during meals. It happens 
that the same condiment is regularly served to him In bottles labelled 'catsup* 
at breakfast, when it is eaten with eggs and hash browns, and in bottles 
labelled 'ketchup' at lunch, when it is eaten with hamburgers. And such a 
situation induces Sasha to think that he is consuming a different condiment in 
each case (though one which is similar in taste, colour and consistency). 
Therefore, whereas 'Ketchup is ketchup' is uninformative to Sasha, 'Ketchup is 
catsup' would be quite informative to him: his knowledge would be substantially 
extended if he came to know that the condiment is one and the same In both 
cases. Hence, by the generalized Frege's Puzzle, one would come to the 
conclusion that the information value of 'ketchup' (whatever it is) differs from 
the information value of 'catsup' (whatever it is), which clearly contradicts the 
obvious principle that synonymy preserves information value.
I shall now discuss three possible rejoinders to the above sort of Millian 
argument. To begin with, an indirect counter-argument could be adduced to the 
effect that Salmon's argument in turn contradicts the following equally obvious 
principle' 1 :
(E) Necessarily, if a speaker x understands two expressions E and E f In
a language L, and E and E f are (strict) synonyms in L, then x knows that
E and E' are synonyms in L. 
Principle (E) seems to be quite plausible: having grasped the meanings of E and




E', and given that E and E' have the same meaning, one is bound to be aware 
of this fact. And such a principle is of course violated in Salmon's case. On the 
one hand, Sasha is credited with an understanding of the words 'ketchup' and 
'catsup' (he is supposed to have learnt the meanings of the words). On the 
other, the words in question are taken to be strict synonyms In English. Yet, 
Sasha does not know that they are synonyms. Therefore, one should apparently 
conclude that either principle (E) is false or Salmon's argument is wrong.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that principle (E) is not unchallengeable . 
Consider the following parallel principle:
(E*) Necessarily, if a speaker x understands two expressions E and E' in
a language L, and E and E f are not (strict) synonyms in L, then x knows
that they are not synonyms in L.
Now (E*) turns out to be false. For instance, competent speakers of English will 
claim that words such as 'stop' and 'finish', or 'accident' and 'mistake', are 
synonymous, until they are.presented with examples which make clear the non- 
synonymy of the words as those speakers themselves use them. And such a sort 
of result about (E*) might be exploited to cast some doubt upon (E). Thus, 
concerning a synonymous pair E and E 1 , it might be claimed that a speaker who 
understands both E and E f might be inclined to count them as synonymous, but 
withhold belief in synonymy because her experience of counter-examples to (E*) 
makes her suspect that she is wrong.
Of course, this could hardly be taken as evidence that principle (E) is 
false. And if the above sort of dilemma were inescapable one would be naturally 
Inclined to take the latter horn of it; indeed, principle (E) is intuitively 
compelling and should not be given up on that basis. However, as we shall see, 
there is just no need to argue from the truth of principle (E) to the unsound-
I am very much indebted to Tim Williamson for this point.
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ness of Salmon's argument, and hence our dilemma turns out to be clearly 
escapable. I would regard the foregoing reflection about principle (E*) as at 
least showing that the Indirect counter-argument from principle (E) is not as 
persuasive as one might think, in the sense that the intuitive strength of (E) 
may be after all Insufficient to yield a convincing refutation of the Millian 
argument.
A second sort of reply to Salmon's argument, which in a way complements 
the one just outlined, consists in what we might call the objection from partial 
(or Imperfect) understanding. It might be argued that the 'ketchup'/'catsup' 
story does not satisfy a requirement which turns out to be crucial to the 
original Fregean argument about informativeness. The requirement in question 
is that the speaker fully understand both sentences fS"| and fSf"| and therefore 
the singular terms out of which these sentences are composed. And it is alleged 
that It is doubtful whether Salmon's case meets this kind of demand since, on 
the one hand, Sasha is not a native or fully competent speaker of English, and, 
on the other, his peculiar way of learning the use of the words 'ketchup' and 
'catsup' might be regarded as revealing that he has only a partial (or Imperfect) 
grasp of the meanings of these words; and a full mastery is indeed required in 
the Fregean argument.
Now I have doubts about the effectiveness of such a line of attack. 
Indeed, it seems to be vulnerable to the following sort of intuitively powerful 
objection. Suppose that Sasha had learned the meaning of 'ketchup' in the 
peculiar way described before, but without the word 'catsup' coming Into the 
story. This would normally be quite adequate for understanding. On the other 
hand, also learning something about 'catsup' should not undermine that. Hence, 
one may say that Sasha understands 'ketchup'; and, by a parallel argument, one 
would say that he also understands 'catsup'. Of course, there is no reason to
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think that such an objection would be decisive; maybe some reasonable reply 
could be framed against it. And one might even be Inclined to think that the 
issue whether or not a speaker like Sasha should be credited with an adequate 
understanding of the words 'ketchup' and 'catsup', is a moot issue; or that it 
Is unlikely that anything like an appeal to our ordinary intuitions about 
understanding would enable us to settle the dispute. Anyway, I guess that we 
are at least entitled to conclude that, given its relative weakness and lack of 
intuitive support, the objection from partial understanding is far from 
representing a good move against the Millian argument.
Finally, let me sketch a third sort of argumentative strategy one might 
pursue in dealing with the 'ketchup'/'catsup' story and similar cases from a 
Fregean perspective. Let us begin by taking for granted the premiss about 
understanding employed In the Millian argument. And let us recall that Salmon's 
argument is intended as a reductio, the allegedly absurd conclusion of which is 
the following claim:
(*) 'ketchup' and 'catsup' have different propositional values (with respect
to Sasha's story).
(As we shall see, Salmon takes the reductio hypothesis to be the claim that 
'Ketchup is catsup' is genuinely informative to Sasha.) And the crucial premisses 
in the argument are these:
(») If expressions E and £' are synonymous (in a language L) then E and
E 1 have the same propositional value (with respect to every possible
context of use).
($) 'Ketchup' and 'catsup' are synonymous (in English).
(*) is deemed implausible because, given ($), it comes out as Inconsistent with 
(a), and («) and ($) are both supposed to be obviously true. Now a Fregean 
reply could proceed in either of the following two directions.
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On the one hand, one could Just reject premiss ($), while keeping («) and 
endorsing (*). As a result, (*) could no longer be taken as a reductio of 
anything at all. But how could ($) be reasonably challenged? Well, one might 
begin by maintaining that the notion of synonymy has no clear application to the 
case of proper names; Indeed, ordinary proper names have no linguistic 
meanings, In the sense that definitional clauses like those one may find in a 
dictionary are not, in general, available for them. Then one might claim that 
words like 'ketchup* and 'catsup' may be thought of as having a semantic status 
which is very similar to that of proper names: they are names of substances or 
names of kinds of stuff. One could then apparently conclude that, strictly 
speaking, words of that sort have no linguistic meanings either; hence, the 
notion of synonymy has no straightforward application to them. However, I do 
not think that such an approach is convincing. First, and less important, it 
turns out that some authorized English dictionaries 13 actually count the words 
'ketchup' and 'catsup' as being strict synonyms, the latter being - along with 
'catchup' - just a spelling variant of the former (a variant used mainly in the 
U.S.A.). Second, and more important, even if one happens to be reluctant to 
apply the notion of synonymy to names of artificial kinds, it turns out that an 
argument can be mounted which parallels the 'ketchup'/'catsup' argument and 
yet involves only colour words; and the objection from the inapplicability of the 
notion of synonymy would hardly make sense with respect to colour words. 
Thus, in Portuguese there are two different words for red, viz. 'vermelhc? and 
'encarnadcf, which have literally the same meaning; I am protty sure that every 
native (or fully competent) speaker of Portuguese would promptly acknowledge 
such words as being strictly synonyrrvous. Now suppose that Ronald, a




monolingual speaker of English, is taught Portuguese by the direct method and 
learns 'vermelhc? and 'encarnadc? under the following sort of circumstances. 
First, he learns the meaning of 'vermelhc? by being presented with samples of 
a particular shade of red. Then he comes to learn 'encarnadc? by being 
presented with samples of what is in fact the very same shade of red. It just 
happens that, on the later occasion, Ronald does not remember the particular 
shade of red he saw when he learned 'vermelhc?; so, when he acquires the word 
'encarnadc?, he does not even entertain the question whether 'vermelhc? holds 
of the samples then seen. Let us agree that one Is entitled by ordinary 
standards to credit Ronald with an adequate understanding of the Portuguese 
predicates 'vermelhc? and 'encarnadc?. Then it would be possible to draw from 
the above case conclusions which parallel those drawn from the 'ketchupY'cat- 
sup' story, a significant difference between the two arguments being that in the 
'vermelhc?/'encarnadc? argument the premiss about synonymy seems to be 
incontrovertible. In particular, it would not be difficult to imagine a set of 
circumstances under which the Portuguese sentence 'Vermelho 6 (is) encarnadc? 
(as uttered on the later occasion) would carry non-trivial or informative 
information to Ronald (whereas 'Vermelho e (is) vermelhc? would be clearly 
uninformative to him). The objection might be raised that as soon as Ronald 
considered the matter, he would realize that the words in question are 
synonymous. Yet, a possible reply might be given as follows: Ronald may realize 
that 'vermelhd and 'encarnadc? have similar meanings, but feel unable to rule 
out the possibility that he will one day see a shade that will strike him as 
vermelho, but not as encarnado.
Alternatively, and this is the kind of move I would be inclined to favour, 
one could just reject premiss («), while accepting premiss ($) and fully 
endorsing claim (*). Again, it would follow that (*) could no longer be taken as
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a reductio of anything at all. But how could one reasonably reject («)? Well, it 
turns out that from a Fregean standpoint, a standpoint in which information 
values are (at least partially) senses or modes of presentation, claim («) is by 
no means compulsory. Indeed, it seems to me that a Fregean theorist might, 
plausibly and fruitfully, hold the view that sameness of linguistic meaning does 
not entail sameness of sense.
Notice that the connection holding between the notions of linguistic 
meaning and Fregean sense is a very loose one, at least according to the 
general conception of sense with which we are willing to work. The linguistic 
meaning conventionally correlated with a given singular term, e.g. an indexical 
expression, is certainly an objective feature of the term; it is something which 
remains necessarily constant across speakers and across occasions of use. By 
contrast, the Fregean senses associated with singular terms are, in many cases, 
non-conventional and subjective; it is always possible for singular modes of 
presentation to vary from speaker to speaker and/or from occasions of use to 
occasion of use. Thus, different speakers may be in a position to attach distinct 
particular senses to a given singular term token t (at a given time), or to 
tokens t and t1 of the same type (at the same or at different times), even when 
t and t' are co-referential (in given contexts of use); i.e., they may entertain 
different particular ways of thinking of the object referred to. And the same 
speaker may be in a position to attach distinct particular senses to singular 
term tokens t and t' of the same type (at different times), even when t and t1 
are co-referential (in given contexts); i.e., she may entertain on distinct 
occasions different particular ways of thinking of the object referred to. 
However, in all such cases, it is obvious that the linguistic meaning of the 
singular term tokens - which is conferred upon them by the types of which 
they are tokens - is necessarily the same. On the other hand, for any tokens
Page 72
NAMING AND INFORMATIVENESS
t and t' of different types which are co-referential in contexts c and c', it is 
obviously not the case that if t and t' express the same particular sense in c 
and c' relative to a given speaker, then t and t1 are synonymous (or belong to 
synonymous types); according to some neo-Fregean accounts, certain uses of 
indexicals such as 'here' and 'there', or demonstratives such as 'this' and 'that', 
illustrate this point.
Moreover, one may even introduce cases in which singular term tokens t 
and t' which are co-referential (in given contexts of use) and which belong to 
different but synonymous types are nevertheless to be seen, in the light of 
certain brands of Fregeanism, as having different senses with respect to a given 
subject. Thus, one may safely assume that the expression-types 'yesterday' and 
'the day (just) before today' have exactly the same linguistic meaning 
(dictionaries usually give the latter as the meaning of the former). But consider 
tokens of such types as uttered by a speaker, say Jones, under the following 
sort of circumstances. At 11:58 pm on a day d Jones asserts 'Yesterday was 
mild', having thus a belief about d-1; and one hour later, looking at his watch, 
he comes to assert 'The day before today was not mild', apparently having thus 
a belief about d. Yet, Jones happens to be unaware that Summer Time ends 
precisely at midnight on d and that then clocks go back one hour, so that the 
time of his later assertion is In fact 11:58 pm on d and the associated (putative) 
belief a belief about d-1. Now if one thinks of the modes of presentation 
correlated with temporal indexicals as consisting in ways of tracking a time - 
or re-identifying it - throughout a period of time, then it will not be the case 
that Jones entertains on both occasions (or, rather, at what is conventionally the 
same time) the same singular sense14.
^ This is a very rough description of the case under consideration; I examine 
the notion of indexical sense employed here in Sections 3 and 4.
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The preceding considerations motivate a picture of the relationship 
between linguistic meaning and Information value on which there is a consider- 
able gap between the two notions and on which claim ( ) is not, In general, 
true. Claim (d) is simply taken for granted in Salmon's argument; and this is so 
because, considered in its application to ordinary proper names and to names 
of (natural or artificial) kinds, It comes out as trivially true under a strict 
Millian account. In effect, the object or the kind referred to by any syntacti- 
cally simple singular term of the above sort (In a given context) is regarded on 
such a view as playing a double semantic role: it is (or at least it determines) 
the linguistic meaning of the term; and it is also the prepositional value 
assigned to the term (in the context). But it seems to be somehow unfair to 
invoke this doctrine - as a means of validating claim (e) - in the course of 
assessing an argument (Frege's Puzzle) whose aim is to show that such a 
doctrine is wrong. And once one drops the Millian conception of the information 
values of simple sentences as being singular propositions, which are by 
definition psychologically insensitive, in favour of a conception of such 
information values as being Fregean thoughts, which are by definition 
psychologically sensitive, claim («) ceases to be compelling.
I am therefore prepared to endorse the claim that, in general, it is 
possible for expressions which are strict synonymous (in a given language) to 
have different senses in a speaker's idiolect. Concerning the 'ketchup'/'catsup' 
story, I would say that Sasha employs different ways of thinking of the same 
condiment, the 'ketchup'-way of thinking and the 'catsup'-way of thinking. He 
is obviously not aware that he is being presented with a single kind of stuff 
at breakfast and at lunch; no wonder then that the thought that ketchup is 
catsup is Informative to him. Given their analogy with ordinary proper names,
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names of natural or artificial kinds are - to use Evans's terminology^5 - 
information-invoking singular terms. Accordingly, one could sketchily represent 
Sasha's distinct modes of presentation of ketchup as consisting in different 
chains of information, or in separate mental files titled 'ketchup* and 'catsup 1 , 
formed on the basis of his disparate cognitive encounters with the condiment at 
breakfast and at lunch. And a parallel treatment might be provided to the 
'vermelhtf/'encarnadd case, the difference being that even a Millian theorist 
would acknowledge that predicates are to be assigned something very akin to 
Fregean senses as their prepositional values in possible contexts of use. Indeed, 
on Salmon's theory of predicative reference, in contradistinction to the case of 
syntactically simple singular terms, syntactically simple predicates are thought 
of as having two sorts of semantic value: their information values, which are 
taken to be certain intensional entities like n-ary attributes; and their 
references, which are taken to be certain extensional entities like functions from 
n-tuples of objects to truth-values. But Salmon would presumably treat 
synonymous predicates like 'vermelho* and 'encarnado* as invariably contributing 
one and the same unary attribute to the information contents of sentences in 
which they might occur. And this would not enable us to accommodate possible 
differences in cognitive significance which, pace Salmon, we wish to take as 
basic data in need of explanation, such as the potential difference in informative 
value - relative to Ronald and to his story - between a thought expressed with 
the help of 'verme/ho* and a thought expressed with the help of 'encarnado*. 
Thus, I would say that Ronald employs in thought different ways of thinking of 
redness; or, if one prefers, he employs different ways of thinking of that 
function or Fregean concept which yields, for any red surface as argument, the 
True as value. And Ronald's case seems to motivate a De Re view of the kind of
15 See Evans 1982, 384-5.
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senses expressed by colour terms, i.e. a view on which such senses are to be 
seen as being (partially) dependent upon certain perceptual relations holding 
between a thinker and colour samples In her environment; in effect, it is the 
presence of this sort of non-conceptual factors which ultimately explains why 
redness Is presented to Ronald under distinct modes of presentation.
A consequence of the above way of countering the anti-Fregean argument 
is that principle (E) should be, after all, given up. We are committed to the 
result that e.g., though 'vermelhc? and 'encarnadc? are synonyms (In Portu- 
guese), Ronald does not know that they are synonyms. If Ronald knew this then 
he would know that 'vermelhd and 'encarnadc? are co-extensional predicates and 
thus that one and the same colour is presented to him on both occasions; but 
then a sentence such as 'Vermelho 6 encarnadd would not express a thought 
which would be informative to him. Therefore, since we take as intuitively sound 
the claim about informativeness, and since we take the objection from Imperfect 
understanding as intuitively dubious, we are forced to reject principle (E). Now 
I think that there is nothing essentially wrong in pursuing this train of 
thought. Underlying principle (E) is a certain form of cartesianism about 
meaning, in the sense that our knowledge about sameness of meaning is taken 
to be infallible. But one may have good reasons, in this and in other areas of 
philosophical inquiry, to be suspicious about such cartesian principles; it is very 
likely that linguistic meaning is not as transparent as it is claimed, and that 
even fully competent and reflective speakers may be mistaken about synonymy.
1.4 Let us finally consider the crux of the Millian argument, viz. the attack 
on the minor premiss of Frege's Puzzle.
This line of criticism is related to the one Just discussed as follows. 
Suppose that we are to accept the claim that the Fregean strategy to block any
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identification of propositional value with reference is, In general, incorrect. Still, 
the Millian theorist Is under the obligation of providing us with a further 
account of what is the particular mistake involved in the Fregean argument. Now 
such a mistake could not be a logical one; for Frege's Puzzle amounts, in that 
respect, to two correct applications of a valid rule of inference, viz. Modus 
To/lens. So we are bound to conclude that at least one of the premisses is false 
or can be plausibly challenged. The second line of attack consists thus in 
scrutinizing the Fregean premisses in order to locate the putative flaw. And, if 
sound, such a line of reasoning would be per se enough to force us to reject 
the Fregean argument; even if we are not persuaded by the first line of 
criticism, as is indeed the case, the identification of a flawed premiss would be 
sufficient to discredit Frege's Puzzle altogether.
Salmon's diagnosis is that the error lies in the minor premiss, i.e. in the 
(apparently uncontroversial) observation that two sentences of the form 
mentioned, e.g. 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', may 
conspicuously differ in informativeness, e.g. relative to the ancient astronomer 
who did not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This verdict is rather 
surprising and counter-intuitive, since one would be naturally inclined to count 
the minor as a sort of empirical truth, a truth easily derived from our ordinary 
linguistic intuitions; and the fact that such a verdict contradicts this sort of 
evidence could indeed be taken as a reductioof the Millian argument against the 
minor. Yet, as we shall see, things are not that simple and, even if one should 
In the end argue along those lines, the anti-Fregean argument should be tackled 
with the utmost caution.
Salmon contends that the remaining premisses of Frege's Puzzle, viz. the 
major and the principle of compositionality, are unassailable. And we shall 
willingly follow him in this respect. As we have seen, the latter principle belongs
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to a set of shared semantical assumptions and Is thus beyond dispute. 
Concerning the major premiss, Its uncontroverslal character Is not Immediately 
obvious and must be argued for. It Is claimed that a proper reading of the 
major would turn It Into a logical truth and hence Into an undefeaslble principle. 
Frege's Puzzle could then be synoptlcally viewed as being made up of a logical 
truth (the major), a semantical truth (the law of composltlonallty), and a 
controversial seemingly empirical truth (the minor).
Given that the reason for repudiating the minor is closely connected with 
the construal of the major as a logical truth, it is advisable to take such a 
construal as our starting-point. The major is the thesis that a necessary 
condition for sentences fSl and fS'l to have the very same information content 
In contexts of use c and c' is that fsl is informative in c just in case fS'l is 
informative in c'. According to Salmon, underlying the Fregean understanding 
of this thesis is the idea that the property of a sentence fSl of being 
informative could be further elucidated by means of an appeal to a certain class 
of properties which are primarily ascribed to the information content of fsl. 
Typical members of the envisaged class are properties such as that of being a 
valuable extension of our knowledge, that of being not already a "given", that 
of being non-trivial, etc. A sort of definition for the intuitive notion of 
informativeness could then be provided as follows: a sentence fsil is informative 
(in a context c) iff the information content of fSl (in c) has some such 
informative-making property. Salmon's claim is thus that the notion of a given 
proposition having some informative-making property should be thought of as 
being conceptually prior to the notion of a sentence fSl being informative; that 
is, fSl (or a particular utterance of [Si) being Informative or unlnformative 
rests exclusively upon fS] containing the information that it does, I.e. upon 




Given this conception of informativeness, the major premiss could be 
restated as follows. Let Inf[S]c be the information content of a sentence fSl In 
a context c, and T a variable ranging over a domain of Informative-making 
properties; then the following holds:
(PM)' Inf[SJc = Inf[S'Jc , + (VI)[I(InffS]e}^I(fnffSJe)JL
Since (PM)' is easily derivable from Leibniz's Law, it has the status of a logical 
truth.
A Fregean theorist might take the account given so far across the board. 
Yet, Salmon's next move consists in assessing the minor premiss in the light of 
such an account and in enquiring whether the notion of informativeness as 
employed in the minor coincides with the notion as employed in the major. When 
the Fregean theorist maintains that a sentence such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' 
is potentially informative, is she using 'informative' in the relevant sense, i.e. 
in that sense which is in .fact required by the major? Is she really reading 
'informative' as a predicate which can only be truly ascribable to 'Hesperus is 
Phosphorus' in virtue of the sort of information encoded in the sentence, i.e. in 
virtue of its information content having a certain informative-making property? 
Or could it be that there are two distinct notions of informativeness In play 
here, so that Frege's Puzzle would suffer from the fallacy of equivocation, the 
same word being used with two different meanings in the premisses? It Is 
assumed that the only possible way to safeguard the major from being 
challenged is to interpret it as a logical truth, which in turn requires that 
'informative' should be understood in the relevant sense; therefore, it Is the 
minor premiss that should conform to the major In that respect.
The following sort of pragmatic strategy is then used to cast doubt upon 
the minor premiss. A distinction Is drawn between two kinds of information that
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might be conveyed by a sentence fsl, to which correspond in turn two 
different senses in which fsl might be informative. First, there is that 
information which is semantically contained in [Si; only this sort of information 
is adequate to determine the informative character of fsl in the relevant sense, 
since the informative-making properties must belong to the very information 
content of fsl. Second, there is also that information which may be pragmati­ 
cally imparted by an utterance of fsl; this sort of information does not belong 
to the content of fsl and lacks any of the relevant informative-making prop- 
erties. A typical example of information pragmatically imparted by fsl is the 
information that fsl is true, or that fsl expresses a truth; in general, such 
information is not semantically contained in fsl (though there are exceptions, 
e.g. Tarskian sentences such as 'This very sentence is true').
Now, concerning the 'ketchup'/'catsup' case, it is alleged that 'Ketchucp 
is catsup' is not informative in the relevant sense; for, on the basis of 
synonymy, the information semantically contained in it is just the proposition 
that ketchup is ketchup, which plainly lacks any of the informative-making 
properties. However, an utterance of that sentence can be informative in the 
pragmatic sense: to someone like Sasha, it would be news to be told 'Ketchup is 
catsup' since he would come to know that this is a true sentence (in English) 
and hence, by means of some elementary semantical knowledge, he would come 
to know that 'ketchup' and 'catsup' are co-referential terms (in English). And 
cases such as the 'Hesperus'/'Phosphorus' story are dealt with in the same way. 
It is by no means certain that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is informative in the 
appropriate sense. One may doubt whether the apparent informativeness of such 
a sentence is actually semantically contained in it, whether the proposition that 
Hesperus Is Phosphorus really has some informative-making property as an 
intrinsic attribute. The Fregean just assumes this without any further
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justification. But the claim that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is informative needs 
to be supported by an argument; and, since no argument Is offered, Frege's 
Puzzle does not get off the ground and hence does not yield a straightforward 
refutation of the Millian doctrine encapsulated in thesis (DRT).
Moreover, the Millian argument proceeds, one has reasons to believe that 
the putative Informativeness of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is entirely due to 
pragmatically imparted information, especially the information that the sentence 
is true. Indeed, by being told 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' (or some translation of 
it), our astronomer would learn that the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' 
denote the same planet and thereby acquire a new piece of information. But this 
is metalinguistic information, not semantically contained in the sentence, and 
hence the claim is unwarranted that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is informative (in 
the required sense). The way is thus paved for the Millian theorist to hold his 
view that an utterance of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' actually is as uninformative 
(with respect to any competent speaker) as an utterance of 'Hesperus is 
Hesperus': the information semantically contained in both sentences is just the 
tautologous proposition that Venus is identical to Venus. And our customary 
Intuitions to the effect that utterances of the latter sentence may be informative 
are explained away on the basis of our mistaking pragmatically imparted informa- 
tion for semantically contained information. The upshot is that either the minor 
premiss is false or Frege's Puzzle begs the question (what is taken for granted 
in the minor is something which In fact would have to be proved).
Let us now discuss Salmon's argument. I shall try to show that the 
pragmatic strategy employed is dubious and leaves the problem of informative 
value essentially unresolved.
Salmon's criticism rests inter alia upon two ideas: the notion of an 
informative-making property as primarily attached to a proposition, which leads
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to the construal of the major as logically true; and the distinction between 
semantically contained and pragmatically imparted information. I think that it is 
useless to repudiate any of these assumptions. The former appears to be 
constitutive of a Fregean conception of cognitive significance. As to the latter, 
it is clear that some such distinction is needed, even within a Fregean 
framework. And one should also agree that the information semantically contained 
in a sentence fSl, i.e. the proposition that S, and the information typically 
pragmatically imparted by fSl, i.e. the proposition that fSl is true, are 
different pieces of information; assuming that the (syntactically simple) singular 
terms in fSl are rigid designators, it is sufficient to point out that such 
propositions differ in modal value, the former being necessarily true (if true) 
and the latter being contingently true (if true) tj .
What I take to be unacceptable is rather the claim that the potential 
informativeness of fSl is entirely pragmatic, typically amounting to the potential 
informativeness of 'fSl is true', as well as the associated claim that sentences 
fSl and fSl of the envisaged form, e.g. fa=al and fa=bl, are both semantically 
uninformative. First, one should remark that the 'ketchup'/'catsup 1 argument 
does not provide us with conclusive evidence that the pragmatic view is right; 
for it depends on the premiss that synonymy entails identity of information 
value and, as we have seen, this idea can be reasonably resisted. Second, and 
more important, the following general argument can be adduced against the 
pragmatic view 1 *. Take a sentence of the form fa=b1. It is held that an 
utterance of fa=bl seems informative to a speaker x because an utterance of 
'[a=bl is true', and hence of Tal and fbl are co-referential', would be
" Assuming that sentences are not individuated semantically.
!' Michael Devitt argues in a similar vein in his paper 1989, 222-4.
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informative to x. Now one might ask in turn in what sense the latter sentence 
would be informative to x; the answer Is that it must be semantically informative 
to her, otherwise one would be presumably involved in a regressus. But it turns 
out that, with respect to a competent speaker who masters the names fal and 
fbl, the informativeness of the piece of information semantically encoded in 
'fa=bl is true', and so In Tal and fbl are co-referential', is very likely to be 
causally connected with the informativeness of the piece of information 
semantically encoded in fa=bl. Indeed, one would in the end say that x finds 
it informative that fa=bl is true, and hence that fal and fbl denote the same 
thing, precisely because x finds it informative that a and b are one and the 
same thing; i.e., one would in the end regard the Informative value (relative to 
x) of the proposition expressed by 'fa=bl is true' (or by 'fal and fbl are co- 
referential') as being actually determined by the informative value (relative to 
x) of the proposition expressed by fa=bl. Yet, if this is right, then the claim 
is unwarranted that the potential informativeness of fa=bl is exhausted by the 
potential informativeness of the piece of information that it typically pragmati- 
cally imparts, and so the pragmatic account should be deemed inadequate.
Moreover, the pragmatic view runs into difficulties if one turns the tables 
(so as to speak) on the minor premiss and introduces cases where an instance 
of fa=al is informative to a given speaker and an instance of fa=bl is 
uninformative to her (at the same time)18 . To see this, let us go back to the 
second version of our story about Carneiro and his encounters with Pessoa1 '. 
We said then that, under the envisaged circumstances, the utterances in
^ In a recent article (Wettstein 1989), Howard Wettstein takes cases of this 
sort as militating against Fregeanism. On the contrary, I take them as being 
nicely accomodated within a Fregean framework and as militating against the 
Millian pragmatic strategy.
1J Cf. Chapter I, Section 3, 3.5.
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question of the sentences
(1) Fernando Pessoa 6 (is) Fernando Pessoa
(2) Fernando Pessoa e (is) Alvaro Campos
would be (respectively) informative and uninformative to Carneiro; the former 
would convey to him the hitherto unavailable information that his colleague 
Pessoa and Pessoa the poet are a single person, whereas the latter would convey 
to him the already available information that Pessoa the poet and Campos are a 
single person. Now, according to the pragmatic explanation, this description is 
misleading. What one should say is that the alleged informativeness of (1) 
actually reduces to the informativeness pragmatically imparted by it, i.e. to the 
informativeness of
(1)' 'Fernando Pessoa 6 Fernando Pessoa' is true (in Portuguese), hence 
the referent of 'Fernando Pessoa' is the same as the referent of 'Fernando 
Pessoa'.
Likewise, one should say that the uninformativeness of (2) actually reduces to 
the uninformativeness pragmatically imparted by it, i.e. to the uninformativeness 
of
(2)' 'Fernando Pessoa 6 Alvaro Campos' is true (in Portuguese), hence the 
referent of 'Fernando Pessoa' is the same as the referent of 'Alvaro 
Campos'.
But, as it stands, (1)' seems to contain trivial information; anyone minimally 
competent in Portuguese (i.e. anyone who at least knows that 'Fernando Pessoa' 
Is a non-empty personal name and (1) a Portuguese identity sentence) and 
minimally competent in semantics (as couched in English) would be able to 
recognize at once such information as true. And, as it stands, (2)' seems to 
contain substantial information; linguistic and semantic expertise would not be 
sufficient to recognize such information as true. Of course, one should perhaps
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agree that, given our characterization of Carneiro's story, there is a sense in 
which (1)' could be made semantically informative, and (2)' semantical/y 
uninformative, to Carneiro. I assume, for the sake of argument, that he 
understands the metalanguage, i.e. English, and possesses the semantic concepts 
involved. However, if one tried to figure out the conditions under which e.g. the 
piece of information encoded in (1)1 might be news to Carneiro, one would be 
bound to bring in considerations which necessarily concern the particular 
content assigned to (1) in the envisaged circumstances of utterance (especially 
the intentions of the utterer). Thus, one could hardly account for the non-trivial 
character which the information semantically contained in (1)' might have for 
Carneiro without appealing in some way to the non-trivial character which the 
information semantically contained in (1) has for him. In the light of the 
pragmatic view, (1) is (or, better, seems) informative to Carneiro because (the 
content of) (1)' would be genuinely informative to him. Yet, if the above 
observations are along the. right lines, one comes to the conclusion that the 
proposition expressed by (1) f would be informative to Carneiro because the 
proposition expressed by (1) is informative to him. (And parallel remarks could 
be made with respect to the uninformativeness of (2) and (2)').
A different sort of objection might be raised against the Millian pragmatic 
account of informativeness. It might be argued that there is some tension 
between the pragmatic strategy and certain other assumptions which seem to be 
constitutive of a Millian theory (or, at least, of Salmon's brand of Millianism). 
Consider the following pair of sentences28 :
(3) Phosphorus is a planet
20 Incidentally, although the pragmatic strategy might still have some initial 
appeal as applied to identity sentences, I think it becomes clearly inadequate 
as a way of dismissing potential differences in informative value between pairs 
of atomic sentences of other kinds, such as (3) and (4).
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(4) Hesperus is a planet
Our intuition teils us that utterances of (3) and (4) (or of their translations) 
have contents which would be (respectively) uninformative and informative to 
a certain ancient astronomer, say Ptolemy. Suppose that Ptolemy correctly 
identifies the celestial body which appears at dawn and which he names 
'Phosphorus' as a planet, but incorrectly identifies the celestial body which 
appears at dusk and which he names 'Hesperus' as a star. On the pragmatic 
view, such an intuition is apparently discarded by claiming that what Ptolemy 
really takes as uninformative and informative (respectively) are, not the contents 
of (3) and (4) (these are both alleged to be uninformative to him), but the 
contents of (translations of):
(3) f The referent of 'Phosphorus1 is a planet
(4)' The referent of 'Hesperus* is a planet.
Now the Millian theorist would surely agree that informativeness is a matter of 
a given subject's knowledge at a certain time, i.e. a matter of what the subject 
already knows (or does not know yet) at the time. Hence, I guess that one would 
be entitled to say that the following reports are jointly true of Ptolemy (with 
respect to a time t):
(5) Ptolemy knows (at t) that the referent of 'Phosphorus' is a planet
(6) Ptolemy does not know (at t) that the referent of 'Hesperus' is a
planet.
Assuming that propositions or pieces of information are the proper objects of 
knowledge, this would not present any problem to the Millian account. On such 
an account, (3)' and (4)' do not express the same proposition. Indeed, the 
propositions expressed by (3)' and (4)' are about distinct objects, viz. distinct 
names, and so they are distinct from one another; therefore, one could have 
both (5) and (6) as true. However, on the basis of a certain analysis of attitude- 
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ascriptions (In particular, knowledge-ascriptions)21 , Salmon's account would also 
entail the following result. From the fact that Ptolemy knows (at t) the 
proposition expressed by (3) (in the given context) it follows that he knows (at 
t) the proposition expressed by (4) (in the context); that is, the following report 
would also come out as true:
(7) Ptolemy knows (at t) that Hesperus Is a planet.
Roughly, the reason is that the piece of information encoded in (4) is the piece 
of information encoded in (3), viz. the ordered pair of Venus and Planethood, 
and so if Ptolemy knows the latter then he will necessarily know the former.
(7) is undoubtedly a highly counter-intuitive sort of result. One would 
ordinarily insist that, under the envisaged circumstances, Ptolemy does not know 
(at t) that Hesperus is a planet; and this is something which Salmon's theory 
could not allow us to assert, on pain of rendering the proposition expressed by 
(4) informative (to Ptolemy). But that is not our immediate concern. Our point 
is rather that it seems hard to harmonize the truth of report (6) with the truth 
of report (7). Of course, (6) is not (formally) inconsistent with (7), and so the 
claim is not that the Millian view is internally incoherent. A formal inconsistency 
could only be generated by means of the following additional reasoning. To begin 
with, the following would clearly hold with respect to Ptolemy's story:
(8) Ptolemy knows (at t) that Hesperus is the referent of 'Hesperus*. 
Let us suppose further that Ptolemy has a good knowledge of elementary logic, 
which he willingly exercises whenever he is given the opportunity; In particular, 
he is especially keen on the rule of Identity Elimination, i.e. the rule which 
allows us to infer [0(b)l from premisses fa=bl and [0(a)l. Then one would be 
presumably entitled to derive (9) from (7) and (8):
(9) Ptolemy knows (at t) that the referent of 'Hesperus* is a planet;
I discuss such a proposal in detail in Section 2.
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and (9) Is (formally) inconsistent with (6). The pattern under which such a 
derivation falls is this: fx knows (at t) that a=bl, fx knows (at t) that 0(a)l 
h fx knows (at t) that 0(b)l. Now, although this schema Is unreservedly taken 
as valid by a number of philosophers, there are a few who do not subscribe to 
the idea that, as a rule, propositlonal attitudes are necessarily closed under 
logical deductions made by the subject, and who would perhaps accept only some 
restricted version of the schema. On Salmon's Millian account, for instance, 
knowledge of singular propositions is taken as relativized to so-called "guises", 
i.e. It is seen as a ternary relation holding between a knower, a singular (neo- 
Russellian) proposition, and a guise or a mode of presentation under which such 
a proposition appears to the knower. Accordingly, the following sort of 
restriction would presumably be imposed upon the schema; roughly, an instance 
of it will be valid only if one and the same singular guise Is employed 
throughout the inference. Yet, in our example, distinct guises occur in the 
premisses: Ptolemy knows of.Hesperus that it is the referent of 'Hesperus1 under 
the singular guise 'Hesperus' (or perhaps under a guise which is a function of 
the name 'Hesperus'); but he knows of Hesperus that it is a planet under the 
singular guise 'Phosphorus'. Therefore, the Millian theorist could thus be in a 
position to resist the above reasoning. However, this would not dissipate the 
tension holding between (6) and (7). One might be inclined to regard the 
conjunction of (6) and (7) as intuitively implausible (with respect to Ptolemy's 
case), and hence to see an account which clearly entails such a result as 
intuitively implausible.
I guess that the Millian theorist intends the pragmatic explanation as a 
way of mitigating the counter-intultiveness of his claim that e.g. the contents 
of 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' are Invariably alike In 
informative value, being both uninformative. But, once the pragmatic strategy
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is dropped as unconvincing, such a claim emerges as conspicuously wrong. I 
take it that the different roles that contents of that kind may have in our 
cognitive lives, and in the explanation of our behaviour, strongly militate against 
the Millian claim (if one assumes, as I do, that accounting for such phenomena 
is part of the task of semantics in the broad sense). Suppose that Ptolemy 
worships Hesperus as the Goddess of Dusk, but is not at all awed by the 
appearances of Venus at dawn. Then a substantial portion of Ptolemy's religious 
beliefs and practise would be left unexplained if one were to ground our account 
on the Millian claim.
Furthermore, when the objects of knowledge are propositions expressible 
with the help of ordinary proper names, the dynamics of knowledge - and 
especially the transition from ignorance to knowledge - would turn out to be 
unaccountable. For instance, one might introduce a case in which at a time t 
Ptolemy does not know that Hesperus is a planet, but at a later time t', after 
having carried out a certain amount of astronomical research, he comes to know 
that Hesperus is a planet. Yet, one could hardly make sense of such transitions, 
which seem to be perfectly intelligible, in the light of Millianism; for one would 
be bound to assert that our subject has always known that Hesperus is a planet 
(though perhaps under different guises on different occasions). Or take the case 
of doubt. I assume that there is a sense of 'doubt' in which a subject doubts 
that p only if she neither knows that p (she has no evidence that p holds) nor 
knows that not-p (she has no evidence that the negation of p holds ). Now we 
can imagine our astronomer Ptolemy, on some occasion between t and t* and in 
the course of his research, as doubting that Hesperus is a planet in the above 
sense. Again, the Millian theorist could not accommodate this sort of epistemic 
state: given that Ptolemy knows, at the time in question, that Hesperus is a 
planet, one would have to say that it is not the case that he doubts then that
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Hesperus is a planet.
I guess that one would be entitled by ordinary standards to say that 
Ptolemy would find it informative at t that Hesperus is a planet because (10) 
would be true of him:
(10) Ptolemy does not know (at t) that Hesperus Is a planet. 
Yet, report (10) is false under Millianism (and (7) is true); for there Is a guise, 
viz. 'Phosphorus is a planet' (or its counterpart in Ptolemy's language, assuming 
that translation preserves guises of some sort), under which Ptolemy would 
stand in the Knowledge-relation at t to the proposition that Hesperus is a 
planet. Hence, Millianism comes into conflict with our ordinary intuitions about 
informativeness. Moreover, our intuition to the effect that a report such as (10) 
is true could not be explained away by employing the sort of strategy devised 
for the case of belief (and other attitudes). As we shall see In the next Section, 
our intuition to the effect that e.g. 'Ptolemy does not believe that Hesperus is 
a planet' is true (with respect to Ptolemy's story) Is accounted for by claiming 
that such a report is ambiguous between 'It is not the case that Ptolemy 
believes that Hesperus is a planet', which is construed as false, and 'Ptolemy 
disbelieves that Hesperus is a planet', which is construed as true; thus, when 
we are inclined to regard the above report as correct it is the latter reading 
that we have tacitly in mind. But disbelief, or belief in the negation, appears to 
have no clear analogue in the case of knowledge (obviously, one could not say 
that Ptolemy knows that Hesperus is not a planet).
Finally, I am afraid that the Millian account of informativeness would also 
be vulnerable to the following objection involving iterated epistemic attitudes. 
One might be inclined to assume that it would be essential to Millianism that the 




(11) Ptolemy does not know (at t) that he knows that Hesperus is a planet.
(One might express this by saying that the content of report (7) ought to be 
informative to Ptolemy at t). However, assuming that the apparatus of guises 
applies to iterated attitudes as well, it can be shown that (11) comes out as false 
under the Millian account. In effect, there is a guise - e.g. 'I know that 
Phosphorus is a planet', or 'I know that that (pointing to Venus at dawn) is a 
planet' - under which Ptolemy would stand in the Knowledge-relation at t to the 
proposition that he knows that Hesperus is a planet. Therefore, the Millian 
theorist would be compelled to assert that Ptolemy knows (at t) that he knows 
that Hesperus is a planet, a result which one might see as disastrous for the 
Millian view.
My overall conclusion is that the Millian framework of neo-Russellian 
propositions, even if supplemented by prepositional guises and complemented 
with the pragmatic strategy, is the wrong sort of theoretical framework to deal 
with the issue of the informal!veness of thoughts expressible by means of 
proper names. Salmon's attack on the Fregean argument about informative value, 
in spite of its ingenuity, is in general unconvincing and does not provide us 
with solid grounds on which the Fregean claim that informative value is not 
reference might be rejected.
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SECTION 2 - NAMING AND COGNITIVE VALUE
In this Section I intend to address the following two (closely related) 
questions. First, how does a Millian approach to the semantics of ordinary 
proper names fare with respect to the Problem of Cognitive Value? And what 
should one say about current claims to the effect that such a problem is indeed 
soluble within the framework of a direct reference theory? Secondly, how is one 
to assess certain arguments recently advanced by some Millian philosophers 
towards the conclusion that a variant of Frege's Puzzle framed in terms of the 
notion of cognitive value should be deemed unsound?
I begin by introducing the revised Fregean argument; and, taking once 
more Salmon's views as representing the Millian side, I consider his account of 
cognitive value - especially his account of belief and belief-ascriptions - and his 
alleged rebuttal of the new Frege's Puzzle. Then I discuss and eventually reject 
an argument recurrently adduced on the neo-Fregean side to the effect that the 
sort of Millian theory in question would be, in certain significant respects, 
totally indiscernible from a (certain version of a) Fregean theory. Finally, I 
argue on different grounds towards the conclusion that Millianism about 
cognitive value should also be taken as unacceptable.
2.1 Cognitive value is here taken as that aspect of cognitive significance 
which concerns the sort of prepositional attitudes a subject might take towards 
a given proposition or information content. Confining our attention to proposi- 
tions expressible by sentences containing proper names, what I have called the 
Problem of Cognitive Value is this. How is it possible that utterances of 
sentences fsl and fS'l of the envisaged kind - viz. f...a...l and f...b...l, where 
fd and fbl are co-referential names - express propositions which differ in
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cognitive value (relative to given contexts of use and to a given subject)? In 
particular, how is it possible for some subject to believe (judge, suspect, hope, 
etc.) that S without at the same time believing (Judging, suspecting, hoping, 
etc.) that S'? Naturally, it is assumed that our pre-theoretical intuitions provide 
us with empirical evidence that differences in cognitive value of that sort are 
indeed possible, and that the conceptual machinery of an adequate semantic 
theory ought to be such as to accommodate them in some satisfactory way.
The reformulated Frege's Puzzle is basically an argument which draws 
upon our ground-level intuitions about cognitive value. For our present 
purposes, it might be synoptically represented as follows**. The premisses of 
the new argument are these:
1. The Compositionality Principle: If the proposition expressed by a 
sentence fSl in a context c has the same mode of composition and the 
same constituents as the proposition expressed by a sentence fS'l in a 
context c1 then they .are one and the same proposition.
2. The New Major: If the proposition expressed by fSl in c is the same 
as the proposition expressed by fS'l in c1 then, for any agent x and time 
t, x believes (judges, suspects, hopes, etc.) at t that S (relative to c) if 
and only if x believes (judges, suspects, hopes, etc.) at t that Sf (relative 
to c1 ).
3. The New Minor: Let fSl and [S'l be (respectively) of the form f...a,..1 
and f...b...l, where fal and fbl are co-referential names (with respect 
to contexts c and c'). Then it is possible, for some agent x and time t, 
that x believes (judges, suspects, hopes, etc.) at t that S (relative to c) 
and x does not believe (judge, suspect, hope, etc.) at t that S' (relative 
to c').
M This is, in essence, the version exaained by Salnon; cf. Saloon 1986, 80 ff.
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Now, taken In conjunction with certain (relatively) uncontroverslal general 
suppositions, the new major and the new minor entail the result that the 
proposition expressed by fsl (I.e. f...a..J) in c differs from the proposition 
expressed by fSl (i.e. f...b...l) in cf. And the envisaged suppositions might be 
(crudely) stated as follows. Attitudes like belief, judgement, suspicion, etc., are 
to be regarded as being certain relations which hold between given subjects, 
on the one hand, and propositions, on the other, the latter being the objects of 
the attitudes. Accordingly, it is natural to construe attitude verbs as being two- 
place predicates which stand for such relations; and an attitude-ascription of 
the general form [x V's at t that Si, where V is an attitude verb, is said to be 
true of a subject s (relative to a context c) if and only If s V's (believes, 
judges, suspects, etc.) at t the proposition expressed by [Si (in c).
Then, by means of the Compositionality Principle, one would be able to 
draw from the above result the conclusion that distinct co-referential names \a] 
and fbl occurring in fsl and fS'l cannot be assigned the same prepositional 
value (relative to the given contexts c and c'). Therefore, the prepositional value 
- or the semantic content - of an ordinary proper name (in a context) cannot 
be identified with the object referred to by the name (in the context), a conse- 
quence which is inconsistent with what we have taken to be the constitutive 
thesis of a Millian theory of singular reference. Thus, in general, those 
propositions which are typically expressed by sentences containing proper names 
cannot be neo-Russellian propositions, i.e. propositions whose subject-positions 
(so as to speak) are entirely occupied by the bearers of the names.
Concerning the Fregean argument Just outlined, it is worthwhile to have 
the following points in mind. The Compositional ity Principle is as before and will 
be taken for granted in the ensuing discussion. As to the New Major, it Is 
obtained from the old one by substituting the notion of the cognitive value of
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a proposition for the notion of the Informative value of a proposition. Given the 
relational analysis of attitudes and attitude-ascriptions alluded to above, the New 
Major turns out to be (like its predecessor) a logical truth, viz. a consequence 
of Leibniz's Law by Universal Instantiation; so we shall also take it for granted 
in our discussion.
It should be mentioned that a different principle, also linking the notions 
of cognitive value and propositional content, has been sometimes employed by 
some Fregean philosophers23. The principle in question is not, at least in a 
straightforward manner, a truth of logic; besides needing to be restricted to 
rational agents, it is grounded on an intuitive notion of antagonism (or conflict) 
as applied to pairs of propositional attitudes. Roughly, it is the claim that it is 
impossible for a rational subject to hold mutually antagonistic (or conflicting) 
propositional attitudes towards the same proposition at the same time. An 
alternative argument about cognitive value could then be mounted on its basis, 
the premisses of which are these2*:
 
1 f . The Compositionality Principle
2f. The Alternative New Major: If the proposition expressed by a sentence
fsl in a context c is the same as the proposition expressed by a sentence
[Si in a context c" then, for any rational agent x and time t, if x
believes at t that S (relative to c) then it is not the case that x
disbelieves that S' at t, or x suspends belief about SJ at t, or x does not
believe that S' at t (relative to c').
3'. The Alternative New Minor: Let [Si and fS'l be (respectively) of the
^ E.g. by Gareth Evans; see his Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts 
in Evans 1982, 18-20. Such a principle is discussed, in connection with the 
topic of cognitive dynamics, in Chapter III.
^ For convenience, I take the case of belief as paradigmatic.
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form I...SL..] and [».b...l, where fal and fbl are co-referential names 
(with respect to contexts c and cf ). Then it is possible, for some rational 
agent x and time t, that x believes at t that S (relative to c) and x 
disbelieves that S' at t, or x suspends belief about S' at t, or x does not 
believe that S' at t (relative to c1 ).
It is assumed that belief and disbelief, and belief and suspension of belief, and 
belief and failure to belief, might be taken as forming pairs of prepositional 
attitudes which are in some intuitive sense antagonistic to one another. Due 
mainly to the relative vulnerability of its major premiss (by reference to the 
logical status of the New Major), the alternative argument comes out as less 
compelling than the original one; still, I am inclined to think that it is anchored 
upon ideas which are in general sound, and I shall come back to it later on.
Let us resume our discussion of the new Frege's Puzzle by considering 
its minor premiss. This is again seen, from Salmon's viewpoint, as the crux of 
the Fregean argument. Since the notion of a sentence being informative is not 
used at all - and since, as a result, there is no rationale for the suspicion that 
some pragmatically imparted (versus semantically encoded) information might be 
conveyed by an utterance of a sentence such as e.g. 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' - 
it is not possible for the Millian theorist to charge (on that basis) the new 
Frege's Puzzle with being a petitio principil; and such an immunity from petitio 
is one of the reasons why it is taken as an argument which is much more 
difficult to resist than the original one.
Furthermore, the New Minor seems to be sanctioned by our ordinary 
deductive practise, in particular by some of our strongest logical Intuitions 
about the soundness of inferences involving attitude-ascriptions. In effect, we 
would intuitively rate a number of inferences falling under the schema
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(V) x V's at t that S 
.-. x V's at t that S'
(where fsl and [S'l are as before) as being logically invalid, in the normal 
sense of having true premisses and false conclusions; thus, we would be inclined 
to deem schema (V) unsound. For instance, we would count the belief-ascriptions
(1) Ptolemy believes that Phosphorus is a planet
(2) Ptolemy believes that Hesperus is a planet
as true and false (respectively) with respect to Ptolemy's story and to a certain 
time; likewise, we would count
(3) Carneiro believes that Pessoa is Pessoa
(4) Carneiro believes that Pessoa is Campos
as true and false (respectively) with respect to Carneiro's story (in its primitive 
version) and to a certain time. Hence, we would regard
(5) Ptolemy does not believe that Hesperus is a planet
(6) Carneiro does not believe that Pessoa Is Campos
as being both true relative to the given contexts and times, assuming that (5) 
and (6) are negations of (2) and (4) (respectively).
The central idea underlying the New Minor is that co-referential proper 
names occurring in the subordinate clauses of belief-ascriptions (and other 
attitude-reports) are not, in general, interchangeable salva veritat^. Thus, 
substituting 'Hesperus' for 'Phosphorus' in (1), or 'Campos' for the second 
occurrence of 'Pessoa' in (3), would lead us from a truth, viz. (1) or (3), to a 
falsehood, viz. (2) or (4) (with respect to the stories in question). And the moral 
that the Fregean theorist typically draws from this Is that a proper name
W I assume that all attitude-reports we are dealing with are given their so- 
called De Dicto readings; i.e., in a report of the form fx V's that ...a. ..1 , 
the occurrence of the name [ al is to be taken as being in the semantic scope of 
'that'.
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occurring within the semantic scope of an attitude verb (or, more generally, In 
oratio obliqua) cannot be taken as referring (merely) to that object which Is, in 
any extensional construction (oratio recta), its usual referent or bearer; 
otherwise we would have to face the undesirable consequence that Leibniz's law 
of substitutivity of identicals for identicals is not universally valid, since it 
would admit exceptions. On the traditional Fregean view, a proper name 
occurring in oratio obliqua is said to refer to its customary sense, i.e. to a 
certain mode of presentation of the object which Is referred to by the name 
occurring In oratio recta. On some recent neo-Fregean views, reference to modes 
of presentation is replaced with a certain form of existential quantification over 
modes of presentation. In any case, the Fregean theorist is apparently able to 
block substitutivity of co-referential names in prepositional attitude contexts and 
to do justice to our ground-level judgements about the correctness or 
incorrectness of given attitude-ascriptions.
As is well-known, the new Frege's Puzzle poses a serious problem for any 
form of strict Millianism about singular reference. For If the semantic content 
of a name is invariably identical to its bearer then, given certain general 
principles about attitudes and attitude-ascriptions2', such a view is utterly 
committed to the thesis of the substitutivity, not only salva veritate but also 
salva significatione, of co-referential names in attitude contexts (validating thus 
schema (V) above). As a result, belief-reports such as (2) and (4) would be, from 
a Millian viewpoint, true in the envisaged stories; hence, on pain of allowing an 
inconsistency to be attributed to the ascriber, the Millian theorist is forced to 
count reports (5) and (6) as false (in those stories). It goes without saying that 
such verdicts clearly clash with the untutored intuitions we apparently possess
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clashing once more with our natural Inclination to count (13) and (14) as false 
(with respect to the above versions of our cases and to the above times). 
Moreover, by allowing the conjunction of reports such as (1) and (7), or (3) and 
(8), the Millian account allows the possibility of a rational subject's holding 
inconsistent beliefs, i.e. believing a proposition and its negation, at the same 
time (assuming that disbelief is construed as belief in the negation). And, by 
allowing the conjunction of reports such as (1) and (13), or (3) and (14), it also 
allows the possibility of a rational subject's believing a proposition and 
simultaneously suspending belief about the very same proposition.
2.2 The blatant counter-intuitiveness of the results entailed by the Millian 
view in the area of cognitive value might be thought of as providing us with 
a straightforward reductio of that view. Yet, again, things are not so simple. 
Ingenious arguments have been lately mounted on the Millian side with a view 
to mitigating the intuitive implausibility of such results and casting doubt upon 
the soundness of the Fregean argument. A case in point is Salmon's brand of 
Millianism about cognitive value and his attempt to discredit the new Frege's 
Puzzle27 . Donnellan has recently described Salmon's theory of belief as being 
that Millian proposal which comes closest to succeeding . I think that this 
appraisal is right, and that it is therefore of the utmost importance to undertake 
a careful examination of Salmon's views.
Salmon's strategy for refuting the new Frege's Puzzle Is twofold. On the 
one hand, he argues that the seemingly unassailable New Minor premiss is In 
fact false: contrary to appearances, ascriptions like (2) and (4) are Indeed true
Salmon's account of belief is expounded in Salmon 1986, 103-18. See also
tion IV.Salmon 1990, Sect  
28 Donnellan 1990, 204,
Page 100
NAMING AND COGNITIVE VALUE
and ascriptions like (5) and (6) indeed false (in the respective stories); and, in 
order to accommodate this sort of ruling, he offers an account of the Belief- 
relation grounded on a direct theory of reference. On the other hand, a 
pragmatic explanation is provided of why we think in the way we ordinarily do 
when we regard inferences falling under schema (V) as invalid; as Millianism 
collides with our raw Intuitions, and these are in effect seen as mistaken, Salmon 
has to display the source of our allegedly misguided patterns of speech and 
reasoning about belief.
Schematically represented, Salmon's theory of belief consists in the 
following analysis of reports of the form fx believes that pi (for simplicity, 
reference to times is omitted):
(S) x believes that p iff (3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)].
Here 'x','p' and 'g 1 range (respectively) over believers, (neo-Russellian) proposi- 
tions, and what Salmon calls "modes of acquaintance" with propositions, or 
"guises" under which they may be entertained; and 'G(x,p,g)' abbreviates 'x 
grasps p by means of g 1 . Thus, the ordinary binary relation of belief is defined 
In terms of the existential generalization of a ternary relation BEL whose relata 
are believers, propositions, and guises; and standing in the BEL relation to a 
proposition p is taken to be something like being disposed to assent mentally 
to p when taking p under a certain guise.
In addition, there are two constraints which Salmon imposes on his BEL 
relation. The first is obvious and might be expressed as follows:
(A) -CI [(3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)] -> (Vg)[G(x,p,g) * BEL(x,p,g)]].
In other words, it is possible for x to stand in BEL to a given proposition p 
under some guise by means of which x Is familiar with p without standing In 
BEL to p under every guise by means of which x is familiar with p; hence, it
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Is allowed that conditions of the form f(3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)l and 
f(3g)[G(x,p,g) & -«BEL(x,p,g)l be jointly satisfied by a given believer (at a given 
time). The second constraint amounts to the following construal of the notion of 
a subject's withholding belief from a proposition:
(B) x withholds belief from p Iff (3g)[G(x,p,g) & -.BEL(x,p,g)].
A corollary of (A) and (B) is that it is possible for a subject x to believe a 
proposition p while at the same time withholding belief concerning p; for the 
formulas f(3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)]l and f(3g)[G(x,p,g) & -iBEL(x,p,g)]l are
clearly not mutually inconsistent.
Furthermore, one might introduce the notion of failure to believe, 
separating it in limine from that of withholding belief, as follows:
(C) x falls to believe that p Iff -*(3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)];
indeed, (C) is easily obtainable from (S) by elementary logic (reading f x falls 
to believe that pi as fit Is not the case that x believes that pi). And the 
notions of suspension of belief and disbelief might also be introduced in the 
following way:
(D) x suspends belief about p iff (3g)[G(x,p,g) & -i[BEL(x,p,g)V BEL(x,-«p,-ig)]] 
(E) x disbelieves that p iff (3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,-.p,g)].
Clearly, a subject's suspending belief about a given proposition entails (but is 
not entailed by) her withholding belief from that proposition; and, presumably, 
a rational subject's disbelieving a proposition entails (but is not entailed by) 
her withholding belief from that proposition.
Salmon does not say much about the third relatum of his BEL relation, i.e. 
about the nature of propositional guises. He suggests though that in most cases, 
but not in all, a guise might be thought of as being a binary function f which
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maps each believer x and sentence fsl (of x's language) onto the way x would 
take the proposition expressed by fsl were this proposition presented to her 
through the very sentence fsl. Thus, we could take the following claim as 
typically holding: for any subject x and guise g, there is a sentence fsl in x's 
language such that g = f(x,fsl), where f(x,fsl) is the way in which x would 
take the proposition encoded in fsl if he were acquainted with such a 
proposition by means of fsl. And claims (S) through (E) could then be rewritten 
in accordance with such a construal of the notion of a guise.
Let us see how the theoretical apparatus just sketched might be employed 
with a view to assessing the Fregean argument. To begin with, it is crucial to 
notice that Salmon's general premiss here is a strict Mlllian criterion of identity 
for singular propositions, according to which singular propositions p and q are 
the same proposition if and only if p and q are constructed out of exactly the 
same objects and the same attributes by means of the same mode of composition. 
Hence, it is assumed that e.g. the proposition that Pessoa is Campos is in fact 
the same as the proposition that Pessoa is Pessoa, or as the proposition that 
Campos is Campos; likewise, the proposition that Phosphorus Is a planet and the 
proposition that Hesperus is a planet are supposed to be one and the same 
singular proposition.
Now the New Minor premiss comes out as false under Salmon's account of 
belief. In effect, such an account entails the general result that, necessarily, If 
fx believes at t that Si is true of a given subject then fx believes at t that 
S'l is also true of her (where fsil and fsl are as Indicated). For If the former 
ascription holds, then there will be a guise g by means of which x grasps the 
proposition that S and under which x stands In BEL to the proposition that 8 
at t; but, since the proposition that S Is the proposition that Sf, g will also be 
a guise by means of which x grasps the proposition that Sf and under which x
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stands In the BEL relation to the proposition that S' at t; and so the latter 
ascription will also hold.
Accordingly, reports such as (2) and (4) turn out to be true In the light 
of the Millian account (with respect to the given stories). Indeed, the following 
conditions would obtain:
(i) BEL [Ptolemy,that Hesperus is a planet,f( Ptolemy,'Phosphorus is a planet)] 
(ii) BEL[Carneiro, that Pessoa is Campos, f(Carneiro,'Pessoa 6 Pessoa')] 
(where in (I) we should rather have some appropriate translation of 'Phosphorus 
is a planet' into Ptolemy's language); and then, by means of existential 
generalization and (S) (appropriately revised), one would get (2) and (4). On the 
other hand, if one reads fx does not believe that pi as fx fails to believe that 
pi, then reports such as (5) and (6) come out as false under the Millian account 
(with respect to the given stories). Indeed, (i) and (ii) are (respectively) 
sufficient to render the following false:
-«(3g)[Ptolemy, that Hesperus is a planet, g]
-i(3g)[Carneiro, that Pessoa is Campos, g];
and so, by means of (C) and the above assumption, (5) and (6) will not be the 
case.
As to the alternative argument, it is its major premiss which would be 
deemed false from the Millian standpoint. Assuming that fSl and fS'l are 
(respectively) of the form f...a...l and f...b...l, where fal and fbl are co- 
referential names, Salmon's account entails the following general result: It is 
possible for pairs of ascriptions of the form fx believes at t that Si and fx 
disbelieves at t that S'l, or fx believes at t that Si and fx suspends belief at 
t about S1, to be true of a rational subject s (even if the proposition that S 
is the same as the proposition that S 1 ). Indeed, let p be that proposition which 
is ex hypothesi referred to both by fthat Si and fthat S'l. Then the Millian
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account allows the following conditions to be jointly satisfied by s 
(*) G(x,p,g) 4 BEL(x,p,g) 
(**) G(x,p,h) & BEL(x,ip,h), 
with the important proviso that -i(n = -ig); in effect, a conjunction of the form
BEL[x,p,f(x,fSl)] 4 BEL[x,-p,f(x,hS'l)]
might turn out to be true of s. Hence, by means of (revised) (S) and (E), one 
would get from (*) and (**) (respectively) to the result that both (x believes 
at t that Sl and fx disbelieves at t that S'l may hold of s. Note that the 
proviso -i(h = -«g) is required in order to block the possibility of a rational 
subject's simultaneously believing and disbelieving the same proposition under 
one and the same guise, or believing contradictory propositions under a guise 
and its negation. (And remarks which parallel the ones made about belief and 
disbelief could be made with respect to belief and suspension of belief.)
Accordingly, reports such as (7) and (8) turn out to be true in the light 
of the Millian theory (with respect to the given stories). Indeed, the following 
would obtain:
(ill) BEL[Ptdemy,that Phosphorus is not a planet,f(Ptolemy, fHesperus is not
a planet)] 
(Iv) BEL[Carneiro, that Pessoa is not Pessoa, f(Carneiro,'Pessoa ndo 6 (is
not) Campos')]
(where, again, in (iii) we should have some appropriate translation of 'Hesperus 
Is not a planet' into Ptolemy's language); and then, by means of existential 
generalization and (revised) (E), one would get (7) and (8). Likewise, (13) and 
(14) come out as true under the Millian account (with respect to the given 
versions of the stories). In effect, the following would hold:
(v) iBEL[Ptolemy,that Phosphorus is a planet,f(Ptolemy,'Hesperus is a 
planet')] 4 -•BEL[Ptolemy,that Phosphorus Is not a planet,
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f(Ptolemy,'Hesperus is not a planet']
(vi) ->BEL[Carnelro,that Pessoa is Pessoa,f(Carneiro, f Pessoa 6 Campos)] & 
iBEL[Carneiro,that Pessoa is not Pessoa,f(Carneiro, fPessoa nSo 6 
Campos)];
and then, by Existential Generalization and (revised) (D), one would get (13) and 
(14).
Finally, let me summarize the sort of account provided by Salmon about 
the source of our allegedly mistaken ordinary intuitions about cognitive value. 
Take, for instance, our inclination to count ascription (4) as false, and hence (6) 
as true, with respect to Carneiro's story. Salmon's explanation" is divided into 
three parts. First, it is claimed that in certain cases we are disposed to see (4) 
as false because we have a propensity to conflate the content of (4) with the 
content of a different report, viz.
(15) Carneiro believes that 'Pessoa 4 Campos1 is true (in Portuguese); 
since (15) is obviously false, we would tacitly ground our intuitive verdict about 
(4) on (15)'s falsity. Secondly, it may also happen that we are disposed to see 
(4) as false because we have a propensity to infer the falsity of (4), and the 
truth of (6), from the fact that Carneiro would sincerely and reflectively dissent 
from an utterance of the sentence 'Pessoa 4 Campos' (a sentence which he fully 
understands); on Salmon's view, such an inference Is unsound: what one should 
conclude from the above fact is not that Carneiro does not believe the 
proposition that Pessoa Is Campos, but that he withholds belief (in the given 
sense) from that proposition under the guise 'Pessoa is Campos'. Thirdly, (4)'s 
appearance of falsity might also be due to the fact that our usual practise of 
belief-ascription would lead us to see (4) as conveying, not only the proposition
25 Salmon 1990, 232-4.
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believed by Carneiro, but also the guise under which it is believed, i.e. the way 
Carneiro takes that proposition in agreeing to it (which, on Salmon's view, is no 
part of the semantic content of (4)). That is to say, one would be tacitly and 
wrongly reading (4) as the following false claim (as couched in Salmon's 
terminology): Carneiro stands in the BEL relation to the proposition that Pessoa 
is Campos under the guise 'Pessoa 6 Campos'.
2.3 A Fregean rejoinder to Salmon's anti-Fregean argument which suggests 
itself in a natural way consists in claiming that, by relying on an apparatus of 
guises or modes of presentation of propositions, the Millian account of belief 
which supports such an argument is in the end a mere terminological version 
of a Fregean account of belief. This sort of rejoinder is very common in recent 
neo-Fregean literature on the topic*8; one might even say that it represents the 
predominant way of arguing against Millianism on the part of present-day Fre- 
gean philosophers .
It is to such a line of counter-argumentation, a paradigm of which is 
Graeme Forbes's criticism of Salmon's views about cognitive value, that I turn 
now my attention. In a review of Frege's Puzzle** Forbes makes the central 
claim that Salmon's theory of belief might be seen, under certain conditions, as 
a notational variant of a neo-Fregean theory; and thus that the Millian account 
could be reduced to a neo-Fregean one simply by rewriting it in terms of 
Fregean vocabulary. With a view to supporting his claim Forbes offers an outline 
of an account of belief which, according to him, would satisfy the following
30 References concerning what I shall call the neo-Fregean Notational Variance 
Claim are given in Section 3.
31 An exception is given in McDowell 1984; cf. 104, footnote 15.
32 Forbes 1987a.
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conditions: (i)- it could be directly obtained from Salmon's own analysis by 
means of a certain set of substitutions, which presumably would not affect the 
essential features of Salmon's view; (II)- it could naturally be described as 
Fregean, in the sense that it would preserve (at least) the spirit of Frege's 
original semantical doctrines, especially his fundamental Intuitions about belief. 
Of course, the upshot is that Salmon's theory would not, at bottom, constitute 
a genuine Millian alternative to a Fregean semantics for belief-ascriptions.
Before considering Forbes's central claim, I would like to examine a 
preliminary claim he also makes to the effect that Salmon's analysis entails the 
possibility of our ascribing contradictory beliefs to some (rational) believer, i.e. 
a belief that p and simultaneously a belief that not-p; and that the fact that 
this sort of consequence is not at all derivable from a Fregean theory (indeed 
its negation needs to be derivable) is to be thought of as being a significant 
advantage of this kind of theory over the Millian theory. It seems to me that 
this preliminary claim is inconsistent with Forbes's central claim that the Millian 
account only differs from a Fregean one with respect to the sort of notation 
employed, so that there is no substantial divergence between them. In effect, it 
is reasonable to require of two theories Tj and T2 , which are ex hypothesi 
notational variants of each other and hence mutually translatable, that they 
generate exactly the same set of logical consequences. In other words, for any 
proposition q which may be expressed both by some sentence fsl in Tj and by 
its notational variant fS*l in T2 , It is natural to require that q is deduclble in 
T| if and only if q is deducible in T2 . And if we further assume, which seems 
plausible under our present conditions, that Tj and T2 are consistent theories, 
then it is not the case that we could have, for some proposition r, both a 
derivation of r In T, and a derivation of not-r in T2 . Now let Tj and T2 be the 
philosophical theories of belief proposed by Salmon and by the Fregean,
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respectively, and let r be the proposition that it is possible correctly to 
attribute contradictory beliefs to a certain believer. We would then obtain the 
straightforward conclusion that, contrary to Forbes's central claim, Salmon's 
theory cannot be a notational variant of the envisaged Fregean theory; at least 
if the latter is not supposed to have the mentioned unFregean consequence, and 
this is surely a sound assumption within a Fregean framework 33. (I have also 
assumed that words like 'belief, etc., mean the same in both theories.)
As we have seen, Forbes is certainly right when he says that Millianism 
implies that it is possible to ascribe Inconsistent beliefs to some agent. But this 
is to be understood in a certain sense. Take Ptolemy's case. In the light of (S), 
the following ascriptions are both true:
(16) Ptolemy believes that Hesperus is a planet
(17) Ptolemy believes that Hesperus is not a planet.
Hence we are indeed in a position, under Salmon's analysis, to attribute 
contradictory beliefs to Ptolemy. Yet, this is to be taken in the sense that, 
whereas Ptolemy believes the proposition that Hesperus is a planet under the 
guise f(Ptolemy,'Phosphorus is a planet'), he comes to believe the contradictory 
of that proposition under the guise f(Ptolemy,'Hesperus is not a planet'); and it 
should be stressed that the sentence 'Hesperus is not a planet' is not the 
negation of the sentence 'Phosphorus is a planet'. Therefore, in this sense, we 
are not committed to any description of our agent as being an illogical or 
irrational believer. He could only be so described if we also had
BEL[Ptolemy,that Hesperus is not a planet,f(Ptolemy/Phosphorus Is not
a planet')], 
which is obviously not the case (in Ptolemy's story). Of course, these observa-
^ Forbes's argument that the difference tells in favour of neo-Fregeanism seems 
to assume this.
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tions do not render Salmon's theory any less counter-intuitive for it has in any 
case the consequence that Ptolemy believes that Hesperus is a planet tout court 
and also believes that Hesperus is not a planet tout court, but, apparently, they 
somehow mitigate the implausibility of such a consequence.
By contrast, there is no sense in which ascriptions of inconsistent beliefs 
such as (16) and (17) could be both obtainable in a Fregean theory, for Instance 
the sort of theory put forward by Forbes^. On the basis of the distinct 
(perceptual) modes of presentation of Venus attached by Ptolemy to 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' (or to the counterparts of these names in his language), he 
can be said to stand in the belief-relation to the Fregean proposition expressed 
by 'Hesperus is not a planet', which is the denotation of the 'that'-clause in 
(17); hence (17) is true in Ptolemy's story. But (16) is not at all the case, since 
Ptolemy does not stand in the belief-relation to the Fregean proposition 
expressed by 'Hesperus is a planet', which is the denotation of the 'that'-clause 
in (16); although he does stand in that relation to the proposition expressed by 
'Phosphorus is a planet', which Is a different Fregean thought as it contains a 
different mode of presentation of Venus (relative to Ptolemy).
Let us now consider Forbes's central claim and his proposed neo-Fregean 
reconstruction of the Millian account. Forbes strategy consists in taking Salmon's 
crucial claim concerning belief, expressed in
(S) x believes that p Iff (3g)[G(x,p,g) & BEL(x,p,g)],
as his starting-point and in subjecting (S) to the following set of substitutions: 
First, on the right-hand side of the biconditional, replace the ternary predicate 
'G(x,p,g)' ('x grasps p by means of g') with the ternary predicate fT(x,p,g)' ('x 
thinks of p by means of g'), where 'x', 'p' and 'g' are to be regarded as
Forbes 1987b.
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variables ranging over believers, states of affairs and propositions (respective- 
ly). Second, still on the right-hand side, replace 'BEL(x,p,g)' by the conjunction 
'B(x,p) & p = Ref(g)', where 'x','p' and 'g' are read as above, 'B' stands for the 
belief-relation, and 'Ref stands for the Reference function, which in this case 
assigns to each proposition g some state of affairs p as its referent. Finally, 
substitute 'p is believed by x to obtain 1 for the left-hand side. The result would 
be the formula:
(F) p is believed by x to obtain Iff (3g)[T(x,p,g) & B(x,g) & p = Ref(g)].
Thus, Forbes's states of affairs replace Salmon's propositions and Salmon's 
guises are replaced by Forbes's propositions. The idea underlying (F) is that 
states of affairs are the referents of sentences; or, to be precise, the referents 
of the propositions expressed by these sentences. It is implicitly assumed that 
the relation between a proposition g and a certain state of affairs p is the 
relation which obtains between Fregean sense (the proposition expressed by 
some sentence fSl) and reference (the state of affairs referred to by fSl); and 
this relation is to the effect that sense determines reference, so that we can say 
that a sentence fSl refers to a state of affairs p only in a derivative way: 
primarily, it is the proposition g expressed by fSl which determines p as its 
referent.
Concerning the above reconstruction, Forbes advances two kinds of claim. 
First, (F) may be seen, in a fairly conspicuous manner, as a mere notational 
variant of Salmon's analysis (S), the apparent differences between (S) and (F) 
reducing to terminological ones. Assuming that his states of affairs coincide with 
Salmon's propositions - since they are conceived as displaying precisely the 
same sort of composition as neo-Russellian propositions, viz. objects coupled with 
properties - Forbes contends that Salmon's concept of a guise plays in (S) 
exactly the same kind of role as the concept of a Fregean proposition In (F); so
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that there are reasons to suspect that Milllan guises dissolve into Fregean 
senses. Given that a neo-Russellian proposition p is an entity structured in the 
way described above, every guise under which x can take p is bound to have 
as constituents a manner of grasping some object o and a manner of grasping 
some property P. But such manners of grasping, Forbes argues, are no other 
than the Fregean senses which together make up the proposition a~0, where a 
and 0 are (respectively) modes of presentation (relative to x) of the object o 
and the property P (I use '"' for concatenation of senses). Therefore, Just as 
in Forbes's neo-Fregean analysis (F) a (Fregean) proposition g is a mode of 
presentation of some state of affairs p, so in Salmon's Millian analysis (S) a 
guise g could be viewed as being, in essence, a mode of presentation of some 
(neo-Russellian) proposition (= state of affairs) p. (Of course, I have been 
assuming that we are only dealing with atomic propositions, i.e. those which may 
be expressed by sentences constructed out of simple unary predicates and 
simple singular terms.)
Forbes's subsidiary claim, which I shall take here for granted (though I 
think it is disputable), is simply that his reconstruction of the Millian theory 
may be plausibly considered as being Fregean in nature; that is, it would not 
represent any significant departure from the spirit of Frege's doctrines.
Now I think Forbes's central claim is not in general sound. It seems to me 
that the sort of indirect argument used - that of trying to undermine the Millian 
account by showing that it is just a version of a neo-Fregean account, so that 
one would not really be confronted with two different and rival theories - does 
not provide someone working within a Fregean argument with an adequate 
strategy to counter the Millian view. It would perhaps be better, and that Is 
what I shall do later on, to concentrate a Fregean attack on certain apparently 
dubious and highly controversial results which are constitutive of the Millian
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view, particularly the counter-intuitive character of a substantial set of 
consequences which follow from Salmon's theory of belief, as well as the 
associated revisionist stand he is forced to take towards our current patterns 
of speaking about belief.
Although I think that Forbes's considerations show that there must be 
some sense in which Salmon's account could be seen as invoking the same kind 
of conceptual machinery as the neo-Fregean theory, I shall argue that Forbes's 
"notational variance" claim cannot be accepted; and if I am right, guises cannot 
be assimilated, at least on that basis, to Fregean senses. I shall resume to the 
effect a line of reasoning already introduced, which can be synoptically 
represented as follows. If Salmon's analysis (S) is to be regarded as a notational 
variant of its neo-Fregean counterpart (F), then (F) itself is bound to have the 
same consequences as (S); in particular, (F) is bound to yield exactly the same 
verdicts on the truth-values of given belief-ascriptions. But either this is not 
the case, and then Forbes is wrong in claiming that Salmon's account is a 
notational variant of (F) and that guises are "disguised" Fregean senses; or it 
is the case, but then (F) would at once disqualify itself as Fregean in spirit (for 
obvious reasons). I shall now try to show that the first branch of this 
disjunction holds.
Having in mind Ptolemy's case, one would prima facie reach the conclusion 
that Forbes's analysis (F) implies that it is possible correctly to ascribe 
inconsistent beliefs to Ptolemy (displaying thus the same sort of behaviour as 
(S) in this respect). Applying (F) so as to try to settle the question whether it 
allows us to assert that Ptolemy believes that Hesperus is a planet, one would 
obtain the following (for convenience, I abbreviate 'the state of affairs that p'
to Vp/'):
/Hesperus is a planet/ is believed by Ptolemy to obtain iff (3g)[T(Pto-
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Iemy,/Hesperus is a planet/,g) & B(Ptolemy,g) & /Hesperus is a planet/ =
Ref(g)].
Let g be the Fregean proposition ['Phosphorus is a planet*! 35, so that this 
proposition is a mode of presentation of /Hesperus is a planet/ for Ptolemy, it 
is clearly believed by Ptolemy in his story, and its referent is obviously 
/Hesperus is a planet/. Thus, we come to the conclusion that
(18) The state of affairs that Hesperus is a planet is believed by Ptolemy
to obtain.
On the other hand, let g be ['Hesperus is not a planet1!. Then the following 
holds:
(3g)[T(Ptolemy,/Hesperus is not a planet/,g) & B(Ptolemy,g) & /Hesperus
is not a planet/ = Ref(g)]. 
Hence, by (F), we are also in a position to assert:
(19) The state of affairs that Hesperus is not a planet is believed by
Ptolemy to obtain.
So the conjunction of (18) and (19) implies at least that Ptolemy believes of 
inconsistent states of affairs that they both obtain. But is there any sense in 
which this could amount to ascribing contradictory beliefs to Ptolemy?
In order to answer this question we have to determine whether or not (18) 
and (19) might receive (respectively) the readings:
(20) Ptolemy believes that the state of affairs that Hesperus is a planet 
obtains.
(21) Ptolemy believes that the state of affairs that Hesperus is not a 
planet obtains. 
If so, I would argue on Fregean grounds that (20) and (21), and hence (18) and
35 I use 'f'V'1 ' as sense-quotes, i.e. the result of writing a given expression 
within such symbols is a nane of the Fregean sense of the expression.
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(19), are respectively the same as (16) and (17), in which case (F) would indeed 
entail the possibility of our correctly attributing inconsistent beliefs to Ptolemy. 
Taking (20) as an example, I would argue as follows. According to the Fregean 
account, the occurrence of the singular term 'the state of affairs that Hesperus 
is a planet* in (20) must have as its reference, not its customary reference (ex 
hypothesi a certain state of affairs, e.g. the reference of the sentence 
'Phosphorus is a planet'), but that which is its customary sense; and, using 
Forbes's assumptions, this sense is a concept of that state of affairs, viz. the 
Fregean proposition f sHesperus is a planet*! (which might be expressed by the 
sentence 'Hesperus is a planet' occurring by itself) . Thus, the Fregean 
regimentation for (20) is
B(Ptolemy,[ 8Hesperus is a planet^^obtains8]), 
which may presumably be abbreviated to
B(Ptolemy,f sHesperus is a planet*!),
which in turn is the Fregean regimentation for (16). (And a similar argument 
could be applied to (21)).
However, there is a strong reason to think that Forbes would not allow 
(18) and (19) to have, respectively, the readings (20) and (21) (in the sense of 
their forming pairs of logically equivalent belief-ascriptions). The reason is that 
e.g. (18) would rather receive the overtly De Re reading (or, in Forbes's 
terminology, the "external form" reading)
(18) f The state of affairs that Hesperus Is a planet is something Ptolemy
believes to obtain, 
where the occurrence of the singular term 'the state of affairs that Hesperus
35 Actually, it could be that the description f the state of affairs that s! might 
express a slightly different (perhaps more intimate) way of thinking of a state 
of affairs than that which is expressed by the sentence f Si ; but I ignore the 
complication here.
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is a planet* is an external occurrence and has as its reference the customary 
reference of the term (the state of affairs itself), being thus open to replace- 
ment salva veritate by any co-referential singular term (e.g. 'the state of affairs 
that Venus is a planet'). By contrast, in (20) the occurrence of the same term 
Is internal and (20) is itself an internal form (in classical terminology, a De Dicto 
ascription, although the De Re/De Dicto distinction does not fully coincide with 
Forbes's external form/internal form distinction).
Now the logical relations which are seen to hold between external forms 
and the corresponding internal forms are such that the former ascriptions can 
always be inferred from the latter ones, while the converse inference is not 
valid in Forbes's Fregean theory; that is, whereas a belief-ascription of the 
general form
(a) a is something x believes to be F, 
whose regimentation is
(3m)[T(x,a,m) & B(x, rrTf s is F8!)]
(where 'm' ranges over modes of presentation of objects), is entailed by a 
belief-ascription of the form
(b) x believes that a is F, 
whose regimentation is
B(x, rVTPls F8 1),
the converse deduction is not allowed. It follows that (18) (read as (18)'), which 
has the form (a), does not entail (20), which has the form (b). Thus, (18) cannot 
have the reading (20), and the same would apply to (19) and (21).
Our general conclusion is that, under such circumstances, Forbes's 
analysis (F) does not yield the same consequences, concerning the truth-values 
of belief-ascriptions such as (16) and (17), as Salmon's analysis (S); for Instance, 
whereas (S) implies that (16) is true (In Ptolemy's story), (F) would entail the
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falsity of (16) (and It would be In this sense genuinely Fregean). This Is 
sufficient to establish the result that, pace Forbes, Salmon's theory Is not a 
notatlonal variant of a neo-Fregean account (as represented In (F)). Neverthe- 
less, and Independently of translation considerations, Forbes's reconstruction has 
the merit of enabling us to see Salmon's theory, from a Fregean point of view, 
as misinterpreting belief-ascriptions by treating states of affairs as the objects 
of belief.
2.4 Let me close this Section with a brief mention of a number of aspects 
which are constitutive of the Millian account of cognitive value and which I take 
to be irremediably defective. The aspects in question relate mainly to the failure 
of the Millian theory to accommodate certain fundamental features of our 
ordinary practise of attitude-ascription. I assume that our definitive method of 
assessment of a given semantical theory consists in checking out whether or not 
the theory is able to accommodate our pre-theoretical linguistic Intuitions. To 
use Donnellan's phrase37 , such intuitions are the bottom line in philosophical 
argumentation about language. And I think that the Millian appeal to guises as 
external to the singular contents believed, judged, etc., as well as the associated 
pragmatic strategy employed to discard our ground-floor judgements, are 
insufficient to palliate the manifest implausibility of a number of Millian 
descriptions of our propositional attitudes. Maybe, as Kripke has claimed 38, our 
intuitions about belief are not, In general, as solid as one might expect, and 
maybe there are cases concerning which they are likely to break down. But 
there are also clear-cut cases, cases concerning which our intuitions are 
perfectly in order; and It is against such cases that I think one should test the
37 Donnellan 1990, 204. 
3S S.Kripke 1979.
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Mllllan view and eventually reject it. It is true that a neo-Fregean account of 
belief has problems of Its own; but, by treating a belief-ascription containing 
a simple singular term as conveying information, not only about the object the 
belief Is about, but also about some mode of presentation under which the 
believer takes the object, such an account has at least the significant advantage 
of blocking from the outset any counter-intuitive descriptions of the envisaged 
sort.
Let me then delineate what I take to be the most serious drawbacks to the 
Millian view of cognitive value. To begin with, a necessary consequence of such 
a view is that an ascription such as
(22) Carneiro believes that Campos is not Campos
would be entirely in order (with respect to Carneiro's case). Now It seems to me 
that this kind of result can hardly be accepted. I doubt whether the pragmatic 
strategy, backed up by a framework of guises, would succeed in dispelling in 
a satisfactory way our strongly entrenched intuition to the effect that (22) is 
utterly incorrect. And if one switches from belief-ascriptions to reports of 
sayings then, assuming that the Millian account also applies to the latter, the 
intuitive implausibility of the Millian verdicts becomes even more apparent. 
Suppose that Carneiro, in the context of his story, comes to utter a token of 
'Pessoa is not Campos' (or rather 'Pessoa n&o 6 Campos'). Then Millianism would 
allow us to report this in Indirect discourse as follows:
(23) Carneiro said that Campos is not Campos;
and (23) seems to be wholly inappropriate in the light of our ordinary 
standards.
By entailing the truth of attributions like (22), the Millian theory entails 
the possibility of our attributing to an ex hypothesi fully rational and logical 
subject a belief in a self-contradiction (or, better, a belief in a logical
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impossibility, viz. the negation of a logical truth). Now such a consequence would 
not be completely unreasonable, one might concede, only if the subject could not 
be in a position to be aware of the fact that she believes a self-contradictory 
proposition. The problem is that it seems that (Salmon's brand of) Miliianism also 
entails that it is possible for a rational subject who is described as believing 
a self-contradiction to realize that she believes the self-contradiction in 
question. Indeed, assuming that Carneiro is minimally competent in attributing 
beliefs (to others and to himself), the following would be true of him under the 
Mi I Man account:
(24) Carneiro knows that he believes that Campos is not Campos. 
The reason is that Carneiro would stand in the epistemic analogue of the BEL 
relation, which one might call the KNOW relation, to the neo-Russeilian 
proposition that Carneiro believes that Campos is not Campos; for there would 
be a guise, e.g. f(Carneiro, that Carneiro believes that Campos is not Campos, 
J Eu acred/to qua Pessoa nao e Campos' ('I believe that Pessoa is not Campos')), 
by means of which he would be familiar with that proposition and under which 
he would stand in KNOW to it. (Incidentally, I guess that Miliianism would even 
entitle us to assert that Carneiro knows (24).)
On the other hand, suppose that Carneiro has some expertise in elementary 
logic and semantics; and, in particular, that he has the concept of a self- 
inconsistent proposition. Then Miliianism allows us to assert that Carneiro knows 
that the proposition he believes, viz. the proposition that Campos is not Campos, 
Is self-Inconsistent; In effect, there would be a guise, e.g. f(Carnelro, the 
proposition that Campos is not Campos is self-inconsistent, 'A proposlcao qua 
Campos nao e Campos e auto-Inconsistent^ ('The proposition that Campos is not 
Campos Is self-Inconsistent')), by means of which he is ex hypothesi familiar with 
that proposition and under which he stands In the KNOW relation to It. And the
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existence of such a guise would also warrant the claim that Carneiro knows that 
the proposition that Campos is not Pessoa is a self-Inconsistent proposition! 
True, what Carneiro is ignorant of is the metalinguistic proposition that the 
sentence 'Pessoa nao 6 Campos' expresses (in Portuguese) a self-inconsistent 
proposition; and this happens to be the sentence used to specify the guise 
under which he believes, and knows that he believes, the self-inconsistency that 
Campos is not Campos. Still, I think that the preceding results strongly militate 
against the intuitive tenability of the Millian account. Furthermore, one might 
take the following principle as imposing a plausible constraint on the notion of 
rationality: if x is rational then, if x knows that x believes a proposition p and 
x knows that p is self-inconsistent, then x will cease to believe p. Now it seems 
that this principle is violated by the Millian theory. Indeed, letting p be the 
proposition that Campos is not Campos, all the conditions stated in the 
antecedent are apparently fulfilled in Carneiro's case. Yet, according to
*
Miilianism, Carneiro continues to believe that Campos is not Campos. True, he 
also withholds belief from the proposition in question, and disbelieves it as well; 
but this is something which he has done all along.
Another sort of counter-intuitive consequence of the Millian account of 
cognitive value is that it licenses attributions of beliefs whose contents are 
specified by using proper names which are not available in the repertoire of the 
believer, or which are not the counterparts of any names in the believer's 
idiolect (if the language of the ascriber differs from the language of the 
believer)3'. Thus, for instance, Miilianism entitles us to ascribe to Ptolemy a 
number of beliefs expressed using our name for both Hesperus and Phosphorus, 
viz. the name 'Venus', a name whose Introduction into the language was
M This has been noticed by Donnellan in his article 1990, 204, footnote 4.
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presumably a result of the astronomical discovery that the Evening Star and the 
Morning Star are one and the same planet. In effect, the following would come 
out as a correct belief-attribution on the Millian view:
(25) Ptolemy believes that Venus is a planet;
for Ptolemy would be disposed to agree to the proposition that Venus is a planet 
If such a proposition were presented to him it under a guise specified in terms 
of (some suitable translation of) the sentence 'Phosphorus is a planet'. Yet, it 
seems to be intuitively Implausible that any belief-ascription of such a sort, 
containing 'Venus' in the 'that'-clause, could be true of Ptolemy. Rather, we 
would be inclined to take reports such as (25) as incorrect and hence to take 
reports such as
(26) Ptolemy fails to believe that Venus is a planet;
as correct; but, as we have seen, (26) would be deemed false by the Millian 
theorist.
To take a different kind of case, suppose that Carneiro is not at all 
familiar with the name 'Ricardo Reis', this being another heteronym employed by 
Pessoa. Likewise, we would be nevertheless entitled by Millianism to attribute to 
Carneiro a number of beliefs expressed using 'Ricardo Reis', a name which ex 
hypothesi he does not even understand. For instance, the Millian account would 
allow us to assert the following:
(27) Carneiro believes that Fernando Pessoa is Ricardo Reis
(28) Carneiro believes that Ricardo Reis is a poet;
for Carneiro would be disposed to accept the propositions that Pessoa is Reis 
and that Reis is a poet when taking them (respectively) under guises such as 
e.g. 'Campos 6 Campos' and 'Campos 6 urn poetsf. Again, this appears to be 
highly dubious in the light of our ordinary standards. What we would be 
Intuitively prepared to assert concerning this sort of situation is that Carneiro
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fails to believe that Fernando Pessoa is Ricardo Reis and that he fails to believe 
that Ricardo Rels is a poet, assertions whose contents come out as false under 
Mlllianism.
Finally, let me point out very briefly that there are important aspects of 
our psychological and cognitive lives, namely aspects involving the dynamics of 
belief (and other attitudes) and the functional role of belief (and other 
attitudes), that a Miilian account of cognitive value would be unable to 
accommodate in a satisfactory way w.
As to the former aspects, it turns out that a number of perfectly 
admissible transitions from old doxastic states to new doxastic states, taking 
place in a given subject throughout a certain period of time, would be left 
unexplained in the light of Millianism. For instance, one could introduce a 
situation in which Carneiro, on the basis of new evidence, changes his mind at 
a time tf about his belief, held at an earlier time t, that Pessoa is not Campos; 
at t' he might come to suspend judgement about whether Pessoa is Campos, or 
he might come to disbelieve that Pessoa is not Campos (i.e. to believe that 
Pessoa and Campos are after all one and the same person). Yet, one could not 
make sense of these and other possible transitions on the basis of the Miilian 
theory. For such a theory would yield the consequence that Carneiro has always, 
i.e. at any time between t and t1 , suspended judgement about the proposition 
that Pessoa is Campos, as well as the consequence that Carneiro has always 
disbelieved the proposition that Pessoa is not Campos.
As to the latter aspects, it is also very unlikely that the Miilian theory 
could adequately account for the functional role of mental states whose contents 
are specifiable with the help of proper names (or other syntactically simple
*" The inadequacy of the Miilian theory to cope with the phenomena in question 
is shown in L.R. Baker 1982.
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singular terms). The functional role of a particular belief consists In Its relations 
to other mental states, as well as to environmental Input and to behaviour 
(Including linguistic behaviour). Now there are good reasons to suppose that, for 
Instance, the functional role played in Carnelro's life by the belief that Pessoa 
is Campos would be substantially different from the one played in his life by the 
belief that Pessoa is Pessoa (the latter would be very meagre indeed). And this 
might be thought of as providing us with a basis on which to discriminate 
between the particular contents of those beliefs. However, on the Millian view, 
such a difference in functional role would remain unaccountable; for the beliefs 
in question would be assigned the same neo-Russellian proposition as their 
particular content. Maybe this sort of difficulty could be overcome by bringing 
ways of believing, or propositional guises, into the picture and by using them 
to account in some way for functional role. But then, assuming that such a 
manoeuvre could be successfully carried out, the intuitive connection which 
presumably holds between the content of a particular belief and its functional 
role would be lost; for ways of believing or guises are, by definition, external 
to content.
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SECTION 3 - THE CASE AGAINST INDEXICAL SINN
3.1 On the neo-Fregean side41 , the charge has often been made against Mlllian 
theories of singular reference that they necessarily end up with the admission 
of theoretical entities which are apparently indistinguishable from Fregean 
senses. Such a countenance of sense-like entities is normally taken by the neo- 
Fregean theorist as an almost inevitable result of any attempt on the part of the 
Millian theorist to deal with certain aspects of the problem of singular reference. 
The aspects In question consist mainly in issues about the cognitive significance 
of our use of sentences containing syntactically simple and unquoted singular 
terms. In trying to accommodate such problems within a directly referential 
approach, the Millian theorist is apparently led to introduce a conceptual 
apparatus which, according to his Fregean opponent, would not significantly 
differ from a framework of modes of presentation.
The general upshot of the Fregean criticism is that one could hardly 
expect to be offered a satisfactory account of singular reference which would 
qualify as being purely Mill/an, i.e. an account on which the propositional value 
of a singular term (in a certain context) is exhausted by its referent (In the 
context). Putative genuinely Millian theories, it is claimed, do not provide us 
with a real alternative to Fregeanism since a careful analysis will reveal them 
to be mere terminological variants of an essentially Fregean account. Indeed, the 
sense-like entities that such theories are allegedly forced to posit - e.g. 
Salmon's singular guises or Perry's ways of apprehending individuals - would 
in some way or other play an intermediate semantic role between the singular
^ For example, Evans argues that John Perry's account of indexical belief night 
be seen as a notational variant of a Fregean account, Perry's ways of apprehend- 
ing objects being equated with Fregean indexical senses; see Evans 1981, 317-8. 
More recently, Forbes makes a similar claim in his article 1989b, 474-5.
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terms, on the one hand, and their referents, on the other; and this would 
presumably preclude the theories in question from being purely Millian (in the 
above sense).
3.2 More surprising is the fact that the converse claim has also been 
advanced, though perhaps not so often, on the Millian side. In effect, the view 
has been put forward42 that certain versions of a Fregean account of singular 
reference, especially those versions whose distinctive feature is a De Re 
construal of singular Sinne, might in the end be counted as being mere 
terminological variants of a direct reference theory.
A typical pattern of reasoning used by the Millian theorist to reach such 
a conclusion might be synoptically described as follows. Once subjected to a 
close scrutiny, putative De Re senses attached by speakers to singular terms in 
the language, besides being obscure or ill-defined, turn out to be spurious or 
redundant. And the general reason usually adduced to establish this redundancy 
is that every substantive semantic role which could be reasonably assigned to 
the postulated singular senses could apparently be entirely carried out by, or 
naturally passed on to, either the referents of the singular terms or other 
theoretical entities available in the conceptual machinery of a direct reference 
theory (e.g. Kaplan's characters or Perry's belief states). Hence, by applying 
Ockam's razor, it seems that one would be in a position to eliminate De Re Sinne 
from the ontology of a neo-Fregean theory of reference, in which case such a 
(reconstructed) theory would indeed dissolve into a Millian theory. Therefore, 
if the arguments given for the eliminability of De Re singular senses on the 
basis of their alleged semantic vacuity were sound, then neo-Fregean accounts 
resting upon them would not constitute a serious alternative to Millianism.
E.g. by Scott Soames; see Soames 1989, 153-6.
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I shall label as follows the two conflicting general views, both grounded 
on "notational variance" considerations, sketched above. I shall call the view 
that certain forms of Millianism are (in the sense mentioned) notational variants 
of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and I 
shall call the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are (In the sense mentioned) 
notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance 
Claim. To sum up, while the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct 
reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo- 
Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain sense-like 
entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean 
theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by 
showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable.
3.3 Now the question how many accounts of singular reference are we 
confronted with here - Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or 
just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? - is surely of 
importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be 
answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the 
above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts one would 
naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially 
disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would 
have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fre- 
geanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single 
general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. And, while not intending 
to neglect other reference theories - even those theories about the impossibility, 
in principle, of setting up a systematic account of singular reference (perhaps 
following a Wittgensteinian model or the model of Schiffer's "No-Theory Theory
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of Meaning"43 ) - it appears that the contemporary dispute in the field turns 
mainly around the two sorts of approach under consideration.
My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian 
counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I think that they 
are clearly wrong if one takes them literally; notice that, in this case, they are 
very strong claims indeed since they involve very strong assumptions 
concerning the two theories, e.g. their full inter-translatability and the strict 
identity of their logical consequences. Moreover, I am inclined to think that they 
are also wrong if one weakens them in a certain way and construes them as 
claims which are only approximately true (in a sense to be introduced when 
particular proposals are considered).
On the other hand, such negative results about the two notational variance 
claims have to be independently established. For, at least given the way in 
which they have been represented, it is clear that the unsoundness of either 
of them would not entail either the unsoundness of the other (this one might
*
still hold) or its soundness (they might both be false). Indeed, what we seem to 
have here are two claims each having the following conjunctive form. The 
Fregean claim is to the effect that the Millian theory - subjected to certain 
modifications which would not affect it in a substantial way - is a notational 
variant of a neo-Fregean account, and that the equivalent theories should 
eventually be regarded as two-level theories of semantic (singular) content. And 
the Millian claim is to the effect that the neo-Fregean theory - subjected to 
certain modifications which would not affect it in a substantial way - is a 
notational variant of a directly referential account, and that the equivalent 
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I have already argued that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - 
considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports 
involving proper names - is unsound. I intend now to supplement such a result 
by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the 
semantics of indexlcal expressions - should also be rated as incorrect. I focus 
on a certain line of reasoning for the Millian Claim, a line of reasoning which I 
take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with 
respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals.
One might summarize as follows the main sort of criticism developed by the 
Millian theorist. It is argued that neo-Fregean theories about De Re senses for 
indexical expressions are bound to face the following dilemma. Either they can 
be reconstructed as notational variants of direct reference theories, De Re 
indexical senses having no clear explanatory function and being thus wholly 
dispensable in favour of a Millian semantics for indexicals; or they yield results 
which are unacceptable in the light of our intuitions about the use of indexicals
 
in the ascription of attitudes. In what follows, my concern is basically with the 
first horn of the above putative dilemma.
3.4 For convenience, I take the target of the Millian notational variance 
arguments to be some such neo-Fregean account of indexicality as the one 
expounded by Evans4*; although the arguments in question are such that they 
apply to virtually any Fregean theory using the notion of a De Re Indexical 
mode of presentation, e.g. Peacocke's account**.
It is a curious thing to notice that Evans draws on translation considera- 
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charges with being a terminological variant of a Fregean theory. Furthermore, 
the sort of argumentative strategy employed is prima facie very similar to the 
one used by the Millian theorist; indeed, the general pattern of reasoning seems 
to consist in trying, in both cases, to establish the following kind of disjunction 
(taken as constituting an inescapable dilemma for the rival account): the opposite 
view is shown either to conflict with some aspects of our ordinary practice of 
attitude-ascription (e.g. Perry's "P-Thoughts" - i.e. sequences of objects and 
senses of predicative expressions - are taken by Evans as utterly inadequate 
to serve as the objects of prepositional attitudes), or to be a mere notational 
variant of the favoured approach.
As noticed, the direct reference theorist is likely to argue from the 
dispensability of indexical senses to the Millian Notational Variance Claim. And 
there is no immediate reason to think that such a move might not be a valid 
one, provided that it is at the same time shown that the conceptual machinery 
of a direct reference theory for indexicals is able to do everything which the
 
allegedly superfluous senses were supposed to do. Let me then outline the 
central arguments which could be mounted in order to support the premiss of 
the above move. The Millian strategy might be characterized as follows. First, 
we are given some enumeration of certain fundamental semantic roles which are 
standardly assigned to singular senses, such roles being normally regarded by 
the Fregean theorist as providing us with conclusive reasons for the introduc- 
tion of Sinne. Then it is claimed that either De Re indexical senses are not really 
needed to carry out any of the listed semantic functions - these could be 
arguably transferred to theoretical entities already available within a Millian 
framework - or they turn out to be simply inadequate to fulfil the semantic 
roles in question (or both).
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3.5 I select that semantic role of senses which links them to cognitive value 
as the one which is most relevant for our discussion of the Millian notational 
variance claim. Such a role is given in the property indexical senses supposedly 
possess of accounting for possible failures of substitutivity of co-referential 
indexlcals in attitude-attributions, as well as blocking other apparently 
problematic results involving attitudes, particularly the possibility of a rational 
subject's having contradictory indexical beliefs at a given time (or, without 
changing her mind, at different times). Indeed, a difference in (customary) sense 
between indexicals i and i 1 in contexts c and c' (where one might have c=c', as 
well as i=i j ) is usually postulated to block in general inferences from ascriptions 
of the form [x V's that S(i)l to ascriptions of the form fx V's that S(i')l; here 
'V stands for a propositional-attitude verb, the (customary) referents of i and 
i' in contexts c and c' coincide, and the ascriptions are to be given their De 
Dicto readings. A familiar example is given in the pair of sentences 'He is being 
attacked' and 'I am being attacked' taken in a context in which I assertively
*
utter the former intending to refer to someone else, while what actually happens 
is that I do not recognize myself as the person whom I see - in a mirror I take 
to be a glass - being attacked; thus, I would vehemently dissent from the latter 
sentence. The invalidity of the move from 'I believe that he is being attacked' 
to 'I believe that I am being attacked' - taken with respect to such a sort of 
circumstance - would be explained in terms of a difference in the modes of 
presentation of myself referred to by the occurrences of the indexicals 'he' and 
T within the 'that'-clauses; there would be a difference between the types of 
ways of thinking of myself which I employ in thought - the third-person type 
versus the first-person type - and which I attach to the tokens of 'he' and '!' 
in the envisaged situation. And when, under those circumstances, I believe both 
that he (the man in question) is being attacked and that I am not being
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attacked, I cannot be described as holding at the same time mutually contradic- 
tory indexical beliefs about myself; for, according to the neo-Fregean account, 
the contents of my beliefs are a certain Fregean thought and the negation of 
a distinct Fregean thought.
Now the Millian theorist might argue with a view to establishing the 
following claim about the semantic redundancy of Indexical modes of presentation: 
De Re senses are not needed to explain apparent failures of substitutivity of co- 
referential indexicals in attitude-ascriptions, or to block certain apparently 
problematic results involving attitudes48. If sound this claim would constitute 
a serious objection to any Fregean account of indexicality, since what is taken 
to be the privileged role of senses, and what is often proposed as the crucial 
rationale for their introduction, consists precisely in their status as theoretical 
entities postulated to explain why co-referential singular terms are not in 
general interchangeable salva veritate when occurring in the embedded 
sentences of prepositional-attitude constructions.
The anti-Fregean argument for the above claim runs as follows. Clearly, 
a necessary condition for inferences falling under the general pattern fx V's 
that S(i)l, M=i1 .-. fx V's that S(i')l to be rated as invalid by the proponent 
of a Fregean theory is that such a theory must provide us with a criterion for 
sameness of indexical sense; that is, it should state clearly under what 
conditions an indexical i used in a context c has the same sense as an indexical 
i f used in a context c'. And, since sameness of reference is thought of as being 
necessary for sameness of sense, one should expect such a test to be given in 
particular for the case in which the referent of i In c is identical with the 
referent of i' in c'. Yet, the Fregean theory does not contain a uniform criterion
** See Soames 1989, 154-5. Although Soames's arguments are mainly directed 
against Evans's particular version of Fregeanism, they could be easily 
generalized to other neo-Fregean approaches.
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for the sameness of indexical sense, i.e. a means of decision capable of being 
applied to the different categories of indexicals, such as personal pronouns like 
T and 'he', demonstratives like 'this' and 'that', temporal Indexicals like 'now' 
and 'today', etc. Therefore, it is in general unclear how an appeal to senses 
might even account for failures of substitutivity (assuming for the sake of 
argument the anti-Millian thesis that co-referential indexicals are not inter- 
changeable salva veritate in attitude contexts).
The Millian critic would discern a certain tension in the neo-Fregean 
account, a tension which reflects the alleged absence of a clear and uniform 
means of individuating Indexical senses. On the one hand, the Fregean treatment 
of temporal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and perceptual demonstratives allows 
utterances of sentences containing different but co-referential indexicals of 
these kinds, as used in distinct contexts, to express the same (token) Fregean 
thought; hence, it allows the possibility of the same particular mode of 
presentation being associated with different indexicals in different contexts of 
use. As a result, substitutivity and other problematic results about attitude- 
ascriptions would apparently be forthcoming in a neo-Fregean account of such 
categories of indexicals. On the other hand, the Fregean treatment of personal 
pronouns precludes utterances of sentences containing distinct but co-referential 
indexicals (used in possibly different contexts) from expressing the same (token) 
Fregean thought; hence, it disallows the possibility of the same particular sense 
being attached to different indexicals of that sort (in possibly different 
contexts). As a result, substitutivity and other problematic results about 
attitude-ascriptions would be blocked in a neo-Fregean account of such a 
category of indexicals.
The consequences the Millian theorist urges us to draw from the adoption 
of such allegedly disparate verdicts on sameness of indexical sense are as
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follows. If indexical expressions are treated along the lines suggested above for 
temporal indexicals, etc., then the resulting theory will no longer be Fregean in 
nature; it will be simply a notational variant of a direct reference theory, 
redundant De Re indexical senses being eliminable and the referents of indexicals 
in given contexts doing all the relevant semantic work. If, on the other hand, 
indexicals are to be treated on the model of personal pronouns, then the 
resulting theory, though presumably Fregean in nature, will be Implausible since 
some of its consequences are incompatible with the way we Intuitively use 
indexicals in attitude-ascriptions. The implication is, of course, that we should 
generalize in the former direction, i.e. from temporal indexicals to other 
indexicals, in which case the Millian Notational Variance Claim would be 
warranted.
3.6 In the next Section I shall examine in some detail the Millian claim about 
the dispensability of De Re Sinne. And I shall focus my attention on the former 
categories of indexicals, since they are clearly more relevant to the issue of 
notational variance.
But, before doing that, let me point out at once that if one restricts the 
Millian claim to substitutivity results involving temporal indexicals, spatial 
indexicals, and perceptual demonstratives, then such a claim seems to be 
misplaced; for the simple reason that, as far as I can see, one could hardly find 
any cases of genuine interchangeability salva veritate of indexicals of those 
sorts in attitude-attributions (assuming that these are given their De Dlcto 
readings).
Take the case of temporal indexicals. Consider the sentence-type
(1) Today is fine, 
as uttered on a particular day, say d, and the sentence-type
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(2) Yesterday was fine,
as uttered on d+1, so that the referents of 'today' on d and 'yesterday' on d+1 
coincide. Evans and other neo-Fregean theorists, following Frege, hold that 
under certain conditions the particular Fregean thought expressed by (1) on d 
may be the same as the one expressed by (2) on d+1; hence, the sense a 
speaker may attach to 'today' on d, i.e. the particular way of thinking of d she 
entertains on d, is allowed to be identical with the sense attached to 'yesterday' 
on d+1, i.e. the particular way of thinking of d she entertains on d+1. Thus, 
here we have different indexicals, same reference, different contexts of use (the 
times are distinct), and (possibly) the same sense.
The Millian theorist would typically claim that this amounts to admitting 
that the referents of 'today' and 'yesterday' on d, d+1 fully determine the 
senses these indexicals may express on these occasions, in the sense that 
sameness of reference seems to be employed to individuate and equate the 
senses in question, determining the thoughts expressed as being one and the 
same on both occasions. It apparently follows that the putative Do Re senses 
associated with the indexicals are entirely irrelevant for the semantic purpose 
of fixing the prepositional contents of utterances of (1) and (2); the referents 
of 'today' and 'yesterday' on d, d+1 - taken as fixed by their associated 
characters - are clearly sufficient to the effect.
Furthermore, it is held that an appeal to indexical senses to block 
substitutivity results would be useless here, since the neo-Fregean account 
would be in fact committed to such results. Yet, this appears to be wrong; for 
It turns out that the envisaged cases are not cases of substitutivity at all. 
Suppose that, on the 28th October 1989, Jones sincerely and reflectively assents 
to (an utterance) of (1). Thus, the belief-ascription
(3) Jones believes that today is fine,
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as uttered on that day, would naturally be counted as true. Yet, in the light of 
neo-Fregeanism, the belief-report
(4) Jones believes that yesterday was fine,
as uttered on the 29th October 1989, might also - under certain conditions*' - 
be counted as true (provided that meanwhile Jones has not changed his beliefs 
about the weather on the previous day); indeed, ex hypothesi, the embedded 
sentences in (3) and (4) may denote the same proposition: under certain 
circumstances, Jones could not believe the Fregean thought referred to by the 
'that'-clause in (3) without believing the Fregean thought referred to by the 
'that'-clause in (4).
However, transitions such as the one from (3) to (4) - which are indeed 
licensed by the neo-Fregean account (as well as, on different grounds, by any 
Millian account) - are obviously not instances of substitutivity salva veritate of 
co-referential indexicals within the subordinate clauses of attitude-ascriptions; 
because the times of Jones's believings in (3) and (4) are clearly different. And 
It is very likely that one come across the same sort of situation in dealing with 
spatial indexicals and perceptual demonstratives (where the times at which the 
attitudes are held are relevant in a similar way). Therefore, one should deem 
wrong the Millian claim that, since in this area of indexicality there are no 
failures of substitutivity for senses to explain (substitutivity being in fact 
licensed by neo-Fregeanism), senses would not be needed to explain failures of 
substitutivity; in effect, it simply turns out that no substitutivity results of the 
intended kind are forthcoming in the area.
3.7 Let me finish the exposition of what I take to be the Millian argument for 
the redundancy of indexical modes of presentation by briefly contrasting the
*' Such conditions for belief-retention are discussed in Chapter III, Section 5.
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foregoing account of temporal indexicals, etc., with the standard Fregean view 
on personal pronouns. Consider the sentence-type
(5) I am ugly, 
as uttered by Jones at a time t, and the sentence-type
(6) You are ugly,
as uttered at tf (possibly t=t') by someone, say Ralph, addressing Jones. Thus, 
given such contexts of use, the referent of T In (5) is the same as the referent 
of 'you' in (6), viz. Jones. Now Evans and other Fregean theorists, again 
following Frege, hold that the thought expressed by Jones when he utters (5) 
is necessarily distinct from the thought expressed by Ralph when he utters (6). 
Accordingly, the senses attached by Jones and Ralph to T and 'you 1 must 
diverge, i.e. the particular way of thinking of himself Jones entertains in (5) is 
necessarily different from the particular way of thinking of him entertained by 
Ralph in (6). Hence, what we have here is the mentioned asymmetry between the 
treatment given to temporal jndexicals, etc., and the treatment given to personal 
pronouns; with respect to the latter case, and in contrast with what happens in 
the former case, it is impossible for tokens of distinct personal pronouns used 
in contexts in which they are co-referential to express the same particular 
sense.
The Millian theorist would take the reason for such an asymmetry to lie 
mainly in the Fregean doctrine that each person attaches a sense to T which 
is not entertainable or graspable by anyone else. Thus, only Jones is in a 
position to think of himself by employing the first-person way of thinking, and 
such thoughts are only accessible to him. Ralph can only think of Jones by 
employing the second-person (or the third-person) way of thinking, and he 
might do this by uttering a sentence such as (6). According to Millianism, this 
conception of logically private modes of presentation Is Incompatible with our
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current practices in ascribing prepositional-attitudes. For instance, it is said to 
imply that only I could be in a position to report e.g. the belief that I am ugly: 
it would be impossible for someone else to report it by saying about me 'He 
believes that he Is ugly 1 , for the ascriber would have to entertain my particular 
way of thinking about myself (which ex hypothesi cannot be the case). In 
addition to this, I could not be in a position to report prepositional attitudes 
someone else, e.g. Ralph, takes about me; for example, it would be impossible for 
me to report one by saying 'Ralph believes that I am ugly' for I would have to 
suppose that my particular way of thinking about myself is accessible to Ralph 
(which again cannot be the case). Again, the upshot is that, given the apparent 
implausibility of such consequences, the Fregean should treat personal pronouns 
on the model proposed for temporal indexicals, etc.; but then the resulting 
semantic theory could allegedly be shown to be a notational variant of a directly 
referential account.
Having in mind our general purpose, I will not tackle the first-person 
issue here. But let me just mention that the Millian criticism might be countered 
by appealing to the distinction between using a sense in thought and mentioning 
a sense**. Roughly, the idea is that in order for a thinker to grasp or entertain 
a thought containing a certain mode of presentation it is surely necessary that 
she be able to refer to, or to think of, that mode of presentation; but it is not 
at all necessary that she be able to employ in thought the mode of presentation 
in question, or to think the thought in question herself. Hence, it is certainly 
possible for someone else to refer to e.g. the thought that I am ugly; for when 
Jones thinks about me 'He thinks that he is ugly', he is not employing in 
thought my first-person way of thinking, or thinking the thought that I am ugly 
himself: he is referring to my first-person way of thinking. Likewise, it is
41 See C.Peacocke 1981, 191-3.
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certainly possible for me to report e.g. Ralph's thought that I am ugly: from the 
fact that Ralph cannot think thoughts containing my first-person way of 
thinking it does not follow that such thoughts are unaccessible to him, or that 
he Is prevented from referring to my first-person way of thinking.
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SECTION 4 - INDEXICALITY AND COGNITIVE VALUE
4.1 According to the brand of neo- Fregean ism we have been considering, the 
following kind of result holds with respect to indexical expressions such as 
perceptual demonstratives and temporal and spatial indexicals. There are 
circumstances in which two (syntactically simple) indexicals i and i' of those 
types, taken as used in distinct contexts c and c' where they turn out to be co- 
referential, are to be seen as expressing the same particular sense, or as being 
associated in c, c' with the same particular way of thinking of their common 
denotation. As a result, sentences (S(i)l and fs(i')l uttered in c, c1 are 
assigned the same propositional content, i.e. the same Fregean thought, with 
respect to c, cf.
Take the case of spatial indexicals. Suppose that on a certain occasion I 
am at a certain place p, e.g. a certain corner of my living-room, and that I utter 
a token of the sentence *
(7) It is cold here.
I then move to a different place pf , e.g. the opposite corner of my living-room, 
and utter a token of the sentence
(8) It is cold there
(while pointing to p). Then, on the neo-Fregean view, the co-referential 
indexicals 'here' and 'there' in (7) and (8) have the same sense with respect to 
the contexts in question: in both cases I am entertaining the same way of 
thinking of a place (viz. p); and with my utterances of (7) and (8) I am 
expressing the very same Fregean thought4'.
Or take the case of perceptual demonstratives. Suppose that I am faced 
with a set of briefcases. I hold one of them and assert
*' I ignore the difference in time of 'it is'.
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(9) This briefcase is heavy.
A few moments later, having managed in some way to track the briefcase in 
question, I point at it from a distance and assert
(10) That briefcase is heavy.
Again, according to the neo-Fregean account, I attach to the demonstratives 
'this* and 'that' in (9) and (10) the same mode of presentation of an object; in 
spite of there being superficial differences between the tactual way of thinking 
of it I employ in (9) and the visual way of thinking of it I employ in (10), I am 
expressing the same particular Fregean thought on both occasions.
Now the anti-Fregean claim is that there would be no substantive way by 
means of which one would be able to distinguish the above sort of account from 
a direct reference theory of indexicals. It is alleged that results which are quite 
similar to the ones outlined are forthcoming in such a theory, and that the 
differences between the two kinds of account might be counted as being minor 
(simply terminological) ones. In effect, given the same set of starting assump- 
tions about indexicals i and i' in contexts c and c', and given that (syntactically 
simple) indexicals are construed as directly referential expressions, it follows 
that i and i* in c, cf make exactly the same contribution to prepositional content; 
indeed, on the Millian view, they just contribute their common denotation with 
respect to the given contexts c, c'. Hence, assuming compositionality, the 
propositions expressed by sentences fS(l)l and fS(i')] In c, c' are one and the 
same, viz. a certain neo-Russellian proposition. Thus, in our examples, the tokens 
of 'here' and 'there' in (7) and (8) (respectively the tokens of 'this' and 'that' 
In (9) and (10)) make the same contribution to propositional content with respect 
to the contexts in question: they contribute p (respectively the briefcase 
referred to); and with my utterances of (7) and (8) (respectively (9) and (10)) 
I am expressing the same proposition, viz. the ordered pair of p and Coldness
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(respectively the ordered pair of the briefcase and the property of being 
heavy).
4.2 Before dealing with the arguments about attitude-ascriptions involving 
indexicals, let us consider the Millian criticism that, therefore, it looks as if on 
the neo-Fregean view it is the identity of the referents of the indexicals i, i' 
in c, c' which is actually determining the identity of the singular senses they 
allegedly express in these contexts; and that it seems that It is the De Re nature 
attributed to such senses which makes them entirely dependent upon the objects 
they present, these doing all the relevant semantic job.
I think that such a criticism is unwarranted. Briefly stated, my main 
objection is that it involves the following sort of non sequitur. From the 
supposition that indexicals i and i' (of the envisaged types) - taken as referring 
to the same object, say o, in contexts c and c' - may be assigned the same 
singular sense in c, c1 it does not follow that it is the identity of their common 
denotation o which determines their senses as being identical in c, cf ; surely, 
a different sort of consideration might be used by the neo-Fregean theorist, and 
is actually used (see below), to argue for such a sameness of sense. Although 
there is a sense in which, in general, a De Re mode of presentation m of an 
object o depends upon the very existence of o, viz. the sense in which m would 
not be available to be employed if o did not exist, this does not by itself allow 
us to say that the indexical modes of presentation attached to i, i 1 in c, cf are 
identical because they are both ways of thinking of the same object o.
Indeed, consider Evans's account of indexical reference, for instance. 
Evans establishes certain results about identity of sense between co-referential 
indexicals i, T In contexts c, c', not from considerations about identity of 
reference (though this Is surely a necessary condition for sameness of sense),
Page 141
INDEXICALITY AND COGNITIVE VALUE
but from considerations arising out of a substantive elucidation of the notion of 
an indexical way of thinking of an object. Roughly stated, Evans's proposal 5* 
consists in explaining this notion in terms of the notion of an account of the 
conditions under which a subject's indexical thought is about the object it is 
about; and this involves in turn giving an account of how the subject knows 
which object is in question. Thus, in certain cases the sense of I in c is the 
same as the sense of i' in c' because the account of the conditions under which 
the subject's indexical thought in c is about o is taken to be the same as the 
account of the conditions under which the subject's thought in c' is about a 
And, in general, this is so when the subject is in the same epistemic state in 
c and c', i.e. when she exercises in c and c' the same ability to think of the 
object o. In the case of temporal indexicals such as 'today' and 'yesterday' - as 
employed e.g. in (1) and (2) - the ability in question will be the ability to keep 
track of a time (a day) as time passes by. In the case of spatial indexicals such 
as 'here' and 'there' - as employed e.g. in (7) and (8) - it will be the ability to 
keep track of a place as one moves about. And in the case of perceptual 
demonstratives such as 'this' and 'that' - as employed e.g. in (9) and (10) - it 
will be the ability to keep track of a spatio-temporal particular from sensory 
modality (e.g. touch) to sensory modality (e.g. sight).
Thus, on such a view, indexical modes of presentation are individuated, 
not (or, better, not only) in terms of the identity of the particular objects 
referred to in given contexts, but in terms of certain ways of keeping track of 
such objects a thinker may employ. Of course, none of the above abilities could 
be exercised by a thinker In the absence of a particular object to which the
^ See Evans 1981, 294, 303. Evans's ways of thinking of objects are governed by 
what he calls Russell's Principle: in order to make a judgement about an object 
one must know which object is in question. See also Evans 1982, 65.
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thinker stands In a certain suitable (possibly causal) relation. But this is 
tantamount to saying that the indexical and demonstrative senses grounded on 
such abilities are De Re in nature; it surely does not mean that the presented 
Res is doing all the job involved in the individuation of indexical content. I 
conclude that there seems to be no sense in which neo-Fregean accounts of the 
kind discussed might be construed as implicitly arguing from sameness of 
indexical reference to sameness of indexical sense, and hence to sameness of 
indexical content (with respect to those cases where sameness of indexical 
content is indeed acknowledged by the neo-Fregean theorist, e.g. cases like (7) 
and (8) or (9) and (10) taken in the envisaged contexts of use).
4.3 Furthermore, it may be conclusively shown that the impression of 
similarity between the Millian account and the neo-Fregean one is nothing but 
deceptive (relative to the sort of semantic treatment given to utterances 
containing indexicals of the kinds under consideration). In effect, whereas the 
former kind of account invariably yields the result that indexicals i and I 1 , used 
in contexts c and c' where they are co-referential, have the same semantic 
content with respect to c, c1 , the same cannot be said of the latter kind of 
account. The reason is that the neo-Fregean approach makes room for the 
existence of a certain range of cases concerning which one obtains precisely the 
opposite sort of result; in such cases indexicals i and T which are co-referential 
in contexts c, cf are assigned different Fregean senses, and hence different 
semantic contents with respect to c, c'.
To appreciate this, consider the following situation involving spatial 
indexicals. Suppose that I am at a certain place p in the middle of a desert and 
I assert 'It is hot here'. Suddenly there is a sand storm, I get lost and it 
happens that (unbeknownst to me) I am driven to the same place, viz. p.
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Suppose that then I assert again 'It is hot here'. On the Millian view, the 
distinct tokens of 'here' I use on those occasions are presumably assigned the 
same propositional value, viz. p, and my utterances are presumably assigned the 
same semantic content (modulo a difference in the times of the utterances, which 
I Ignore for the present purposes). Yet, on the neo-Fregean view, given the 
proposed indlviduation of indexical senses in terms of keeping track of things, 
the result is not forthcoming that I entertain the same way of thinking of a 
place on both occasions, or that I attach to the distinct tokens of 'here' the 
same sense. Indeed, on such a view, either I am described as attaching no sense 
at all to the token of 'here' I use on the latter occasion, and hence as not really 
expressing then any proposition at all; or I am described as entertaining a 
different sense, and hence as expressing a different proposition. At any rate, 
it is not the case that the tokens of 'here' I employ have the same propositional 
value with respect to the contexts in question, though they are certainly co- 
referential in such contexts, (if they have senses at all).
And the above case has the following sort of temporal analogue. Suppose 
that on a certain day d, during the afternoon, someone (say John) assertively 
utters the sentence
(1) Today is fine,
and I agree with him. Then I take a nap, a "nap" which In fact lasts for 24 
hours. When I wake up in the afternoon of d+1, wrongly thinking that I have 
slept for a short period, I hear John assertively uttering the sentence
(2) Yesterday was fine;
and I also agree to this (on the basis of what the weather was like on d-1). 
Suppose further that, unlike me, John has correctly kept track of the days from 
d to d+1. On the Millian view, with his utterances of (1) and (2) in the above 
contexts, the speaker (John) expresses and believes the same neo-Russellian
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proposition at different times (though under different characters). As to the 
hearer (myself), such a view would probably describe him as unknowingly 
entertaining and believing the same neo-Russelllan proposition at different times 
(under different characters as well).
I take such a sort of description as Intuitively implausible, this being a 
consequence of the general semantic insensitivity to the cognitive aspects of 
language use displayed by Millian accounts; but that is irrelevant for my 
immediate concerns. What really matters is that there is a conspicuous 
dissimilarity between the above account and the way a neo-Fregean theory would 
treat the same sort of case. On this view, speaker and hearer would be 
described as diverging with respect to the indexical contents they associate with 
(1) and (2) in the contexts in question. As already noted, John would be 
regarded as attaching the same particular sense to the given tokens of 'today' 
and 'yesterday', or as thinking of d in the same way on both occasions, and 
hence as expressing and believing the same Fregean thought at different times. 
Yet, I would be in no position to grasp, and thus to believe, that Fregean 
thought, at least as it is expressed by John when he utters (2) on d+1. In 
effect, according to such a form of neo-Fregean ism, I attach to John's use of 
'yesterday' in (2) a sense which is different from the one he employs, and then 
(given the circumstances) I am unable to entertain this sense; or, more likely, 
I do not attach any sense to it at all - I am only under the illusion that I am 
then employing a way of thinking about a particular day - and thus I am 
actually unable to grasp the Fregean thought expressed by John on d+1.
4.4 As a parenthetical remark, it should be noticed at this point that I am not 
necessarily endorsing the particular neo-Fregean account of temporal indexicals 
we have been discussing; maybe results of the above sort are also in a sense
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contrary to our intuitions. Our current focus on such a view is mainly due to 
the fact that it is the sort of neo-Fregean view to which the Millian notationai 
variance arguments are par excellence applicable. But there are other possible 
neo-Fregean accounts of temporal indexicality which would be from the outset 
immune to such arguments. For instance, one might hold the view51 that there 
are no circumstances under which any given tokens of 'today 1 and 'yesterday 1 
might be assigned the same Fregean sense, even in contexts in which they have 
the same reference and in which the speaker does not mistrack time. And such 
a view, which in the above respects departs significantly from Frege's original 
doctrine, might still preserve the principle that indexical sense is not constant 
across contexts; in the sense that e.g. tokens of 'today 1 uttered on different 
days necessarily express different particular senses, though they might be 
assigned the same type of sense. That principle is In fact an instance of the 
general Fregean principle that sense determines reference, construed as the 
claim that the sort of correspondence obtaining between reference and senses 
is necessarily one-to-many52 . Thus, one could take the sense of a particular 
token of 'today' - uttered on a certain occasion - as being that of the (impure) 
description 'the day of this utterance', where the demonstrative refers to that 
very utterance of 'today'. Likewise, one could take the sense of a particular 
token of 'yesterday' - uttered on a certain occasion - as being that of the 
description 'the day immediately before the day of this utterance', where the 
demonstrative refers to that very utterance of 'yesterday'. This would not 
necessarily force us to regard the description giving the sense of each temporal
51 This is the sort of view adopted by John Searle in his book 1983, 218-30.
5* Such a principle is explicitly rejected in the account of indexical modes of 
presentation developed in Colin McGinn's book 1983, Chapter 5. On such an 
account, indexical senses - such as those associated with 'today* or 'I' - are 
constant across contexts: they always present their (possibly different) 
referents in the same way.
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indexical as providing us with a definition of the indexical in question, i.e. as 
being analytically equivalent to it. Indeed, on the one hand, the proposition 
expressed e.g. by an utterance on a particular day d of the sentence
(11) Today is the day of this utterance
(where 'this utterance1 is self-referential), seems to be a priori with respect to 
a fully competent speaker of English (the negation of (11) would be epistemically 
impossible for her). Yet, on the other hand, such a proposition should be 
regarded, not as (metaphysically) necessary, but as contingent; for the day d 
might exist without any utterance of (11) having been made on d, in which case 
the proposition expressed by 'Today might not have been the day of this 
utterance' would be counted as true.
If the above suggestion were along the right lines then one should regard 
tokens of 'today' and 'yesterday' used in contexts where they have the same 
reference (e.g. (1) and (2) as uttered by John) as containing different modes of 
presentation of the same day, and hence the Fregean thoughts expressed in 
such contexts could not be one and the same. And such a difference in sense 
might be seen as a difference in the conceptual ingredients making up the 
descriptions associated with the indexicals (assuming that sense is, in general, 
what is expressed); 'yesterday' would thus be conceptually dependent upon 
'today', since its associated description contains the sense of 'today' as a compo- 
nent part53 .
4.5 Having finished such an excursus, I turn now to the Millian arguments 
concerning attitude-attributions. Recall that one of the claims here is that neo-
^ The sort of account just outlined could perhaps be generalized to other 
temporal indexicals, such as e.g. 'tomorrow' and 'now'; but I doubt that it 
could be also plausibly applied to spatial indexicals or perceptual demonstra- 
tives.
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Fregeanism of the sort described earlier on would entail the prima facie unFre- 
gean consequence that certain transitions (see below) between attitude-reports 
containing occurrences of co-referential indexicals (of the envisaged kinds) 
within the 'that'-clauses are to be rated as legitimate; thus, in this respect 
there would be again no difference between such a Fregean theory and a Millian 
one, from which the consequence in question Is in general acknowledged to be 
derivable. And a different (but related) kind of claim is that the neo-Fregean 
would apparently put a Fregean believer in the same sort of position as Salmon's 
Millian believer Elmer54 , who believes - at a given time or, without changing his 
mind, on different occasions - a pair of mutually inconsistent propositions while 
failing to recognize the same proposition in both cases and hence without being 
illogical; thus, likewise, there would allegedly be Fregean thoughts which are not 
completely transparent to their thinkers.
Let us once more focus on temporal indexicals (having in mind that the 
results obtained might easily be made to apply to spatial indexicals and 
perceptual demonstratives). Suppose that Jones, a logical thinker and a fully 
competent speaker of English, sincerely and reflectively assents at a certain time 
t on a certain day d to a token of the sentence-type (1). Accordingly, one would 
expect the belief-ascription
(3) Jones believes that today is fine,
as uttered by someone (say Ralph) at a certain time t' on d, to be true of Jones 
(here t'>t, and if t'>t one would have also to suppose that Jones does not 
change his mind about the weather on d at any time between t and t1 ). Now the 
sort of neo-Fregean account subscribed to e.g. by Evans would entail, given 
certain additional assumptions, the consequence that the belief-report
(4) Jones believes that yesterday was fine,
54 Salmon 1986, 92 ff.
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as uttered by Ralph at a certain time t" on d+1, is also true of Jones. And the 
assumptions In question are: (i)- that Jones keeps track of the days from d to 
d+1 (and one would have also to assume that the ascriber, i.e. Ralph, does not 
mistrack time either, otherwise there might be a possible divergence between the 
senses attached by him and by Jones to 'yesterday'); and (ii)- that on d+1 Jones 
has not changed his beliefs about the weather on d.
Therefore, it seems that the neo-Fregean theory validates transitions such 
as the one from (3) to (4). In general, such transitions might be characterized 
as consisting in carrying out the following two steps: (i)- interchanging certain 
pairs of co-referential indexicals within the (semantic) scope of psychological 
verbs in propositional-attitude constructions, e.g. replacing in (3) 'today' by 
'yesterday'; and (ii)- readjusting in an appropriate way the times at which the 
attitudes are held, e.g. changing the time tf (or the day d) of Jones's belief in 
(3) to t" (or to d+1). As already noticed, in virtue of step (ii), the transitions 
in question are obviously ngt cases of substitutivity salva veritate; thus, there 
is a clear contrast between moves of the above sort and moves such as e.g. the 
one from 'I believe at t that I am ugly' to 'I believe at t that he is ugly', which, 
assuming that I am the male demonstrated at t, is a valid move according to a 
Millian theory of indexical belief (but an invalid one on a Fregean view).
However, contrary to the Millian claim, the sort of consideration employed 
by the neo-Fregean theorist to ensure the legitimacy of a transition such as the 
one from (3) to (4) (under the given circumstances) has nothing to do with a 
mere identity of indexical reference. Indeed, according to his proposed 
Individuation of temporal modes of presentation in terms of ways of tracking 
times, the neo-Fregean theorist is appealing rather to identity of indexicai sense 
here. The sense referred to by 'today' In (3) is judged to be the same as the 
sense referred to by 'yesterday' in (4), the same particular way of keeping
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track of a day (viz. d) being employed by Jones on both occasions. Hence, 
denoting such a common mode of presentation of d by 'MP^', the belief-reports 
(3) and (4) might be (respectively) given, with respect to the contexts in 
question, the following sort of representations under the envisaged neo-Fregean 
account:
(3)' Bt i [Jones, < MP-f Fineness >]
(4)' B^n [Jones, < MPj, Fineness >]
(the Fregean thoughts believed by Jones at different times being thus one and 
the same); here 'Bt ' stands for the binary Belief-relation as relativized to a 
certain time t55 .
4.6 I want now to argue with a view to establishing the following two points, 
which taken together provide us with a refutation of the Millian arguments for 
the dispensability of De Re Indexical senses. First, on the above sort of neo- 
Fregean view, it turns out that transitions of the form mentioned earlier on may
*
fail to obtain; and such a possibility, which is presumably unavailable under a 
Millian account, is also explained by means of an appeal to indexical senses. 
Secondly, contrary to appearances, the Millian critic is definitely wrong when 
he holds that in the end one would not be able to differentiate between Fregean 
thinkers and Millian thinkers in respect to the possibility of unknowingly 
believing contradictory thoughts. The upshot of my discussion is that the main 
rationale for the introduction of senses in a semantic theory, viz. that of 
blocking problematic results involving attitudes, is still available in this area of 
indexicality.
As to the first point, it is indeed a feature of the neo-Fregean account,
^ I employ the usual notation of ordered pairs only for reasons of simplicity; 
in fact, it sounds strange to say that believing a Fregean thought is something 
like standing in a certain relation to a set.
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a feature which is not usually displayed by a Millian semantics for e.g. 
ascriptions of temporal beliefs, that transitions sharing the form of the one from 
(3) to (4) are not always legitimate under it; I.e., there are circumstances in 
which, although such an account would count a token of a sentence sharing the 
form of (3) (used on d) as holding, it would not count a token of a sentence 
sharing the form of (4) (used on d+1) as holding at all. In effect, consider the 
case (introduced before) in which, after assenting on d to a token of (1) uttered 
by John, I take a 24-hour "nap" and unknowingly lose track of the days. Thus, 
John's belief-ascription on d
(12) He believes that today is fine
(where 'he1 refers to me) would be true. Yet, my assenting on d+1 to a token 
of (2) uttered by John does not put him in a position to make on d+1 the 
following belief-ascription:
(13) He believes that yesterday was fine.
Assume that John reports ail his beliefs according to the neo-Fregean theory, 
that he keeps track of the days correctly, that he remembers the weather on 
the previous day, and that he is aware of my situation. Then, since when I give 
my assent to (2) I am not actually entertaining any way of thinking of d, I am 
not entertaining then any Fregean thought about d, and hence I am not having 
any belief whatsoever about d56. Therefore, (13) does not come out as true 
under the neo-Fregean account (with respect to the given context), but rather 
as a false belief-ascription. Hence, the following report
(14) He lacks the belief that yesterday was fine 
(as uttered by John on d+1) would come out as true (assuming that (14) is the
5* Here one would have to rule out the possibility that (13) is true because of 
some mode of presentation of d under which I have the belief and which I do not 
associate with the word 'yesterday 1 , e.g. a memory-based mode of presentation 
of d.
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negation of (13))5? .
Obviously, this kind of result would not constitute any problem for neo- 
Fregeanism since the thought expressed by (14) would not be inconsistent with 
the one expressed by (12); and hence the ascriber (John) would not be contra- 
dicting himself, the Fregean regimentations for such belief-reports being:
(12)' Bd [J.B., < MP<, Fineness >] 
(14)f -.B^ [J.B., < MPd , Fineness >].
At most, the neo-Fregean account would allow a thinker to hold at different 
times conflicting attitudes towards the same proposition.
From the preceding reflection I think that one is entitled to draw the 
conclusion that, from the standpoint of the neo-Fregean account of indexicality, 
there are in fact illegitimate transitions involving co-referential indexicals of the 
envisaged types in attitude-ascriptions, and that it is in terms of indexical Sinne 
that such an illegitimacy is to be accounted for.
It could be replied that there is a sense In which the transitions in 
question might also be deemed illegitimate on a Millian view. Suppose that one 
supplements a directly referential account of temporal indexicals, spatial 
indexicals and perceptual demonstratives with some epistemic notion of tracking 
an object over time and/or space. And suppose that it is possible to do it in
Note that in place of (14) one might have used
(15) He does not believe that yesterday was fine
(which is - at least syntactically - a straightforward negation of (13)). The 
problem with a report such as (15) - and the reason why I avoid employing it - 
is that it is ambiguous between (14) and
(16) He disbelieves that yesterday was fine,
or
(17) He believes that yesterday was not fine
(which I construe as having the same meaning as (16)). If (15) were read in the 
sense of (16) (or of (17)), then it would surely come out as false with respect 
to the case discussed; thus, a confusion between (15) and (16) (or (17)) would 
help generate the wrong conclusion that (15) is false and hence that (13) is 
true in our story (by means of the wrong premise that (15) - assimilated to (16) 
(or to (17)) - is the negation of (13)).
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such a way that the following sort of general condition would obtain: there 
exists a guise (or other suitable Millian construction) under which a given 
subject stands in the Belief-relation to a neo-Russellian proposition containing 
an indexically presented time, or place, or spatio-temporal item, only if the 
subject is somehow able to track the time, or the place, or the spatio-temporal 
item, in question. Then Millianism could presumably be made to yield the same 
verdicts as neo-Fregeanism on the truth-values of certain belief-ascriptions 
containing indexicals of the above kinds. For instance, reports like (12) and (14) 
would both come out as true, and (13) as false, under the extended Millian 
account (relative to the given contexts); so there are after all moves of the sort 
discussed which would not be validated by Millianism either. However, assuming 
that such a notion of tracking could be harmoniously incorporated into a Millian 
theory, it is obvious that it would have to be located at the pre-semantic level. 
As a result, the Millian and neo-Fregean analyses of belief-ascriptions of that 
kind, in spite of being materially equivalent, would not be logically equivalent 
to each other; a report like (14), for example, would be in each case assigned 
substantially different truth-conditions and meanings. And this would provide 
us with sufficient grounds on which to reject the Millian claim about notational 
variance. On the other hand, if a notion of tracking is to be in the end 
acknowledged as theoretically relevant, then one might always raise the question 
concerning the overall advantages, for explanatory purposes, of taking it as 
semantically relevant as well. Furthermore, cases might be introduced where the 
same object is tracked separately by hand and eye by a given subject and 
where she does not know that the touched object is the seen object. Concerning 
such cases, it is very likely that even the extended Millian account would yield 
different verdicts as the neo-Fregean account on the truth-values of belief- 
reports such as e.g. 'She believes that that (the touched object) is F' and 'She
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believes that that (the seen object) is F'.
4.7 As to the Issue about the possibility of a (rational) subject's believing 
contradictory Fregean thoughts, consider the following sort of case5'. Suppose 
now that Jones sincerely and reflectively assents to a token of (1) on d at 11:58 
p.m., so that (3) is then true of him; and that, without taking the trouble to 
look at his watch, three minutes later (i.e. at 00:01 a.m. on d+1) he sincerely and 
reflectively dissents from a token of (2) (thinking, of course, that he is 
referring to d-1). Assume further that the ascriber is as before, i.e. that he 
does not mistrack time, that he is aware of Jones's situation, etc. And one might 
also assume that, on the later occasion, Jones has not changed his mind about 
his previous belief (he remembers what the weather was like on d).
The question I want to take up, and to which I shall eventually give a 
negative answer, is this. Does it follow that the ascription
(6) Jones, believes that yesterday was not fine,
taken as uttered on d+1, holds of Jones? If so then a consequence of the neo- 
Fregean account would be that Jones, ex hypothesi a rational thinker, comes to 
believe a pair of contradictory thoughts on different occasions without 
apparently having meanwhile changed his mind (I think it would be manifestly 
implausible to construe (6) as implying that a change of mind has taken place). 
In effect, the thoughts referred to by the 'that'-clauses in (3) and (6) would 
clearly contradict each other, the regimentations for (3) and (6) being: 
(3)" B1t:58 p |jd [Jones, < MP^, Fineness>]
This happens to be the kind of case used by Soaroes in support of his 
notational variance arguments against neo-Fregeanism; cf. Soames 1989, 154-5.
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(6)> BflO:01 i.i.,d+1 tjones» < MFV -- 
A positive answer to the above question would thus give us the result
that neo-Fregeanism is committed to reporting Jones's doxastic states in a way 
which is strikingly similar to the way in which a Millian theorist would report 
them. And an additional problem for neo-Fregeanism would be that it does not 
seem to contain a notion designed to fulfil a role similar to that of the Millian 
notion of a guise or appearance under which one may be acquainted with a 
proposition (such a role being mainly that of rendering given propositions 
opaque to the thinker's awareness, so that in some cases one may be prevented 
from re-identifying a proposition previously entertained). Take Salmon's Millian 
believers, for instance. They may find themselves in a situation in which they 
believe inconsistent propositions, at the same or at different times, but (if 
rational) they would necessarily do it under different guises; thus, Salmon's 
analyses for (3) and (6) (taken with respect to the given contexts) would be as 
follows:
(3)'" (3g)[G11:58p|jd (Jones,w,g) & BELJ1:58p|j(,(Jones,w,g)] 
(6)" (3h)[G00:(JtU}d+1 (Jones,w,h) & BELjwm^CJones,-.w,h)]
(where 'w' stands for the Russellian proposition <d, Fineness> and the guises 
g and h are obviously such that -»(g=h)). On the other hand, Fregean believers - 
who allegedly may also find themselves in a situation in which they believe 
contradictory thoughts (at different times) - do not seem to be credited with 
any sort of psychological device by means of which given thoughts could be 
concealed from them (so as to speak); modes of presentation will not do for on 
a Fregean view they are taken as constituent parts of thoughts. Indeed, unlike 
neo-Russellian propositions, Fregean thoughts are seemingly supposed to be com-
55 It is assumed that the negation of a thought consisting of a certain mode of 
presentation of an object and a property is the thought consisting of that mode 
of presentation and the negation of that property.
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pletely transparent to their thinkers. Hence, the Millian critic might claim that 
Fregean believers have the disadvantage of being prevented from not recogni- 
zing that it is one and the same proposition which is believed and disbelieved 
by them on different occasions (Jones's putative situation when he assents to 
(1) and later on dissents from (2)).
However, such a move is doubtful. For its supporting premise, viz. the 
claim that neo-Fregeanism entails the problematic result under consideration, can 
be shown to be false. Indeed, given that Fregean Indexicai thoughts of the 
envisaged types are (partially) individuated in terms of abilities to track the 
objects thought about, a belief-report such as (6) - taken as made on d+1 - 
would have to be counted as false (with respect to Jones's story); whereas, as 
assumed, ascription (3) - taken as uttered on d - holds of Jones. Thus, 
supposing that this sort of result may be extended to spatial indexicals and 
perceptual demonstratives, whose senses in given contexts are individuated along 
the same lines, the consequence is not in general derivable from the neo- 
Fregean account that it is possible for a subject (unknowingly) to believe, on 
different occasions but without having meanwhile changed her mind, mutually 
inconsistent thoughts.
If ascription (6) is false under neo-Fregeanism, then the following report
(18) Jones lacks the belief that yesterday was not fine,
taken as made on d+1 at 00:01 a.m., will come out as true under such an account 
(with respect to Jones's story). Thus, using
(18)' -•BgQ.jj a , dft [Jones, < MPd , -«Flneness>]
(i.e. the negation of (6)') as the Fregean regimentation for (18), and (3)" as the 
Fregean regimentation for (3), one might describe In general Jones's doxastic 
states by saying that on a certain occasion he believes a certain thought and 
on a later occasion he fails to believe the negation of that thought. Hence, the
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sort of case under discussion is definitely not a case in which someone holds 
at different times antagonistic attitudes, e.g. belief and disbelief, towards the 
same thought.
A different way of establishing with respect to Jones's case the falsity of 
(6), and hence the truth of (14), might be given as follows. I take it that, 
according to neo-Fregeanism, the following result is true of Jones at 00:01 a.m. 
on d+1:
(18)" -.(3a)[Tfl0:01a| dl1 (Jones,d,a) & Bpj.,,^ d+) [Jones,<a,iFineness>]]; 
here 'a' ranges over temporal modes of presentation based on abilities to track 
days over time, and 'V stands for that relation which holds, at a given time, 
between a subject x, an object o, and a singular mode of presentation 0 if and 
only if, at that time, x thinks of o under 3. On the other hand, I also take it 
that such a theory rates as being in general valid inferences from given De 
Dicto belief-ascriptions to the corresponding De Re ones; that is, propositions 
of the general form
(*) Bt [x, < MPC, * >],
where 'MP0' and ' ' stand for a mode of presentation of an object o and a 
property (respectively), entail propositions of the form
(**) (30)[Tt(x,o,B) & Bt [x, <B,*>]].
(For convenience, I have only considered the case of beliefs in thoughts of the 
simplest predicative form.) Now the proposition which is the scope of the 
negation symbol in (18)" clearly displays the general form (**). Hence, since ex 
hypothesi (18)" is true in Jones's story, it follows that that proposition is false 
in his story. Therefore, the corresponding proposition of the form (*), which 
turns out to be (6)', is necessarily false In Jones's story. But (6)' is the 
Fregean regimentation for belief-ascription (6). Therefore, (6) comes out as false 
with respect to Jones's story.
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It is instructive to compare the above neo-Fregean results with the 
results a Millian theorist dealing with the same sort of case would usually 
obtain. Thus, under Salmon's account, a belief-report such as (6) would turn out 
to be true with respect to Jones's story; for its Miilian regimentation is given 
in (6)" and this proposition holds with respect to Jones's case (just let 'g* in 
(6)" be 'Yesterday was fine'). Yet, Salmon's theory would rule out a belief-report 
such as (18) as false with respect to Jones's story. Indeed, the Millian 
regimentation for (18) would be given in
(where 'w' is to be read as before); and (18)'" is simply the negation of (6)". 
It should be apparent by now that the verdicts standardly given by the Millian 
theorist on the truth-values of attitude-ascriptions such as (6) and (18) taken 
in the envisaged contexts, respectively true and false, are strictly inconsistent 
with the verdicts given on them by the Fregean theorist, respectively false and 
true. Again, this would be enough to rebut the Millian Notational Variance Claim 
as applied to temporal and spatial indexicals and perceptual demonstratives. On 
the other hand, such a claim would be unsound even if the Millian theorist were 
to be credited with a pre-semantic notion of tracking in the way sketched 
earlier on: presumably, one would have the same assignments of truth-values; 
but one would not have the same assignments of truth-conditions.
4.8 Concerning the principle that Fregean thoughts are necessarily transpar- 
ent to their thinkers, it is clear that such a principle is not threatened by the 
Millian arguments and that it is consistent with the preceding sort of Fregean 
results (though one might perhaps have independent reasons for rejecting it, 
even from a Fregean standpoint). Indeed, the relevant form of the Transparency 
principle might be given as follows:
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(T) If a rational subject x believes that p at t and disbelieves that q at 
t' and the thought that p = the thought that q, then x knows at tf that 
the thought that p = the thought that q (with t'>t).
Now if t'=t then a Fregean theorist would take (T) as being a trivially true claim 
for its antecedent should have to be counted as false: it is simply inconsistent 
with the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts. On the other hand, if tf>t 
- and this is the interesting assumption - then cases of the sort discussed 
before would not constitute any counter-example to claim (T). In effect, an 
instantiation of the principle to Jones's case would turn out to be (again) 
trivially true since its antecedent would turn out to be false; for the second 
conjunct in the antecedent of (T) would not hold: it is not the case that Jones 
disbelieves at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 a thought to the effect that the preceding day 
was fine. Moreover, the envisaged version of the Transparency principle - 
strengthened in a certain way, viz. as in (T)* below - might even be argued to 
be in general (trivially) true from a Fregean viewpoint. Thus, consider the 
following claim:
(T)* If a rational subject x believes that p at t and disbelieves that q at 
t1 and the thought that p = the thought that q and x retains his belief 
that p from t to t', then x knows at t' that the thought that p = the 
thought that q (with t'>t).
One might argue that the antecedent of (T)* does not hold in general on the 
basis that it would be inconsistent with a certain diachronic generalization of 
the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts. In the next Chapter I try to 
put forward what I take to be a plausible formulation of such an extended
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principle; and if my attempt is successful then (T)* should be seen as a trivial 
truth. (It is interesting to notice that (T), as well as (T)*, would presumably 
hold under a Millian account of thoughts and attitude-attributions).
Of course, it does not follow that the neo-Fregean theorist should be seen 
as subscribing in general to the idea that thoughts are transparent to their 
thinkers. On the contrary, there are several senses in which Fregean thoughts 
are opaque to their thinkers. Indeed, there are several versions of the 
Transparency principle that would be regarded as false under a neo-Fregean 
account of indexicality. Thus, take the following sort of claim:
(I) If x entertains at t the thought that p and x entertains at t' the 
thought that q and the thought that p * the thought that q, then x 
knows at t' that the thought that p * the thought that q.
This claim would be unacceptable in the light of neo-Fregeanism. Suppose that 
at t Ralph, looking at a certain object o, judges 'That is nice1 . Meanwhile 
someone replaces o with a distinct (but rather similar) object o1 without Ralph 
noticing it. Later on, at t', looking at what is in fact o', Ralph comes to wonder 
whether the object perceptually presented to him is nice. Assume that Ralph is 
a self-reflective Fregean thinker who is agnostic at t1 about whether the 
thought he is then entertaining is the same as the thought he entertained at t. 
Such thoughts are surely different from one another for they are about distinct 
objects. But, since the thinker is unsure whether he has successfully tracked 
the object thought about at t from t to t', he cannot be in a position to know 
at t1 that the thoughts in question are different.
It is interesting to ascertain whether the following variant of claim (I) 
would be consistent with neo-Fregeanism (it would presumably be consistent with
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Millianism):
(I)* If x entertains at t the thought that p and x entertains at t' the 
thought that q and the thought that p = the thought that q, then x 
knows at t' that the thought that p = the thought that q.
Suppose that Ralph's case is described as before except that this time nobody 
replaces o between t and t1 , while Ralph thinks that a switch has taken place. 
Yet, he comes to judge at tf 'That is nice'. Thus, he wrongly thinks at t' that 
he is then entertaining a distinct thought.
This sort of cases seem to provide us with prima facie straightforward 
counter-examples to claim (I)*. Indeed, if the subject thinks that the thoughts 
he entertains on different occasions are distinct, and if such thoughts are In 
fact one and the same, then it follows that it will not be the case that he knows 
that they are identical. The problem is that, on the neo-Fregean view, the 
second premise of such an inference cannot be taken for granted (with respect 
to cases like the one above). In effect, perceptual singular modes of presentation 
are supposed to be based on abilities to keep track of objects over time and/or 
space, as well as from sensory modality to sensory modality. Hence, it is at least 
arguable that the Fregean thoughts entertained by Ralph at t and tf are not to 
be counted as being identical; indeed, one might claim that it would not make 
much sense to say, with respect to the above sort of circumstances, that Ralph 
has in fact tracked the object o from t to t\ It sounds in a sense weird to say 
that someone has unknowingly kept track of an object, though it surely makes 
sense to say that someone has unknowingly mistracked an object. Thus, one 
might reason as follows with a view to showing that claim (I)* is, in general, not 
inconsistent with the brand of neo-Fregean ism under consideration. Restricting
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our attention to indexical thoughts of the envisaged types, it seems that on such 
a view the only way in which particular thoughts p and q - both about a given 
object o - could be taken as identical is that the thinker who entertains them 
(on different occasions and/or at different places, etc.) keeps track of o. But 
if the above suggestion is correct then, in general, it does not make sense to 
say of a thinker that he unknowingly has kept track of an object. Therefore, 
the thinker could not be in a position to think that p and q are distinct 
thoughts; and hence the conclusion would apparently be blocked that she does 
not know that p and q are one and the same thought. Having our present 
concerns in mind, I shall not try to assess such an argument and settle the 
issue here; I prefer to leave it open (though I shall come back to certain 
aspects of it in Chapter III). But one might at least conclude that, on the neo- 
Fregean account, a claim such as (I)* cannot be conclusively shown to be false 
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INTRODUCTION
In The Varieties of Reference* Gareth Evans urges us to notice that the 
principle labelled by him the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts - 
roughly, the proposition that It is not possible coherently to take different (or 
conflicting) propositional attitudes towards the same thought - should be 
construed as having its range of application limited in the following two 
respects. On the one hand, the principle is not meant to settle questions about 
the identity or difference of thoughts entertained by different subjects (either 
at a single time or at different times). On the other hand, and of greater 
importance to our immediate concerns, the principle is not meant to settle 
questions about the identity or difference of thoughts held by a single subject 
at different times.
Thus, according to Evans, the Intuitive Criterion is to be taken as being 
applicable only to the case of thoughts entertained by the same thinker at the
»
same time. Although a certain minimal constraint seems to be in this way laid 
upon possible acceptable verdicts on the sameness or distinctness of given 
thoughts, it follows that different sorts of consideration must be brought to 
bear on decisions which are intended to cut across agents or across times. And 
it is worthwhile to observe that the synchronlc character of the Intuitive 
Criterion (as well as its restriction to a single agent) appears to have been, In 
general, preserved in more recent neo-Fregean literature2.
In this Chapter I argue to the effect that there is a sense in which the 
second sort of restriction to the Intuitive Criterion mentioned above, i.e. Its 
synchronic dimension, might be reasonably (partially) lifted. Hence, the central
1 Evans 1982, 21.
1 See, for instance, Forbes 1989a, 118.
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aim I intend to attain here is to put forward a plausible diachronic extension of 
the Intuitive Criterion. Such a principle is meant to have the following two 
crucial features. First, it is grounded on the fundamental idea of Cognitive 
Dynamics, the idea that it is a constitutive trait of propositional attitudes that 
they may persist over time, i.e. that they are capable of being retained by their 
agents throughout certain periods of time (an idea which follows the spirit and 
the letter of Evans's proposals). A preliminary step towards our goal of getting 
a diachronic principle off the ground will be to give an admissible account of 
the notion of a token propositional attitude (or a particular propositional 
attitude). The need for such a step becomes apparent once we notice that it is 
natural to construe the objects of retention as being token attitudes taken 
together with their particular contents. Token attitudes are construed as 
concrete mental states formed on certain occasions and in which agents may be 
for certain periods of time, states which have complete propositions as their 
contents and which belong to certain psychological modes or types. Of course, 
the study of attitude-retention is important in so far as it enables us to 
investigate the dynamics of mental content, i.e. the conditions under which 
particular thoughts entertained on certain occasions may persist over time and 
be entertained on later occasions. Secondly, our envisaged principle involves in 
an essential way a pre-theoretical notion of antagonism as applied to (types of) 
propositional attitudes. So it rests heavily upon certain untutored intuitions we 
have about the correctness or incorrectness of certain attitude-ascriptions and 
about the mutual compatibility or incompatibility of certain pairs of attitude- 
types; thus, we will follow here the general policy adopted in Chapter II: such 
ground-floor intuitions are to be viewed as perfectly sound and taken for
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granted 3.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 1, the nature and 
status of the standard (synchronic) Intuitive Criterion are examined; and a 
particular formulation of the principle, a formulation which turns out to be 
violated by Millian accounts of singular content, is taken as the basis for our 
intended generalization. Section 2 is devoted to a sketch of a minimal account 
of token attitudes; and, in Section 3, I use such a framework to formulate what 
I regard as a satisfactory diachronic extension of the Intuitive Criterion. In 
Section 4, I give an intuitive elucidation of the sort of notion of attitude- 
retention one needs in connection with the diachronic principle by introducing 
a number of constraints that such a notion should satisfy. I focus my attention 
upon the case of demonstrative and indexical content, resuming thus the 
discussion held in Chapter II; and I try to display some relations which hold 
between the notion of attitude-retention and certain other notions in the same 
conceptual family, such as the notions of change of mind, preservation of 
attitude-content, and tracking an object over time and/or space. Finally, Section 
5 contains an outline of a solution to the central problem of Cognitive Dynamics, 
viz. the Issue about the conditions under which a thinker is able to re-express 
on later occasions certain token attitudes, e.g. particular temporal beliefs, she 
previously held.
* As we shall see, such a reliance on intuitive judgements about the possibility 
of combining given attitude-types is something which is already involved in that 
construal of the unextended Intuitive Criterion which I shall take as providing 
us with the right sort of basis for the intended diachronic generalization.
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SECTION 1 - THE SYNCHRONIC INTUITIVE CRITERION
1.1 Let us take the following formulation of the Intuitive Criterion as our
starting-point (actually, it is the sort of formulation which is standard in
Fregean literature):
Thoughts are Identical only if, necessarily, every propositionaJ attitude 
that a rational thinker, who grasps them, takes at a given time to one is 
an attitude that she takes at that time to the other.
One could then formalize this principle In the following way:
(SIC) (p = q) - D(VA)(Vx)(Vt)[[G(x,p,t) & G(x,q,t)] - [A(x,p,t) s A(x,q,t)]].
(SIC) is to be interpreted as follows: (i)- the variables 'p','q' range over 
thoughts (or propositions)*; (ii)- V and 't' range over rational thinkers and 
times (respectively); (iii)- 'A' ranges over types of propositional attitudes, such 
as e.g. belief, desire and hope, so that the ternary predicate 'A(x,p,t)' should
Are these to be taken as thought-tokens or thought-types? Well, it depends on 
the sort of classification one wants to adopt. Suppose that one distinguishes 
between thought-tokens and thought-types by analogy with the usual distinction 
between sentence-tokens and sentence-types. Then one would be led to something 
like an occurrent thought or an episodic thought^ i.e. a thought individuated 
in terms of its thinker and the time at which it is entertained. Thus, for 
instance, if at a time t I assert 'All whales are mammals' and at t you assert 
the same sentence-type, then at t we are entertaining distinct thought-tokens, 
but the same thought-type; and if at t I assert 'All whales are mammals' and at 
some other time t' I assert the same sentence-type, then on these occasions I 
am entertaining distinct thought-tokens, but the same thought-type. Now if the 
values of 'p' and 'q' in (SIC) were construed as being thought-tokens in that 
sense, then (SIC) would not be a logical truth; since '=' would not stand for 
the relation of identity, but for the relation of sameness of type. And this 
would give us an Intuitive Criterion which, interesting as it might be, is 
surely different from the one we intend here. Thus, I shall assume that in 
(SIC), and in the subsequent reformulations of the principle, the variables 'p' 
and 'q' range over thought-types in the above sense, so that (SIC) will be a 
logical truth.
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be read 'x takes prepositional attitude A towards p at t' (or simply 'x A's that 
p at t'); and (iv)- 'G(x,p,t)' is to be read 'x grasps p at t' 5.
Assuming a plausible Principle of Compositional I ty for thoughts - roughly, 
the principle that thoughts are complex entities with a certain structure and 
mode of composition - one could derive from (SIC) a corresponding Intuitive 
Criterion of Difference for thought-constituents as follows. Let us use the 
notation 'P(Y)' to represent the fact that a given thought p has a certain 
thought-constituent y (e.g. a predicative, relational, or singular element) as a 
component part. Then the Principle of Compositional I ty might be given thus:
(PC) Let p(y) and p'(y') be thoughts (with the same structure and mode
of composition) which differ only in the fact that p f contains y* where p
contains y. Then if p * p 1 then y * y'.
And (SIC), taken in conjunction with (PC), would yield the following principle 
of individuation for thought-constituents:
(O (y = y') - aVA)(Vx)(Vp)(Vt)[G(x,p,t) - [A(x,p(y),t) = A(x,p(y> ),t)]].
1.2 Now the first thing to notice about the Intuitive Criterion - as repre- 
sented in (SIC) - is that, technically speaking, it is a logical truth; and hence 
it has the truistic nature normally assigned (perhaps wrongly) to any logical
I will not make any particular assumptions about the notion of a subject's 
grasping a thought involved here. One might have at least the following two 
construals of the notion. On the one hand, we might say that a subject grasps 
a thought p at a time t if she is in some sense able to think p at t or to 
entertain p at t, which would presumably require that she has the concepts 
involved in p. On the other hand, and this is a stronger notion, we might say 
that a subject grasps a thought p at t if she knows which thought it is, in the 
sense that she possesses the concepts involved in p and she knows at least the 
minimum necessary to identify p's truth-value (which does not mean that she 
knows the truth-value that p actually has); notice that, on certain views about 
concepts, the first conjunct might be seen as entailing the second. The latter 
notion is basically the one introduced by Dummett 1981, 126 ff. One could also 
claim that a subject's taking a prepositional attitude towards a thought p at 
a time t entails her grasping p at t, in which case one might drop as redundant 
the assumption about the Grasping-relation in the principle (SIC).
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truth. Indeed, (SIC) is clearly a consequence of a theorem of the Logic of 
Identity, namely that which is given In the schema
(Vx)(Vy)[ x = y - (V*)[ *(x) s *(y)]]
(known as Leibniz's Law). And this is so provided that one takes for granted 
the assumption, which is in any case implicit In the notation used to formulate 
(SIC), that thoughts are the appropriate bearers of cognitive significance (or 
cognitive value), i.e. that they are the sort of things which can be believed, 
judged, desired, and so forth.
Another feature of (SIC) I would like to isolate is that its status as a 
logical truth would be preserved even if we dropped both the assumption about 
the Grasping-relation, i.e. the antecedent of the subordinate conditional, and the 
restriction to rational subjects; in other words, the principle would still hold 
with respect to agents who are not necessarily rational thinkers and do not 
necessarily grasp the thoughts p and q.
I shall not explore here the consequences of such a possibility. And I 
shall not examine In detail either the question whether or not the main arrow 
in (SIC) might be reversed, an affirmative answer to which would be tantamount 
to claiming that the notion of sameness of thought is to be taken as being 
exhausted by the notion of sameness of cognitive significance (this notion being 
given in the consequent of (SIC)). Some neo-Fregean philosophers' argue that 
such notions should be kept apart on the following grounds. Thoughts which 
possess the same cognitive significance, e.g. the thought I express by uttering 
'I am hot1 on a certain occasion and the thought I would express were I to utter 
'The subject of these conscious experiences Is hot' on that occasion (where the 
demonstrative would refer to my experiences at the time), might nevertheless be 
counted as distinct on the basis that the latter thought possesses a different
See e.g. Forbes 1989a, 124-125.
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structure: It contains in the subject-position an internally complex constituent, 
viz. the mixed descriptive-demonstrative element the subject of these conscious 
experiences, which is entirely absent from the former thought; and the general 
assumption implicitly used here is that sense is what is expressed or grasped.
But a simpler, and perhaps less theoretically commited, argument might be 
given towards the conclusion that sameness of cognitive significance does not 
entail sameness of thought. Thus, take the following pair of (true) arithmetical 
sentences, for instance: '1038+3456 = 4494' and '(1039-1 )+3456 = 4494'. One might 
apparently assume that the thoughts expressed by these sentences have the 
same cognitive significance; indeed, it seems that anyone who would grasp them 
and judge, believe, etc., either to be true would be bound to judge, believe, 
etc., the other to be true. Yet, one might still be able to discriminate between 
the thoughts in question on the basis of their displaying distinct structures; 
using Frege's terminology, one could represent this fact by saying that the 
binary functional expressions '£ + £' and '(S(£)-1) + C' ~ from which the left- 
hand sides of the above identity sentences might be seen as being (respectively) 
built up - contain distinct modes of presentation of the same function in 
extension.
1.3 However, the seemingly trivial character of the Intuitive Criterion does not 
prevent it from imposing a tight constraint on the acceptability of possible 
theories of content'; and the constraint in question might be expressed as
Consider a principle such as e.g. the principle that if p=q then if p has been 
entertained by a citizen of Lisbon, so has q. This is also a consequence of 
Leibniz's Law, and it also imposes a constraint on possible theories of content. 
Yet, it seems to be a rather uninteresting principle about thoughts. So one 
might ask where does the significance of (SIC) lies (by comparison with 
principles such as the one above). I guess the answer is that (SIC) mentions 
factors which are in some sense relevant to discriminating between thoughts; it 
points to cognitive significance as that property of thoughts which is relevant 
to their individuation. But this does not necessarily mean that such factors are
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follows: a necessary condition for a given theory of content T to be acceptable 
Is that T conforms to (SIC). (SIC) Is then a principle which should be viewed 
as being neutral between different, and even conflicting, theories of content 
which nevertheless share the general assumption that thoughts or propositions 
are the objects of prepositional attitudes (provided that they also take laws of 
logic such as the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals as indisputable); 
thus, it seems that there is nothing distinctively Fregean to the Intuitive 
Criterion, or at least to the formulation of it we have been discussing.
In particular, our principle should be taken as being neutral between a 
neo-Russellian and a neo-Fregean account of singular thought, in the sense that 
both accounts should satisfy such a condition as (SIC) (if they are to be 
regarded as adequate); that is to say, they should not generate verdicts on the 
identity or distinctness of given singular contents which might be counted as 
counter-examples to (SIC). Hence, it seems that (SIC) would be accepted, though 
on obviously different grounds, as a sort of minimal test for the Individuation 
of thoughts both by a neo-Fregean theorist and by his neo-Russellian opponent.
Given its logical status, it is no surprise that even certain more radical 
forms of neo-Russellianism, e.g. the Millian view advanced by Salmon, are 
(implicitly) committed to the Intuitive Criterion as represented in (SIC). 
Therefore, any argument to the effect that Millianism is to be rejected on the 
basis that it violates the Intuitive Criterion should be deemed unsound; for this 
premiss turns out to be false if one gives the Intuitive Criterion the reading
to be regarded as constitutive, in the sense that what would make thoughts p and 
q distinct is the possibility of simultaneously taking different attitudes to 
them. Indeed, one might see (SIC) as an important principle, a sort of minimal 
test of adequacy for given theories of content, and still hold the view that it 
is the distinctness of thoughts p and q - as established by certain independent 
considerations about content - that allows for the possibility of a subject's 
simultaneously taking different attitudes to p and q.
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(SIC). Indeed, Jet us in (SIC) instantiate 'p' and 'q' (respectively) to the thought 
that Hesperus is Hesperus and the thought that Hesperus is Phosphorus (these 
being one and the same Millian thought). Now such thoughts would be bound to 
be distinct in the light of (SIC) - by means of an application of Modus Tollens - 
if It were possible for the following condition to obtain:
(*) (3A)(3x)(3t)[G(x,H=H,t) & G(x,H=P,t) & A(x,H=H,t) & ->A(x,H=P,t)] 
(where 'H=H' and 'H=P' stand for, respectively, the thought that Hesperus is 
Hesperus and the thought that Hesperus is Phosphorus). Let 'A* stand for the 
attitude of belief, V stand for the famous Babylonian astronomer - call him 
'Hammurabi 1 - who was unaware that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and 't' stand for 
a certain time during the lifetime of Hammurabi (I shall also assume that he 
grasps both thoughts). Obviously, in the light of Salmon's apparatus of guises, 
it will not be the case that Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is Hesperus (at 
t) but does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus (at t). As we have seen, 
Salmon construes the general form f-iA(x,p,t)l, or fx does not A that p at t)l, 
as meaning that there is no guise under which x would take the attitude A 
towards p at t (negation being thus given its widest scope). Therefore, there 
seems to be no possible way in which a condition such as (*) might hold in 
Salmon's Millian theory; and hence, in general, such a theory seems to conform 
to (SIC). Thus, again, the conclusion follows that there is nothing distinctively 
Fregean to (SIC).
To formulate the same point in slightly different terms, recall that a 
Millian theorist would take the reports
(1) Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is Hesperus
(2) Hammurabi does not believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus 
as being (respectively) true and false with respect to Hammurabi's story and to
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the time r. On Salmon's style of account, one would not be allowed to Infer the 
truth of (2) from the fact that Hammurabi sincerely and reflectively dissents (at 
t) from an utterance of the sentence 'Hesperus Is Phosphorus1 (or rather Its 
Babylonian counterpart). Accordingly, the negation of the consequent of (SIC) 
would not hold with respect to Hammurabi's story and Modus Tollens could not 
be applied to reach the conclusion (manifestly inconsistent with Millianlsm) that 
the thoughts under consideration are not the same. On the other hand, consider 
Hammurabi's possible doxastic states towards singular thoughts such as the 
thought that Hesperus is the star which appears at dusk in the Eastern sky and 
the thought that Hesperus is the star which appears at dawn in the Western sky 
(thoughts which only differ from one another in that they involve distinct, but 
co-referential, descriptive elements). The Mlllian theorist would presumably count 
the reports
(3) Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is the star which appears at dusk 
in the Eastern sky
(4) Hammurabi does not believe that Hesperus is the star which appears 
at dawn in the Western sky 
as being both true'. Hence, by (SIC), the above thoughts are bound to be taken
' I should mention that there are direct reference theorists who would rather 
count (2) as true; see e.g. Perry and Crimmins 1989 and M.Richard 1990. But the 
accounts in question are not genuinely Millian, since names and other simple 
singular terms are seen as contributing not just their referents to the thoughts 
expressed by sentences in which they may appear.
' The reason why reports such as (4) are to be counted as true according to the 
Millian theory (and with respect to our story) is that there is no guise under 
which our Babylonian subject would be disposed to agree to the thought that 
Hesperus is the star which appears at dawn in the Western sky; indeed, the best 
candidate for such a role, viz. the guise 'Hesperus is the star which appears 
at dawn in the Eastern sky', is not - on the Millian view - a guise which would 
present (so as to speak) that thought. In general, thoughts expressed by pairs 
of sentences of the form fa is the 01 and fa is the fl - where 'a* is a 
syntactically simple singular term and the descriptions are co-referential - are 
taken by the Millian theorist as being distinct general thoughts.
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as being distinct from one another (as one should expect, even from a Milllan 
viewpoint).
As to the Fregean theorist, she would agree to this latter conclusion but 
would vehemently disagree with the former sort of verdict given on reports 
such as (2). Following what appears to be our natural intuition she would count 
(2) as being true (In Hammurabi's story), and would then use (SIC) to establish 
the result that the thought that Hesperus is Hesperus must be distinct from the 
thought that Hesperus is Phosphorus, a result which she might subsequently 
explain in terms of the idea that the thoughts in question contain different 
modes of presentation of the same planet; or, alternatively, she might have some 
prior explanation available for such a difference in thought (in terms of distinct 
Sinne) and then proceed to test it against (SIC)10 .
1.4 Nevertheless, there is a formulation of the Intuitive Criterion, one which 
is not captured by the formalization (SIC), that would not be satisfied by a 
Millian theory of singular content; thus, if the emerging principle is taken as 
plausible then perhaps Millianism should be rejected as an implausible doctrine 
on its basis.
Such a formulation appeals to the intuitive notion of a (type of) 
prepositional attitude being antagonistic to another (type of) propositional 
attitude, in the sense in which e.g. belief conflicts with disbelief and judgement 
is incompatible with suspension of judgement or agnosticism (when such 
attitudes have the same content), and might be given the following sort of 
formalization 11 :
See footnote 8.
^ With a view to rendering the exposition more intuitive, I have used the 
proposition obtained from (SIC) by contraposition as a basis to formulate 
(SIC)*.
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(SIC)* 0(3A)(3B)(3x)(3t)[[G(x,p,t) & G(x,q,t)] &
[A(x,p,t) & B(x,q,t)] & a(A,B)] - -,(p = q) .
Here the variables 'AYS' range over types of prepositional attitude and the 
binary predicate 'a' stands for the Antagonistic-relation, a relation which holds 
between attitude-types A and B Just In case A Is antagonistic to B (such a 
relation being irreflexive, symmetric and non-transitive^). As an illustration, 
consider the case of belief, i.e. the attitude-ascription form fx believes that p 
at tl. Then one might perhaps count the following as attitude-types which are 
(in some sense) antagonistic to belief: (i)- Failure to believe, i.e. fx falls to 
believe that p at ti (or simply fx does not believe that p at tl); (ii)- Disbelief, 
i.e. fx disbelieves that p at tl (which one might take as meaning fx believes 
that not-p at ti); (Hi)- Suspension of belief, i.e. fx suspends belief about p at 
tl (which one might take as meaning fit is not the case that either x believes 
that p at t or x believes that not-p at tl ); and so forth.
1.5 The features of (SIC)* that I would like to single out are the following 
ones. First, it is obviously not a straightforward logical truth; although it might 
(perhaps) be turned into one by means of some analysis of the binary predicate 
'a'^. Notice that (SIC)* is a principle which is considerably stronger than (SIC);
^ In the sense in which the relation of non-identity is non-transitive, i.e. 
from a(A,B) and a(B,A) one cannot infer a(A,A).
^ Yet I have doubts about the possibility of such an analysis. For instance, our 
account would be clearly circular if we explained the antagonism between 
attitude-types in terms of the impossibility of taking them simultaneously 
towards the same prepositional content; though there might be a sense in which 
such a circle could be seen as an informative one. In any case, I would rather 
regard the Antagonistic-relation as primitive and as anchored on our pre- 
theoretical intuitions. Of course, problematic cases are likely to appear. For 
instance, it seems silly to say that a subject believes that p at t, but also 
hopes that p at t or suspects that p at t; yet, we would not intuitively count 
hope and suspicion as antagonistic to belief, at least in the sense which seems
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indeed, one could obtain the latter from the former by instantiating the 
Antagonistic-relation a(A,B) to the Negation-relation, i.e. to A is the negation of 
B (assuming that this is a particular species of antagonism between A and B).
Secondly, Millianism - at least as represented in Salmon's doctrines and 
in other similar accounts - turns out to be inconsistent with (SIC)*. To see this 
it is sufficient to observe that the following attitude-ascriptions
(1) Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is Hesperus (at t) 
(5) Hammurabi disbelieves that Hesperus is Hesperus (at t) 
would both come out as true under Millianism (relative to Hammurabi's story). 
And If we were to apply principle (SIC)* to this case then we would be led to 
the absurd conclusion that the thought that Hesperus is Hesperus is not the 
same as itself; and the Miilian theorist would presumably take such a result as 
a reductio of (SIC)*14.
Thirdly, as already remarked, (SIC)* is intended as a principle which is 
anchored upon our pre-theoretical (and untutored) intuitions about the correct- 
ness or incorrectness of given attitude-attributions, as well as on our ground- 
floor judgements about antagonism between pairs of attitude-types. Thus, for 
example, we would be naturally inclined to count reports such as
to be required by principle (SIC)*.
Of course, Salmon would not take e.g. belief and disbelief, or belief and 
suspension of belief, as mutually conflicting attitude-types; but that seems to 
go against our ordinary intuitions, and would constitute another way of 
expressing his rejection of a principle such as (SIC)*. On the other hand, one 
might perhaps represent Salmon's position by saying that antagonism only makes 
sense relativized to a guise; i.e., attitudes A and B taken towards a certain 
content p are said to be antagonistic only if p is in both cases presented 
through the same guise. But this would be tantamount to seeing Salmon as perhaps 
accepting, not (SIC)*, but a different principle, a principle which would need 
to be backed up by a certain conceptual apparatus and in which the intutive 
appeal of (SIC)* would be, in my opinion, lost. In Section 4 I discuss, in 
connection with the individuation of indexical content, the question whether a 
Miilian account satisfies a counterpart of (SIC)* relativized to guises (or to 
other Miilian constructions, e.g. Kaplanesque characters).
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(6) Hammurabi disbelieves that Hesperus is Phosphorus (at t) 
(2) Hammurabi does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus (at t) 
as being both true, and (5) above as false; hence, Salmon's verdicts on the 
truth-values of ascriptions such as (2) and (5) might be taken as a reductio of 
his Millian theory of singular content. Therefore, if (SIC)* is indeed acceptable 
as a sort of minimal test for the individuation of content then any satisfactory 
theory of singular thought should count such thoughts as e.g. the thought that 
Hesperus is Hesperus and the thought that Hesperus is Phosphorus as distinct; 
for (SIC)*, applied to (1) and (6) (or to (1) and (2)), would clearly yield such 
a result.
1.6 A further move I am now willing to make consists in trying to generalize 
our principle (SIC)* to the diachronic case, partially lifting thus the restriction 
about synchronicity in attitude-taking. Of course, such a generalization would 
preserve all the properties.we have just assigned to (SIC)*; in particular, the 
resulting diachronic principle would still be incompatible with Millianism about 
singular thought.
Now in order to obtain the desired extension of (SIC)* one surely needs 
to replace quantification over attitude-types, which was assumed both In (SIC) 
and (SIC)*, with quantification over token (or particular) attitudes belonging to 
given types. As pointed out before, the rationale for such an intermediate stage 
is that the diachronic principle we are aiming at Is likely to rest on the basic 
notions of Cognitive Dynamics, the notions of attitude-retention and persistence 
of content as applied to token attitudes.
Accordingly, I shall subsequently sketch what I take to be an adequate 
framework for token prepositional attitudes; such an account will be minimal In 
the sense that the set of general principles and assumptions employed are those
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which are strictly needed for the purpose of getting a diachronic Intuitive 
Criterion off the ground.
Page 178
COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
SECTION 2 - A MINIMAL ACCOUNT OF TOKEN ATTITUDES
2.1 Let me begin by making some general remarks about the notion of a token 
prepositional attitude that I want to introduce here.
I shall take token attitudes to be particular mental states which, as such, 
belong necessarily to their subjects and always have a certain duration. They 
are thus construed as displaying some of the properties that Frege assigned to 
his notion of ideas (Vorstellungenfi. In particular, token attitudes are private 
or specific to their owners, in the sense that the possibility of different 
subjects having (numerically) the same token attitude, either at a single time or 
at different times, will not be allowed in our account1'; although different 
agents may obviously have token attitudes of the same general type and with 
the same particular content. Yet, unlike other sorts of Vorstellungen, such as 
e.g. particular pains and mental pictures, they are not mental events - or 
episodic occurrences in the. mind - but rather mental states. Hence, and this is 
a feature which is central to our account, token attitudes are in principle 
capable of being retained by their agents for considerably long periods of time; 
in some cases, such as presumably the case of my belief that the Earth is 
round, such periods almost amount to the span of life of their subjects. And, 
again unlike other sorts of Vorstellungen, they also have certain contents, which 
are not themselves necessarily mental in nature. And such contents - complete 
propositions with unrelativized truth-values and with a certain internal 
structure - are attached to them In an essential way; that is to say, it Is not
15 Frege 1967.
^ I should remark that token prepositional attitudes are not necessarily private 
in the sense employed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his book 1985 (see e.g. no. 
246).
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the case that a token attitude (had by some agent at a certain time) might not 
have had the particular content it In fact has. In addition to this, token 
attitudes are said to belong to certain types (or psychological modes), e.g. the 
Belief-type, the Desire-type, the Suspicion-type, etc., and such types are also 
regarded as being essential to their tokens; that is to say, it is not the case 
that token attitudes might not have belonged to the types to which they actually 
belong.
2.2 Accordingly, the notion of a token attitude I take to be sufficient for the 
purpose we have in mind is one which will have the property of satisfying the 
set of assumptions 1-5 stated below. I intend such assumptions to be relatively 
uncontroversial and intuitively plausible. Thus, if this desideratum is fulfilled 
then the emerging account will presumably be compatible with a wide range of 
views on the nature of propositional attitudes; in particular, the kind of account 
I put forward is not committed to any particular theory of content for proposi- 
tional attitudes, or to any particular doctrine about their ontological status1 '.
I shall now formulate the envisaged assumptions and then make a few 
comments on them.
ASSUMPTION 1: There Is a basic 5-place relation
T(x,a,m,p,t)
which holds between a subject x, a token attitude a, a type of 
attitude m, a content p, and a time t just in case x takes a,
1' The account offered here is in some respects similar to the account proposed 
in Perry and Crimmins 1989. However, unlike them - who suppose that e.g. 
particular singular beliefs are themselves structured mental entitities, 
consisting of so-called conceptions of objects and properties - I do not make 
any particular assumptions about the (metaphysical) nature of token attitudes.
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belonging to m, towards p at t (or x is in the a-state, belonging to 
m, towards p at t) 18.
ASSUMPTION 2: The Essentiallst Principle
Token prepositional attitudes have their agents, types and contents 
essentially; i.e., the following result holds:
T(x,a,m,p,t) - DCVt')[a exists at t' a T(x,a,m,p,tf )].
ASSUMPTION 3: Functionality of Subjects
The relation T is functional In its first relatunr. there is a function 
which maps every token attitude a existing at a time t onto the 
subject x of a at t; i.e., the following result holds: 
[T(x,a,m,p,t) & T(y,a,n,q,t)] -* (x = y)11.
ASSUMPTION 4: Functionality of Contents20
The relation T is functional in its fourth relatum: there is a 
function which maps every token attitude a existing at a time t onto 
the content p of a at t; i.e., the following result holds:
^ Alternatively, one might think of a token attitude as being identical to the 
taking of its type, in which case we would not have both a variable for the 
token and a predicate for the Taking-relation. Thus, instead of the 5-place 
predicate adopted in our notation, one might have a 4-place predicate 
'T(x,«,p|t)', read as *x takes an attitude-type   towards p at t 1 , thereby 
yielding a token attitude of type  . Yet, for convenience of exposition, I have 
preferred the style of notation used in the text.
*' The absence of any quantifiers and modal operators in all these formulae is 
a convenience which may be explained as follows: their assertion can always be 
replaced by assertion of their closures, these being those formulae (containing 
no free variables) which are obtained by prefixing universal quantifiers and 
necessity signs, in any order, to them. See Kripke 1963, 69.
^ Uniqueness of content is here, and will be henceforth, taken as being always 
relative to a given type.
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CT(x,a,m,p,t) & T(x,a,m,q,t)] - (p = q).
ASSUMPTION 5: Existence of Types
For every token attitude a existing at a time t there is a type m to 
which a belongs at t; i.e., the following result holds: 
a exists at t - (3m)(3x)(3p)T(x,a,m,p,t).
2.3 Assumption 1 introduces what is surely the most primitive fact about 
prepositional attitudes, namely the fact that agents simply have (or take) token 
attitudes (e.g. particular beliefs, desires or fears) at certain instants of time, 
such attitudes having certain contents and belonging to certain types. Token 
attitudes are supposed to be concrete mental states: they are formed in a 
particular mind, they endure for a certain period of time, and eventually go out 
of existence (sometimes this only happens when their agents - people who 
certainly have a very rigid, cognitive structure - go out of existence). And one 
might capture the idea that token attitudes are mental particulars with a certain 
duration by means of the following proposition: 
(D) T(x,a,m,p,t) - OtjXat^CtjStSt, & t,<t, &
(Vtjttyt^t,, -* T(x,a,m,p,tj)3].
Thus, a conspicuous consequence of our conception of token attitudes as mental 
states, rather than mental acts or events, is that they have the important 
property of being capable of being retained by their agents as time goes by (I 
shall come back to the notion of retention later on).
2.4 Assumption 2, the Essentialist Principle, states that a token attitude's 
having (at a given time) the subject that it has, the content that It has, and a 
type of which it is a token, are all to be taken as necessary properties of the
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token attitude in question; in other words, they are properties such that It 
would not be possible for such a token attitude to lack them (at any time at 
which it might exist)21 . Token attitudes are in this way individuated In terms 
of the following three intrinsic (or essential) features: their subjects, their 
contents and their types.
2.5 Concerning Assumption 3, one might say that it is intended to express the 
Principle of Privacy of Ownership for mental entitles as applied to the particular 
case of token attitudes. Indeed, It conveys the idea that only the subject (or 
"owner") of a particular attitude - of a given type and content, and which she 
has at a certain time - can have that attitude (on the same or on a different 
occasion): no one else can have it (or share it with her). Moreover, Assumption 
5 entails the following two results, which taken together give us a sense in 
which token attitudes are private mental particulars.
Proposition 3.1: There are no token attitudes that subjects do not have;
i.e., the following holds: 
-.0(3a)(3t)[a exists at t & (Vx)(Vm)(Vp)-iT(x,a,m,p,t)].
Proposition 3.2: No two subjects can have the same token attitude; i.e., the 
following holds: 
[T(x,a,m,p,t) & T(y,b,n,q,t') & -.(x = y)] - i(a = b).
In order to be able to derive 3.1 from 5 one would need certain extra-
^ I am aware that the Essential1st Principle, taken as applied to contents, 
would be possibly rejected on those views which individuate contents by 
reference to a certain sort of mental acts (and not mental states), such as 
Evans*s episodic thoughts; and the same could be said about Assumption 4 
(Functionality of Contents).
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assumptions, in particular the following (rather plausible) one:
(P) D(Va)(3x)(3m)(3p)(3t)T(x,a,m,p,t).
As to Proposition 3.2, it is a consequence of Assumption 5 taken in conjunction 
with the following (seemingly obvious) premiss:
(E) CXVa)(3t)(a exists at t).
Let me illustrate briefly the above sort of result. Suppose that at a 
certain time, e.g. as a result of reading an article on present European politics 
in a newspaper, the particular belief is formed in my mind that German 
reunification constitutes a threat to peace in Europe. And suppose that, at the 
same or at a different time, you sincerely and assertively utter a token of the 
sentence 'German reunification constitutes a threat to peace in Europe'. There 
is obviously a sense in which the attitudes we have are similar (or qualitatively 
identical) to one another; and this is the sense in which they might be said to 
belong to the same type (the Belief-type) and to have the same particular 
content, viz. the proposition that German reunification constitutes a threat to 
peace in Europe (whatever such a proposition might be, taken with respect to 
the time of the context in question). Yet, according to the foregoing account, it 
is not the case that we have the same token belief, or that we are in the same 
particular belief-state (on that occasion): our particular beliefs must be counted 
as being (numerically) distinct on the basis that they simply belong to different 
agents. Of course, nothing in our account precludes the possibility of my having 
(numerically) the same token belief at some later time; such a possibility is 
indeed entailed by our characterization of particular attitudes as mental states.
To take another example, suppose that I assertively utter a token of the 
sentence 'I am hot' on a certain occasion, and that you assertively utter a token 
of the same sentence-type at the same time. Again, it might be said that we have 
the same sort of attitude for our mental states are of the same type and their
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contents presumably belong to the same type of thought (though under any 
reasonable theory of indexlcal content the particular thoughts believed by you 
and me are distinct from each other); nevertheless, we do not have the same 
token belief (according to Assumption 3).
2.6 Let us now turn to Assumption 4. It states that every token attitude 
existing at a certain time is to be assigned a unique content (at that time and 
with respect to a given psychological mode). And Assumption 5 entails with 
respect to contents results which are analogous to those expressed by 
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 with respect to agents, namely the following ones:
Proposition 4.1: There are no token attitudes without a content.
(This proposition is utterly captured by the formalization given for 
Proposition 3.1, but it is worth stating).
Proposition 4.2: No two contents can be attached to the same token
attitude; i.e., the following holds: 
[T(x,a,m,p,t) & T(y,b,m,q,tf ) & -«(p = q)] - -«(a = b).
(And observations which parallel those made with respect to the derivability of 
3.1 and 3.2 apply to Propositions 4.1 and 4.2).
Let me illustrate Proposition 4.2. Suppose that at a time t, pointing at a 
particular object o in my visual field, I sincerely assert 'That is red*. And that 
at a later time t1 , pointing at a numerically different (but qualitatively identical) 
object of from the same angle, I assert a token of the same sentence-type. Then, 
given certain plausible assumptions about content, at t1 I am not in the same 
particular mental state as I was at t: my token beliefs are distinct in virtue of
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the fact that they have different particular propositions as their contents.
As to Proposition 4.1, one might think that it would be vulnerable to the 
following sort of apparent counter-example. Suppose that on a certain occasion 
a child sincerely and assertively utters a token of the sentence 'Santa Claus Is 
short and fat1 , seemingly giving thus voice to a particular belief. Yet, according 
to a certain range of views on singular content, it follows that there is just no 
complete thought or proposition that could be assigned to her mental state as 
its content at that time. It would then seem that Proposition 4.1 does not hold 
at all. However, such an impression is wrong. Let us grant, for the sake of 
argument, that the views in question are along the right lines. Then what one 
would say is not that there is no content available to be assigned to the 
putative belief entertained by the child (as if such a belief were a pre-existent 
thing, waiting for a content to be attached to it), but rather that there is no 
token belief for such a putative content to be assigned to (the child's utterance 
not being counted as expressing any particular belief).
An interesting issue, which is somehow related to the one just discussed, 
is whether Assumption 4 would be vulnerable to so-called Twin-Earth arguments. 
Suppose that at a certain time I assert 'This is water' (pointing at a sample of 
Earth's water) and that, at the same time, my counterpart on Twin-Earth - who 
is ex hypothesi physically and psychologically indistinguishable from me - 
asserts the same thing (pointing at a sample of Twin-Earth's water). Then it 
seems that I and my counterpart on Twin-Earth have exactly the same token- 
belief on that occasion. Yet, assuming that the differences between Twin-Earth 
and Earth are as in Putnam's famous thought-experiment, one could claim - on 
the basis of certain suppositions about content - that the specific content of my 
belief Is different from the specific content of his belief: my token belief is 
about H20 while his token belief is about XYZ. Therefore, it appears that
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different contents might after all be assigned to one and the same token attitude 
(taken at a certain time), and hence it seems that Assumption 4 is simply false. 
However, such a conclusion could be resisted by means of the following 
(possible) reply. Even granting the assumptions about content used in the 
argument, one could still refuse to concede Its main premiss and thus insist that 
my token-belief is not (numerically) the same as my counterpart's token-belief 
because they are had by different subjects; location In space would suffice here 
as a means of individuation for subjects: I am located somewhere on Earth while 
he is hypothetically located somewhere on Twin-Earth.
I will not make any further assumptions about content. Having our general 
purpose in mind, it is sufficient to say that every token attitude, had by a 
certain agent at a certain time, is to be assigned a single complete proposition 
as its content at that time (relative to a given attitude-type); and that complete 
propositions are supposed to have the standard role ascribed to them, viz. that 
of being the proper bearers of (unrelativized) truth-values.
2.7 Let us finally turn our attention to Assumption 5. What is important to 
observe about this principle is that, unlike its counterparts 3 and 4, it only 
assumes existence, and not uniqueness, of types (where these are taken as being 
relative to a fixed content). That is to say, it states that every token attitude, 
taken by a subject at a certain time and having a certain content, must belong 
to some type; hence the possibility is allowed that a given attitude with a 
particular content, had by an agent on a certain occasion, belongs to distinct 
attitude-types.
I think it is instructive to see why one should not require uniqueness of 
types (relative to given contents). First, I shall take here for granted any 
acceptable system of classification of token attitudes, to which certain contents
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are assumed to be attached, into types or psychological modes (such as e.g. the 
one outlined by John Searle22 ). Now suppose that we assume (content-relative) 
functionality of types. Then It follows that our envisaged taxonomy of attitude- 
types, say taxonomy M, must be Into disjoint psychological modes; that Is, M 
must be such that, for any attitude types rrij and mk In M, if rrh * n^ then It Is 
not the case that the following holds
T(x,a,mj,p,t) & T(x,a,mk,p,t)23.
There are some consequences of such an assumption about (content- 
relative) functionality of attitude-types that I would like to single out as being 
clearly undesirable from the point of view of our envisaged diachronic principle 
of indivlduation for contents.
To begin with, an immediate consequence of the above supposition is that, 
for instance, the Hope-type and the Desire-type would not be both allowed to 
belong to our taxonomy M of attitude-types. To appreciate this, suppose that the 
following obtains
T(x,a,mj,p,t),
and that rrij is the Hope-type. Then, since Hope presumably entails Desire with 
respect to a fixed prepositional content (i.e. fx hopes that p at tl logically 
implies fx desires that p at ti), it follows that
T(x,a,mk,p,t),
where mk is the Desire-type. Therefore our uniqueness requirement on M would 
be violated, for rrh * mk ; and hence we would have to make do with Hope only 
(dispensing with Desire in M), which I take to be a rather unwelcome result. And
See Searle 1983 (especially Chapter 3).
could also formulate the uniqueness requirement for attitude-types (with 
respect to fixed contents) in set-theoretical terms as follows. If •• and •. are 
any attitude-types in N then what is required is that •• n BL = 0 , where •• 
(respectively m^) is the set of possible ordered quadruples <x,a,p,t> sucn 
that T(x,a,Bj,p,t) (respectively T(x,a,^,p,t)).
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similar results would also obtain for other attitude-types between which there 
are likely to be relations of entailment (when the tokens of the types in 
question have the same particular content, of course).
In addition to this, I shall now try to show that another sort of 
undesirable consequence of the assumption about uniqueness of types is that 
certain pairs of attitude-types which one would clearly count as being 
intuitively antagonistic to one another would not be both allowed to belong to 
our taxonomy M.
Let us consider some unproblematic cases In the first place. Thus, even 
if uniqueness of types were required, our taxonomy M would still contain some 
instances of what might be taken as mutually conflicting attitude-types. For 
example, Belief and Disbelief would still both belong to M. Although Disbelief that 
p presumably entails (and is entailed by) Belief that not-p, this would not 
violate the uniqueness requirement, which we construed as being necessarily 
relative to a fixed content. .In effect, from
T(x,a,mj,p,t), 
where rrij is the Disbelief-type, one could infer
T(x,a,mk ,ip,t),
where mk is the Belief-type (and the converse inference would also be valid); 
but this would hardly be inconsistent with that requirement.
Now one might wish to know whether the same sort of (unproblematic) 
result could be generalized to other cases of intuitively antagonistic attitude- 
types, whether these belong to the same constellation (so as to speak) of types, 
such as e.g. the pairs Belief/Failure to Believe, Belief/Suspension of Belief, etc., 
or not, such as e.g. the pair Disbelief/Judgement.
Well, the latter cases do not seem to present any special problems. Yet, 
the former ones are likely to give rise to certain difficulties (if content-relative
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uniqueness of types is assumed, of course). Take, for instance, Judgement and 
Suspension of Judgement (or Agnosticism) concerning a given prepositional 
content, say p. Assuming that fx suspends judgement about p at tl is to be 
analysed as fit is not the case either that x judges that p at t or that x judges 




where m* is the Judgement-type. So far so good. But suppose that we also want 
a notion of Failure to Judge that p, which might be given by the schema fx 
does not judge that p at tl (or fit is not the case that x judges that p at tl) 
and which would surely be (intuitively) antagonistic to Judgement that p (as 
represented in the schema fx judges that p at tl). Then it follows that Suspen- 
sion of Judgement about p entails (but is not entailed by) Failure to Judge that 
p, provided that the latter notion - i.e. fx does not judge that p at tl - is 
represented in our notation as
where rrh is the Judgement-type; notice that the notation T(x,afm|j,p,t) , where 
mk is taken to be the complement of the Judgement-type, would be definitely 
wrong. Hence, it seems that Suspension of Judgement and Failure to Judge would 
not be both allowed to enter into our envisaged taxonomy of attitude-types, the 
former notion being a proper part of the latter. Therefore, one could not be in 
a position to count Suspension of Judgement and Judgement (with respect to a 
certain content) as being antagonistic attitude-types. And, by parity of 
reasoning, the same would hold with respect to Suspension of Belief/Belief and 
so forth. However, such attitude-types are clearly instances of types which are 
intuitively antagonistic to one another (with regard to a fixed content).
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Needless to say, I take the above results as unacceptable consequences 
of the supposition about (content-relative) functionality of types, and hence as 
providing us with a rationale for not adopting it in our account of token 
attitudes.
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SECTION 3 - THE DIACHRONIC INTUITIVE CRITERION
I think that we are now in a position to use the framework for token 
propositional attitudes just introduced and attain the central aim set for the 
present Chapter, namely to sketch an acceptable formulation of a diachronic 
extension of the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts.
3.1 As a preliminary step, let us go back to our formula (SIC)* - the 
synchronic Intuitive Criterion - and let us rewrite it in accordance with the sort 
of account of token attitudes outlined In Section 2. One would obtain the 
following principle:
(SIC)** 0(3x)(3a)(3b)(3m)(3n)(3t)[[G(x,p,t) & G(x,q,t)] & 
[T(x,a,m,p,t) & T(x,b,n,q,t)] & a(m,n)] - -«(p = q).
(SIC)** should then be interpreted as follows: (i)- the ranges of values 
of the individual variables 'p'/qYxVt' are as in (SIC)*; (ii)- the predicate- 
letters 'G' and 'a' are also interpreted as before; (iii)- the Individual variables 
'aYb' range over token propositional attitudes; (iv)- the individual variables 
'm','n' range over attitude-types in our envisaged taxonomy (recall that these 
are not necessarily disjoint types); and (v)- the predicate-letter 'T' stands for 
the 5-place Taking-relation, a relation which holds between (rational) agents, 
token attitudes, attitude-types, thoughts and times. Thus, (SIC)** could be 
assigned the following informal reading:
A sufficient condition for thoughts to be distinct is that it Is possible for
a rational subject who grasps them to take token prepositional attitudes
of antagonistic types towards them at the same time.
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One should remark that the assumption about the Grasping-relation in the 
antecedent of (SIC)** could be dropped if we supposed that a subject's taking 
a token attitude, of a given type, towards a certain proposition at a certain time 
entails her grasping (in some sense) the proposition in question at that time2*; 
and such a supposition does not appear to be much problematic.
3.2 Now in order to obtain an admissible generalization of our principle 
(SIC)** In the intended sense one needs basically to take the following two 
steps.
First, and more obvious, one needs to allow diachronicity in attitude- 
taking, i.e. one needs to make room for the possibility that the token attitudes 
(of certain types) our subject x takes towards the thoughts p and q occur at 
different instants of time.
Secondly, and a little less obvious, one needs then to assume that the 
token attitude (of a certain type) taken by the subject at a certain time, say 
t, towards thought p has been retained by her at the later time, say t', at 
which she takes her token attitude (of a certain type) towards thought q. In 
other words, one must suppose that our subject's original token attitude, 
together with its particular content, persists throughout the period of time 
which goes from the instant t at which such an attitude was taken to the 
instant t1 at which she takes a token attitude whose type is possibly in conflict 
with the type of the first one. Therefore, one needs to appeal to some such 
notion of retention for token attitudes as the one which was alluded to in 
Section 2\ moreover, since token attitudes are assumed to have their contents 
essentially, one also needs to appeal to some notion of persistence of mental 
content over time.
See footnote 5 (Section 1).
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The rationale for Introducing the above supposition about retention of 
token attitudes Is simply that if it were to be dropped then the dlachronic 
principle we are seeking would turn out to be highly implausible (or even 
blatantly false). Indeed, dispensing with the assumption about attitude-retention 
would be tantamount to allowing the possibility of, for instance, our subject's 
changing her mind at some time between the time t at which she takes her 
original token attitude towards thought p and the time t' at which she has a 
certain token attitude towards thought q. And If such a change of mind, which 
would surely be a change of mind concerning the content p of her former token 
attitude, were allowed then the conclusion would be utterly unwarranted that the 
thoughts entertained p and q are distinct on the basis that the token attitudes 
our subject takes towards them at t and tf belong to antagonistic types (such 
a conclusion being thus reached by means of a diachronic principle from which 
the requirement about retention would be ex hypothesi absent); and this would 
be so for the simple reason that a change of mind would have the effect of 
somehow cancelling the former token attitude, and then there would not be any 
attitude-types which one could count as being antagonistic to one another. It 
is certainly possible for a (rational) subject to have on a certain occasion, say, 
a particular belief with content p and, having meanwhile been confronted with 
some sort of new evidence, to come to change her mind on a later occasion about 
p and, say, to believe the negation of p, or to suspend belief about p, on that 
occasion.
Let me illustrate the above sort of consideration. Suppose that, at a time 
t, I look at someone and judge 'He is ugly', when I am in fact looking at my own 
image reflected in a mirror and I am unaware of this. And suppose that, at a 
later time t', I judge 'I am not ugly'. Now am I judging (at different times) a 
certain thought and Its negation, or rather a certain thought and the negation
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of another thought? In order to apply our envisaged diachronic principle of 
individuation so as to get an affirmative answer to the latter alternative one 
would have to assume that at t' I have in some sense retained the particular 
judgement I made at t. For suppose that I have changed my mind concerning 
the thought I judged at t at some time between t and t1. Imagine, for instance, 
that at such a time I have decided to reconsider my previous judgement, and 
that I come to think that after all the man is not that ugly (being still unaware 
of the fact that I am the man in question). Then it seems that I thereby 
withdraw my former token attitude and it makes no sense to say that its type 
is antagonistic to the type of the token attitude I take at t'; hence, the 
consequence would not be forthcoming in the light of our diachronic principle 
that the thought I judge to be the case at t is different from the thought I 
judge not to be the case at t'. (I shall take up the issue about what sort of 
connection should be seen as obtaining between the notions of attitude-retention 
and change of mind in Section 4.)
3.3 Assuming that the foregoing remarks are along the right lines, one could 
tentatively put forward the following formulation of a diachronic Intuitive 
Criterion of Difference for thoughts:
(DIC) 0(3x)(3a)(3b)(3m)(3n)(3t(| )(3tn )(t||>t9 ) C[G(x,p,t0 ) & 
G(x,q,tfl )] & [T(x,a,m,p,t|,) & T(x,b,n,q,tB )] & a(m,n) 
& RetCx^m^t,)] - i(p = q).
In (DIC), and besides the stipulations already adopted, the variables 'V,'V 
are to be Interpreted as ranging over times, and the 6-place predicate-letter 
'Ret* is to be Interpreted as standing for the Retention-relation, a relation which
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holds between an agent x, a token attitude a, an attitude-type m, a content p, 
and times t^t, (with t^) if and only if x retains a, of type m and with content 
p, from tj, to tj|. Of course, if t, = tj, then the assumption about retention in the 
antecedent of (DIC) would turn out to be redundant and one would obtain the 
synchronic Intuitive Criterion (SIC)** from (DIC).
Accordingly, our principle (DIC) could be given the following informal 
reading:
A sufficient condition for thoughts to be distinct is that it is possible for 
a rational subject who grasps them to take, at (possibly) different times, 
token prepositional attitudes of antagonistic types towards them, provided 
that she retains at later times the token attitudes previously held.
3.4 I would like now to make some brief remarks on the notion of attitude- 
retention to be employed in (DIC); in the next two Sections I discuss such a 
notion, as well as the associated notion of persistence of content, in some detail. 
As already pointed out, with regard to the other crucial notion involved in our 
diachronic Criterion, viz. the notion of antagonism between attitude-types, I 
would like to keep it at a purely p re-theoretical level and I would thus regard 
its application as being mainly guided by our ordinary intuitions about attitude- 
ascription.
A definition of the notion of retention which suggests itself in a rather 
natural way might be given as follows:
(R) (Vti )(3tfl )(3tB )(t0 <t1 <t| )[Ret(x,a,m,p,t() ,t1 ) =df a exists at t,].
Although definition (R) captures the most basic fact about retention of 
token attitudes throughout given periods of time, it does not throw much light
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on the conditions under which retention is secured, i.e. on the conditions under 
which a given token attitude might be said to exist at every time in a given 
interval. So what else could one say about attitude-retention? Well, by way of 
a preliminary tackling of the problem, one might naturally impose the following 
two kinds of requirement on the notion of attitude-retention (I shall expand on 
this later on).
A first minimal requirement, suggested by our preceding considerations, 
is this. One might say that in order to retain a token attitude a, of type m and 
content p, from a time tg to a time t^, a subject x must not change her mind 
about p at any time tj between t^ and tj,. Indeed, the retention of a token 
attitude is a continued relation to a certain propositional content, and any 
change of mind concerning that content would have the effect of interrupting 
(so as to speak) such a relation; thus, the token attitude in question would 
cease to exist from the moment at which such a change of mind takes place. 
Accordingly, and assuming that our subject x is a rational agent, one could 
perhaps state the intended condition by means of the following principle:
(C) (Vti )(3t0 )(3tB )(tj)<ti <t|| )[T(x,a,m,p,tfl ) -
[Ret(x,a,m,p,t0,t,,) - -«(3c)(3o)[T(x,c,o,p,t|) &
(where 'c' and 'o' range over, respectively, token attitudes and attitude-types). 
However, there seem to be two kinds of shortcoming to some such require- 
ment as (C). One the one hand, attitude-retention is restricted to rational 
subjects; for it is clear that principle (C) would only hold with respect to them. 
Yet, it is obvious that they are not the only ones to be able to retain token 
attitudes throughout time. But, since our principle (DIG), as well as its 
synchronic counterpart (SIC)**, is also subjected to that sort of restriction, one
Page 197
COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE
could always say that the notion of attitude-retention which is relevant to (DIC) 
is one which would satisfy (C). On the other hand, the notion of change of mind 
employed in (C) is formulated in terms of the notion of antagonism between 
attitude-types; and this might appear to be somehow circular. But, since in (C) 
the notion of retention is not taken as being exhausted by the notion of an 
absence of change of mind, and since the notion of antagonism is in general to 
be taken as primitive, we do not seem to have a genuine shortcoming here. 
(Notice further that the notion of change of mind introduced in claim (C) also 
relies on some notion of persistence of content over time.)
Another requirement which turns out to be crucial for attitude-retention 
has to do with memory, in particular prepositional memory or memory that. 
Indeed, memory is - or at least involves - storage or preservation of (already 
available) information, in contradistinction to acquisition of new information. And, 
since attitude-retention seems to require, in general, preservation of attitude- 
content, I think that the following kind of claim could be reasonably advanced: 
a subject x retains a token attitude a, of type m and content p, from a time t^ 
to a time tn provided that at any time tj in the interval she remembers that p. 
Accordingly, one could formalize as follows this second sort of condition on 
attitude-retention:
(M) (Vti )(3t(} )(3t|| )(t0<ti <tB )[T(x,a,m,p,tfl ) - 
[x remembers that p at t -
It is worth pointing out that the condition stated in the consequent of 
principle (M) could not be plausibly turned into a biconditional. In effect, if 
propositional memory were also to be regarded as a necessary condition for 
attitude-retention then a subject could not be in a position to retain e.g. false
Page 198
THE DIACHRONIC INTUITIVE CRITERION
beliefs (in the sense of beliefs whose contents happen to be false); for fx 
remembers that pi clearly entails fpl, and hence the retention of a token 
attitude with content p would entail the truth of p. But it is obviously possible 
to retain false beliefs: the ancient astronomers, for instance, certainly believed 
for a long time that the Earth is flat and that the planetary orbits are circular. 
The conjunction of principles (C) and (M) entails the following result. If 
a subject x takes a token attitude a, of type m and with content p, at a time 
tQ, then x remembers that p at any time tj in an interval from tjj to tj, only if x 
does not change her mind about p at tj. Now one might be inclined to think that 
this result does not hold. Indeed, at first sight, it would be possible for some 
agent to be in a position to remember that p at tj and at the same time to 
change her mind about p at tj (where p is the content of a certain token 
attitude previously taken). However, such an impression is erroneous. In effect, 
principle (C) assumes rationality, and hence such an assumption must be 
preserved in the above result. Now suppose that our subject has on a certain 
occasion (say) a particular belief that p, and that on a later occasion she 
remembers that p. Then, taking for granted that memory is a form of knowledge, 
it follows that our subject knows that p is the case; thus, her changing her 
mind about p on that occasion - e.g. by being agnostic concerning p - would 
apparently constitute a violation of our requirement that our agent be a rational 
subject.
3.5 Let me finish this Section by considering the following apparent difficulty 
for our diachronic principle (DIG). The problem is that perhaps there is a sense 
in which, by using Definition (R) above in conjunction with certain other 
additional suppositions, (DIG) could be derived from its synchronic counterpart 
(SIC)**. This would not be a straightforward derivation. Indeed, In order to
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carry it out one would also have, for instance, to drop the assumption about the 
Grasping-relation from both principles; for, according to (DIC), the grasping of 
thoughts may occur on distinct occasions. However, even if such a move could 
be plausibly made, I would not take the emerging result as being necessarily a 
bad thing. In effect, it could be seen as merely capturing the fact that (DIC) 
is an extension of (SIC)**, approximately in the same sense in which some 
mathematical results are said to be extensions of certain other results; that is 
to say, it would only mean that some information about diachronic cases could 
already be extracted from (SIC)**, or would already be potentially contained in 
(SIC)**. Thus, it would encapsulate the idea that one could hardly make sense 
of synchronic cases without tacitly appealing to diachronicity.
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SECTION 4 - RETENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT
In this Section I outline the leading ideas of an explanation of the notion 
of attitude-retention involved in the dlachronic principle (DIG). Some principles 
are introduced which impose a number of constraints upon the relevant notion 
of attitude-retention, and in which this notion is explained by reference to a 
certain set of other notions. Our discussion is centred upon the case of 
persistence of attitudes with demonstrative contents; for this is undoubtedly the 
most interesting and challenging case. I examine some consequences of the 
diachronic principle and I test its adequacy against some of our ordinary 
intuitions about the identity or distinctness of given demonstrative thoughts.
4.1 The first thing I think it is important to emphasise is that with the help 
of our diachronic principle one is actually able to discriminate between certain 
singular thoughts which would remain indiscriminable on the basis of the 
standard Intuitive Criterion; and I believe that the intuition that such thoughts 
should be counted as distinct from each other is as appealing as the intuition 
that thoughts discriminable in the light of the usual synchronic principle are 
distinct from each other.
To take a familiar example, consider the following situation. Suppose that, 
on a certain occasion t at dawn and on the basis of his visual perception of a 
certain celestial body in the eastern sky, Jones sincerely and reflectively 
asserts 'That is a planet' (pointing to the celestial body in question). And 
suppose that, on a certain occasion tf at dusk (on the same day), and on the 
basis of his visual perception of a certain celestial body In the western sky, 
Jones sincerely and reflectively asserts 'That is not a planet* (pointing to that 
celestial body, which he takes to be a star). Of course, unbeknownst to Jones,
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the celestial bodies seen by him on both occasions are in fact one and the same, 
viz. the planet Venus.
Now, the standard Intuitive Criterion does not allow us to draw the 
conclusion that the particular thought believed by Jones at dawn is different 
from the particular thought disbelieved by him at dusk; the fact that he takes 
such mutually conflicting attitudes at different times t and tf prevents us from 
obtaining such a consequence. On the other hand, one could indeed discriminate 
between the thoughts in question by means of our extended Intuitive Criterion. 
Naturally, in order to do this one would have to assume that at dusk Jones 
continues to hold his particular belief that the celestial body he saw at dawn 
is a planet; that is to say, one would have to assume that Jones retains that 
particular belief throughout the day. But, on my view, this seems to be a 
plausible assumption to make with respect to Jones's story (and analogous 
cases). In particular, one might reasonably suppose that throughout the day 
Jones does not change his mind concerning the particular content of the belief 
he formed at t, that since dawn he has not been confronted with any sort of 
new evidence which might cause him to withdraw his former belief.
I am aware that, on certain views, such a sort of supposition about 
retention would be regarded with suspicion. For instance, Sidney Shoemaker25 
seems to reject the possibility of a subject's having something like a memory 
demonstration of an object perceived in the past, about which she had then a 
certain belief. Thus, with respect to our example, Shoemaker would perhaps claim 
that the perceptual demonstrative 'that' which Jones uses at t to express his 
belief about Venus would necessarily give way to some sort of description, e.g. 
'The thing I was pointing to at dawn', if he tried to re-express at t' that belief 
on the basis of memory. And this would not secure retention of belief (In our
25 See his paper 1968, 559.
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sense); for 'That is a star* and 'The thing I was pointing to at dawn is a star1 
would presumably differ in content, and hence whereas at t Jones would be seen 
as having a certain singular belief about Venus, at t' he would be seen as 
having a different, descriptive (and maybe general), belief about Venus. In the 
present essay I endorse the view, a development of which is given in Section 
5 in connection with temporal beliefs, that the idea of a memory-based genuinely 
demonstrative mode of presentation of an object is a plausible one. Hence, It 
seems to me that there is certainly a sense in which one might intuitively say 
that the particular belief formed in Jones's mind at t is still there at t'; and 
that he might be able to re-express it then by thinking 'That was a planet', 
where 'that' is associated with a memory-based, and non-descriptive, way of 
thinking of Venus28.
Assuming thus that it is correct to say of Jones that he retains the 
particular belief he had at dawn throughout the period of time which goes from 
t to t', and given that all .other conditions stated in the antecedent of (DIG) 
seem to be fulfilled with respect to Jones's case, one could then use the 
diachronic principle to establish the result that while at t Jones believes a 
certain demonstrative thought, at t' he believes the negation of a different 
demonstrative thought. And such a difference in demonstrative content might be 
accounted for, in a Fregean fashion, in terms of a difference between the 
particular perceptual modes of presentation under which Jones is confronted 
with Venus at dawn and at dusk. Underlying such a difference in Sinne is the 
fact that one might describe Jones as taking the perceptual information he 
receives at dawn and the perceptual Information he receives at dusk as having
^ The view that there is something like an acquaintance with objects by memory 
was held by Bertrand Russell in his book 1989 (cf. 26). And the idea of a 
memory-based type way of thinking of an object (such as a spatio-temporal 
particular, a time, a place, etc.) is developed in Peacocke 1983 (Chapter 6).
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two distinct objects as their sources; of course, Jones would only describe 
himself in that way if he were In a position to reflect about his own perceptual 
experiences, and this does not hold with respect to most of our current 
cognitive transactions with objects in our immediate environment.
4.2 Concerning the notion of change of mind as employed above, it is worth 
observing that one might be naturally Inclined to treat it as a purely internal 
notion, or as a cartesian notion; in the sense that such a notion would 
apparently satisfy a general principle to the effect that those first-person 
judgements we make about our mental acts and states are bound to be infallible. 
Indeed, one might be tempted to think that it does not seem to be possible for 
a rational subject to be wrong about whether or not she has changed her mind 
about a certain content, or to be described as being under the illusion of 
having (or having not) changed her mind about something when in fact such a 
change of mind has not (or has) taken place. In other words, one might be 
inclined to regard the following sort of principle as obtaining:
(CM) Necessarily, if a rational subject x thinks that she has (respectively 
has not) changed her mind about a certain content p at a time t, then x 
has (respectively has not) changed her mind about p at t.
Nevertheless, however tempting the cartesian conception underlying 
principle (CM) may be, there are good reasons to reject it and to give up the 
above construal of the notion of change of mind as being a purely internal 
notion; hence, there are good reasons to take our notion as involving a certain 
sort of external (or extra-mental) component.
In effect, it is possible to show that principle (CM) is not immune to a
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certain class of counter-examples. And the general pattern under which such 
counter-examples fall might be given as follows. Suppose that, on a certain 
occasion t, a certain subject x forms a certain belief to the effect that a certain 
content p holds. And suppose that, on a certain occasion tf (t'>t), x comes to 
suspend belief about p (or to be agnostic concerning p). Now the possibility of 
a (rational) subject's misremembering certain mental states in which she was, or 
certain prepositional attitudes she took, is certainly a feature of our mental 
lives. Let us then suppose that, at t1 , our subject x misremembers the particular 
belief she held at t; imagine, for instance, that x thinks at t' that at t she 
neither accepted nor rejected p (or that at t she was agnostic concerning p). 
Therefore, under such circumstances, one would say that x thinks (at t') that 
she has not changed her mind about p. Yet, on the other hand, it is clearly the 
case that, at t', she has changed her mind about p; and this gives us a clear 
counter-example to half of principle (CM). As to the other half of (CM), viz. the 
claim that it is impossible for a rational agent to think that she has changed her 
mind about a given content without having actually changed her mind about it, 
the same sort of strategy could be used with a view to rendering the claim 
vulnerable to obvious counter-Instances.
In any case, and going back to Jones's story, the fact that (CM) does not 
in general hold has no significant consequences with respect to our supposition 
that, at dusk, Jones has not changed his mind about the content of his former 
belief. For instance, I claim that it would be manifestly incorrect to report 
Jones's situation in the following kind of way. Although Jones would vehemently 
deny at t' that he has changed his mind about his previous belief - if we were 
to question him, he would probably say that he still believes that what he 
pointed to at dawn is a planet - his utterance at t' must nevertheless be seen 
as conveying such a change of mind (regardless of Jones's description of his
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own doxastic state). Such a sort of account would presumably require that one 
should regard the thought that Jones believes at t and the thought he 
disbelieves at t' as being one and the same thought. And this would in turn lead 
us to something like a general conception of singular thoughts as neo-Russellian 
propositions, I.e. ordered n-tuples of properties and objects; thus, in our 
example, the common content of Jones's attitudes at t and t' would be something 
like the ordered pair of Venus and Planethood.
I do not think that such a line of reasoning could be plausibly developed. 
It is not that such an account is untenable because it would entail the 
possibility of a rational thinker's unknowingly changing her mind about 
something. As noticed, such a possibility is clearly consistent with the above 
sort of objection to principle (CM); and it only apparently comes into conflict 
with our ordinary intuitions. The implausibility of the account under consider- 
ation is rather due to the manifest implausibility of the crucial premiss used in 
it, viz. the description of Jones's utterance at t' as representing a change of 
mind relative to his original belief. In addition to this, such an account relies 
on general suppositions about singular content which lead to results which are 
inconsistent either with the standard Intuitive Criterion or with its dlachronic 
extension (e.g. the result that it is possible for a rational subject to believe 
mutually contradictory propositions on the same occasion or, without changing 
her mind, on different occasions).
4.3 Incidentally, it might be thought that Jones's case introduces a problem 
for a Mlllian account of attitude-ascription. Indeed, such an account Is 
eventually bound to employ some such notion as the notion of taking a 
prepositional attitude towards a Russelian proposition under a character
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(Kaplan), or under a guise (Salmon) or under a text (Perry)21 . And, in order 
to block certain absurd descriptions of (apparently) perfectly rational agents as 
being in fact irrational ones, the Millian theorist will very likely rely on some 
such general principle as the following one (which one might see as a sort of 
Millian analogue of the extended Intuitive Criterion of Difference2'):
(G) It is not possible for a rational subject to take - at the same time or, 
without changing her mind, at different times - antagonistic prepositional 
attitudes (e.g. belief and disbelief) towards the same (neo-Russellian) 
proposition under the same character, or guise, or text
Now it might be tempting to claim that principle (G) is not satisfied in Jones's 
case on the following grounds. On the one hand, Jones - who is ex hypothesi 
a rational subject - believes at t the neo-Russellian proposition consisting of 
Venus and Planethood under the guise (text, character) 'That is a planet'; on the 
other, he disbelieves at t1 precisely the same neo-Russellian proposition under 
precisely the same guise (text, character).
However, such a claim is unwarranted. It relies on the supposition that the 
posited Millian entities - characters, texts, guises - are entirely linguistic in 
nature. Thus, in particular, the alleged character (text, guise) under which 
Jones believes at t the Russellian content <Venus, Planethood> and disbelieves 
at t' the same content, is identified with the sentence-type 'That is a planet'. 
Such an identification is presumably correct with respect to the notion of text; 
but it is arguably not correct with respect to the notion of character (and 
perhaps also with respect to the notion of guise). In Kaplan's theory of
27 Kaplan 1988a; Perry 1980; and Salmon 1986. 
M See footnote 14 (Section 1).
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indexicality, the character associated with an indexical sentence is a certain 
constant function whose arguments are possible contexts of use of the sentence 
and whose values are the propositions expressed by the sentence In such 
contexts. Accordingly, the character of a sentence-type such as 'That Is a 
planet* does not seem to vary from occasion of use to occasion of use: it is the 
same function which determines the same value, viz. the above neo-Russellian 
proposition, for the given contexts of use of the sentence by Jones at t and t'. 
On the other hand, characters are also taken as being governed by a rule of 
compositionality which might be crudely stated thus: the character of a complex 
expression is a function of the characters of its constituent parts. Hence, the 
character of our sentence-type 'That is a planet1 will inter alia depend on the 
character associated with the demonstrative 'that'. In general, the character of 
an indexical is a constant function which maps a possible context of use onto the 
object (if there is such an object) referred to by the indexical in the context; 
for instance, the character attached to the expression-type 'now' is grosso modo 
given in the rule according to which an utterance of 'now' in a context c 
denotes the time of c. But, in the case of a perceptual demonstrative such as 
'that', its character can only be regarded as being complete if one takes it in 
conjunction with a certain demonstration, which is invariably attached to the 
demonstrative in a context of use (where a demonstration is paradigmatically an 
ostension of a certain object, the demonstratum, by the agent of the context). 
Thus, In the case of demonstratives - in contradistinction to the case of pure 
Indexicals such as 'now'- a mere consideration of the usual parameters which 
define a possible context of use will not be sufficient to determine an object (if 
there Is such an object) as being the reference of a demonstrative in the 
context; in order to be able to fix a reference for a demonstrative, as used in 
a given context, one needs to take It together with the associated demonstration
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(in the context in question).
Now one might reasonably take the demonstrations which are associated 
with Jones's uses of 'that1 at t and t' as being distinct token demonstrations; 
such demonstrations might be viewed as presenting the same demonstratum in 
different particular ways. Hence, if one takes the character of a demonstrative 
as necessarily involving a certain accompanying demonstration, then one obtains 
the result that the character under which Jones believes at t the neo-Russellian 
proposition <Venus, Planet hood > is different from the character under which he 
disbelieves at t' the same proposition. Therefore, the Millian theorist could not 
be said, at least on the basis of the above argument, to have violated a 
principle (viz. (G)) to which he would probably be committed .
Nevertheless, there are kinds of case involving indexicals with respect to 
which it is uncertain whether a Millian account of cognitive value would conform 
to principle (G). First, it has been claimed 38 that situations might be devised 
in which it would be impossible to discriminate between the token demonstrations 
associated with uses (on distinct occasions) of the same perceptual demonstra- 
tive; and in which a rational agent takes, at different times but without 
changing her mind, conflicting attitudes towards the same neo-Russellian content. 
Secondly, cases might apparently be introduced In which a rational subject 
employs distinct, but co-referential, tokens of the same pure Indexical in such
^ Of course, it might be replied that such an appeal to demonstrations, taken 
as ways in which certain demonstranda may be perceptually presented to a 
thinker, would have the effect of bringing Millianism closer to a Fregean 
account of demonstrative modes of presentation. Yet, I do not think that it 
would follow from this that Millianism should be seen as a notational variant 
of a Fregean theory of demonstratives; for Kaplanesque characters and 
demonstrations are construed as being external to semantic content.
M In his article 1987, William Taschek draws upon such cases to attack Kaplan's 
attempt to explain the phenomena of cognitive significance in terms of the 
notion of character.
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a way that she might be seen as holding conflicting attitudes towards the same 
neo-Russellian content under the same character; notice that the character of 
a pure indexical is exhausted by its linguistic meaning, and this Is a feature 
which is obviously invariant across contexts of use.
Let me concentrate briefly on the latter cases, which I take as being 
potentially more problematic for Millianism. And let me consider a situation which 
involves diachronicity but in which, one might suppose, there is no change in 
the subject's original beliefs. Suppose that, on the 28th October 1989, Jack (a 
rational person) asserts a token of 'Today is fine' in Oxford at 11:30 p.m.; and 
that, an hour later, heavy rain happens to pour down so that, looking at his 
watch, he comes to assert a token of 'Today is not fine'. Unlike Jack, we know 
that the real time of his latter utterance is in fact 11:30 p.m. and the day still 
the 28th October: Jack was simply unaware that British Summer Time ended on 
the 29th October3 *. Hence, it seems that we are entitled to assert that Jack 
believes and disbelieves, .on distinct occasions32 , the same neo-Russellian 
content, viz. the ordered pair of the 28th October 1989 and Fineness, under a 
single character, viz. the linguistic meaning of the sentence-type 'Today is fine' 
(the tokens of the pure indexical 'today' having obviously the same character). 
Thus, supposing that on the later occasion Jack has not changed his former 
belief, it seems that his story provides us with a counter-example to principle 
(G). Yet, a possible way out which might be available to the Millian theorist 
would consist in entering the times of Jack's utterances into the neo-Russellian 
propositions believed and disbelieved by him on the above occasions; such 
propositions would now be something like ordered triples of the day in question,
31 Assume, for the sake of argument, that the convention in Britain was different 
and that the clocks go back at midnight instead of at 2:00 a.m.
3* Or should we say at the same time?
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Fineness, and a time. As a result, one would rather describe Jack as holding 
conflicting attitudes on different occasions towards different neo-Russellian 
contents under the same character. But, although no clear violation of principle 
(G) would thus be forthcoming, one might still say that such attitudes are taken 
towards the same neo-Russellian prepositional matrix (to use Salmon's terminol- 
ogy33 ) under the same character.
Of course, the Miliian theorist could not avail himself of the above sort of 
manoeuvre when dealing with cases in which synchronicity in attitude-taking is 
assumed. So the question arises whether or not cases can be constructed in 
which a single neo-Russellian indexical content is the object of conflicting 
attitudes held by a rational subject at a single time and is presented to her 
under a single character, or under a single guise. Well, I am inclined to think 
that it is unlikely that Millianism could be dismissed on such a basis. Yet, 
although the sort of case introduced below does not give us a straightforward 
afirmative answer to our question, I think that it could hardly be accommodated 
within a framework of characters or guises. Suppose that on a certain day d, 
at breakfast, Jill thinks 'Today is Christmas Day'; and that at lunch, having kept 
track of d, she thinks again 'Today is Christmas Day'. Suppose further that a 
few days later, on d', she comes to think at a certain time t 'I am sure that that 
day was Christmas Day; but I wonder whether that day was Christmas Day', 
where the thoughts entertained at t involve memory-based modes of presentation 
of d which are made available by memory-images of d at breakfast and at lunch 
(respectively). Jill Is unsure whether the same day is In question in both cases, 
and so she holds (at a single time) conflicting attitudes, viz. belief and 
suspension of belief, towards such thoughts. Now, on the Miliian view, these 
happen to be one and the same neo-Russellian proposition. And it Is not obvious
33 See Salmon 1986, 27-8.
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how the notion of character (or the notion of guise) could be applied here so 
as to secure the result that that proposition Is presented to Jill under different 
characters (or guises).
4.4 Having finished such a digression, let me now go back to the notion of 
change of mind. As claimed in Section 334 , the notion of an absence of change 
of mind is entailed by the notion of retention (assuming that we are dealing with 
rational subjects, and this is a supposition which I shall keep throughout the 
current Section).
Now it might be interesting to check whether the converse entailment 
holds. Thus, suppose that at a certain time t a rational thinker, say Ralph, 
looking at a certain pencil on his desk, asserts 'That pencil was bought at 
Rymans'. Suppose further that Ralph falls asleep and that meanwhile someone 
(possibly some philosopher playing the role of a cartesian demon) replaces he 
pencil in question with a qualitatively identical one (assume that this one was 
not bought at Rymans). Then he wakes up and at a later time tf , looking at what 
he naturally takes to be (numerically) the same pencil, asserts again 'That pencil 
was bought at Rymans'. In this sort of situation it is clearly the case that our 
subject has not changed his mind at any time in the interval between t and t' 
concerning the content he believed at t. Yet, there is obviously a sense in which 
one might be inclined to say that Ralph's utterance at t' does not manifest a 
persistence of the particular belief he had at t. The reason why one would say 
that this is so is that there are grounds to think that the particular thoughts 
believed by Ralph on both occasions are not the same; and it seems plausible to 
assume that retention of a token prepositional attitude throughout time requires 
In general that its particular content be preserved (I shall come back to this
This claim was then represented as Principle (C).
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claim soon).
However, one should be cautious In dealing with cases of such a sort. 
Indeed, although it is reasonable to claim that Ralph's utterance at t' does not 
manifest a persistence of his former belief, it does not follow from this that at 
t' he has not retained that belief at all. In effect, in a certain sense, Ralph's 
mental state formed at t does not appear to have been interrupted (or 
terminated), and the particular belief in question might still be there at tf . 
Assuming that the original pencil is no longer within Ralph's perceptual field at 
t', what he is prevented from doing then Is to re-express his former belief by 
assertively uttering, or sincerely assenting to an utterance of, a sentence 
containing a perceptual demonstrative referring to that object; in non-linguistic 
terms, one could say that since at t' Ralph does not stand in any perceptual 
relation to the relevant object, he is prevented from employing then any 
demonstrative way of thinking of it based on perception. But it would be a non 
sequitur to claim that at t'.he is not in a position to retain his previous belief. 
In fact, I think that it would be intuitively plausible to claim that if at t' Ralph 
remembers the pencil seen at t as possessing a certain property (viz. that of 
having been acquired in a certain place), then he will be able to retain at t' his 
former belief about the pencil by employing a demonstrative way of thinking of 
it based on memory; and we might perhaps represent such a continuity of 
Ralph's mental state by saying that at t1 he would be prepared to judge a 
thought such as 'That pencil was bought at Rymans', where the reference of the 
demonstrative would be secured by a memory (or by a memory-image) of the 
pencil seen at t. Of course, if at t' Ralph forgets everything about his 
perceptual encounters with the pencil at t (e.g. as a result of a blow In the 
head while sleeping), then he will not be then in a position to retain his original 
belief in the way suggested above; and, at first blush, this seems to be the only
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way available by means of which such a retention could be secured. Yet, maybe 
there is a sense In which one could still regard him - from a third-person 
perspective - as having not changed his mind about the belief in question, in 
which case the conclusion could be drawn that, In general, the notion of an 
absence of change of mind does not entail the notion of attitude-retention. In 
any case, the preceding reflection surely entitle us to draw a weaker conclusion, 
viz. the conclusion that, in general, an absence of change of mind does not 
entail that species of attitude-retention which is carried out by employing 
demonstrative ways of thinking of objects based on perception.
4.5 The objection might be immediately raised that the foregoing account is 
question-begging on the following grounds. We want the diachronic principle 
with a view to being able to discriminate between given thoughts in an 
apparently more extensive and adequate way. But our principle depends in a 
crucial manner upon a notion of retention for particular attitudes; and it now 
turns out that we need some prior notion of preservation of content, or identity 
of thought throughout time, to make sense of the notion of attitude-retention 
itself.
It is indeed true that our account is committed to the claim that identity 
of content over time is required for a subject's retaining at a later time a token 
attitude previously held. In effect, in Section 3 the notion of retention was 
defined as follows: a subject x retains a token attitude a, of type m and content 
p, from a time tj to a later time t, if and only if a exists at any time tj such 
that t^tjSt,,. And, by the Essentialist Principle introduced in Section 2, the 
particular content attached to a token attitude existing at a certain time is an 
essential property of the attitude In question, a property which it necessarily 
has at any time at which it might exist; therefore, retention of a token attitude
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with a certain content throughout a certain period of time entails that at any 
time in that period the very same content is attached to the attitude in 
question.
However, I have reasons to believe that the account we have been 
developing is not really threatened by the above line of criticism.
Let us begin by considering what I would take to be a bad reply. It might 
be argued that the objection in question would only be effective if we conceded 
that our account requires a prior notion of preservation of content to explain 
(in part) the notion of attitude-retention. Yet, we do not need to make such a 
concession at all. In general, not every condition which one might take as 
necessary for some notion to be satisfied is fpso facto a condition which 
provides us with an explanation of the latter notion. For instance, the condition 
being at least as rich as (which holds of certain ordered pairs of people) is 
surely necessary for the condition being the same person as to obtain; however, 
it would be manifestly absurd to introduce the former notion as (partially) 
explaining the concept of personal identity. Thus, likewise, our claim that 
preservation of content is necessary for attitude-retention would not necessarily 
commit us to construing the latter notion as being (partially) explained in terms 
of the former.
This would be a bad reply because it would render our account utterly 
uninteresting from a philosophical point of view. Indeed, what we are aiming at 
is philosophical explanation; so we are interested in stating, not mere necessary 
conditions, but constraints on the notion of attitude-retention which explain It. 
Hence, I think that one should admit that our account of attitude-retention 
requires in fact a prior notion of persistence of content. However, it does not 
follow that our explanation is viciously (or uninformatively) circular. In effect, 
what one seems to have here is a case of local holism, i.e. a case in which the
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notions under consideration - attitude-retention and preservation of content - 
should be taken as being simultaneously introduced into our account, each of 
them being explained by reference to the other and to a certain set of other 
notions.
Our account could only be regarded as viciously circular if the notion of 
identity of content throughout time to which we must make an appeal involves 
In some way or other the very idea underlying our diachronic principle for the 
individuation of content. But, at least with respect to Ralph's story and similar 
cases, it is clear that the notion of content that we are employing when we 
discriminate between the thought Ralph believes at t and the thought he 
believes at t' is completely independent of the diachronic principle. Indeed, such 
a discrimination relies upon a general assumption about mental content which we 
adopted as a basic one from the outset, viz. the assumption that thoughts are 
the proper bearers of truth-values; and, if this assumption is taken for granted, 
then the following minimal .principle for the individuation of content will be a 
logical truth: necessarily, if thoughts p and q are Identical then p and q have 
the same truth-value. Such a principle is clearly sufficient to differentiate 
between the thoughts entertained by Ralph at t and t1.
But that is an easy kind of case. What should one say about cases, such 
as e.g. Jones's story, where one is unable to discriminate between thoughts 
entertained on distinct occasions on the basis of their truth-values? Well, I 
think that, in general, there appears to be no a priori reason to think that the 
notion of sameness of content required by the notion of retention should 
necessarily Involve some notion of cognitive significance for thoughts such as 
the one underlying our diachronic criterion. On the other hand, the cases in 
question suggest that the notion of content one needs in connection with the
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diachronic principle is some such notion as Evans's notion of a dynamic 
thought, i.e. a thought which involves temporally extended ways of thinking 
of indexically presented objects; In particular, one needs the notion of a memory- 
based thought, i.e. a thought which involves modes of presentation of indexically 
presented objects which are made available by memories, or memory-images, of 
the objects.
4.6 I have claimed that preservation of content believed, judged, desired, and 
so forth, should be viewed as a necessary condition for persistence of belief, 
judgement, desire, and so forth. In his article 'A Problem About Continued 
Belief'36 , John Perry considers the question of whether such a claim Is true 
and, though leaving this question unresolved, he discusses a case which might 
prima facie direct us towards a negative answer.
I take it to be instructive to examine such a case from the viewpoint of 
our account of retention.. Perry's example (slightly modified) is as follows. 
Suppose that I go for a walk in the Oxford University Parks, and that 
throughout the walk I keep thinking to myself 'This is University property'. 
Suppose further that, unbeknownst to me, I leave and re-enter the Parks 
several times in the course of my walk: I just do not pay attention to the 
various signs marking the limits of the Parks. On the one hand, It should be 
obvious that in this sort of situation the content Judged by me changes as I 
move in and out of the University Parks: conspicuous differences in truth-value 
are enough to convince us of this. On the other hand, one might be apparently 
tempted to say that throughout the walk I continue to make the same judgement, 
or that throughout the walk I continue to judge the same thing (although what
35 Evans 1981, 311. 
35 Perry 1980, 323.
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I judge changes truth-value). So it seems that, after all, preservation of content 
is not required for retention.
Nonetheless, what I believe to be the right sort of thing to say concerning 
such a case Is this: throughout the walk, and as I move in and out of the Parks 
area, I am in fact making different particular Judgements (although I am 
unaware of this, of course). That is to say, every time I leave (or re-enter) the 
University Parks and judge 'This is University property 1 I am actually forming 
a new particular judgement. Thus, what I claim is that - contrary to appear- 
ances - no re-expression of judgement is taking place in such a sort of 
situation. But the following query might then be naturally raised. Why is it that 
one is so inclined to hold - perhaps on pre-philosophical grounds (as suggested 
by Perry) - that there is some kind of persistence of judgement going on? Well, 
I think that the example discussed contains two ingredients which might perhaps 
Induce on us such an impression of continuity of attitude. On the one side, the 
(different) particular contents judged by me on distinct occasions during the 
walk (e.g. when I am out of the Parks area and then when I re-enter the Parks) 
may be said to belong to the same type of content, in the sense that on both 
occasions I am thinking of a certain place in the same (demonstrative) sort of 
way (the 'this'-type of way of thinking) and I am ascribing the same property 
to such a place (though different places are in fact thought about on those 
occasions). On the other side, a significant feature of the situation described Is 
that throughout the walk it seems to the thinker (i.e. myself) that he is judging 
the very same particular content all the time (assuming that the thinker is self- 
reflective). And those people who feel tempted to describe my position as that 
of someone who has been re-expressing a particular Judgement for a certain 
period of time are likely to do so on the basis of some p re-theoretical conception 
of retention as something which is wholly internal to the subject, something
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which may not be dependent upon any contingent features of the subject's 
environment.
Now I do not wish to deny that retention of particular attitudes over time 
involves some sort of internal continuity. Yet, as we have seen, such a 
continuity is not adequately represented in the idea that the notion of an 
absence of change of mind, which is undoubtedly entailed by the notion of 
retention, should be taken as a purely internal notion. Thus, I tentatively 
propose the following principle as being appropriate to capture the sort of 
interior continuity which seems to be present in cases such as the one 
discussed above:
(S) Necessarily, if an agent x retains a certain token attitude, with a 
certain content and belonging to a certain type, throughout an interval 
of time from tQ to t,,, then for any time tj in the interval it docs not seem 
to x at tj that x is not taking the attitude towards the same content (e.g. 
it does not seem to x at tj that x is not believing, desiring, judging, etc., 
the same thing).
Nevertheless, the condition just stated is far from being sufficient for 
attitude-retention, as it ought to be in order to warrant the "internalist" 
conception of retention referred to above. In effect, I maintain that cases of the 
sort exemplified by my story in the Parks and by Ralph's story mentioned 
earlier on force upon us the general conclusion that attitude-retention is not a
*'ln formulating principle (S) one might have employed the positive construction 'it seeas to x at t- that x is taking the attitude towards the saae content*. 
The problem is that this would require, on the one hand, that the concept of the attitude in question (e.g. the concept of belief) is part of our agent's 
conceptual repertoire, and that she is in a position to reflect about her own mental states, on the other. By contrast, such requirements are not involved in the negative construction used in the text.
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purely internal notion. And such a result is to be taken in the following sense: 
it is possible for a (rational) agent to think that she has retained at a later time 
a particular propositional attitude previously held, or to think that on such an 
occasion she continues to have the attitude towards the same content, while as 
a matter of fact at the time in question she has not retained that attitude, or 
she no longer continues to have the attitude towards the same content. 
Consequently, our account of retention allows the possibility that a subject be 
wrong about whether or not she has retained on a certain occasion a certain 
particular attitude she formerly took, or about whether or not on that occasion 
she continues to believe, desire, etc., the same thing. There is undoubtedly a 
distinction to be made between cases in which attitude-retention is successful 
and cases in which it is not; and, in general, one should not credit the subject 
with infallible knowledge about whether or not she has (successfully) retained 
a certain propositional attitude.
Moreover, I would propose the following as a crude explanation of why in 
the envisaged cases a re-expression of an attitude would seem (to the thinker) 
to have been accomplished (for convenience, I assume that our thinker is a self- 
reflective one). Throughout my walk in the Parks it would seem to me that I 
have re-expressed a particular Judgement because - or, better, partly because - 
I keep thinking that I am judging the same particular content. And It would 
seem to me that I am judging the same thing all the time (partly) because 
throughout the walk I (wrongly) think that I have (successfully) kept track of 
a certain place, viz. the University Parks area, as I move around. Analogously, 
it would seem to Ralph that he has re-expressed at the later time t* his former 
belief held at t (partly) because he thinks that at t* he is believing the same 
particular content. And it would seem to him that he Is then believing the same 
thing (partly) because he (wrongly) thinks that he has (successfully) kept track
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of a certain object, viz. the pencil on his desk, from t to t'.
4.7 The above considerations suggest that, at least in the case of attitudes 
with demonstrative contents, another kind of internal continuity which is 
Involved in (a certain sort of) retention of a token attitude from one occasion 
to another consists in a continued exercise - on the part of the subject of the 
attitude - of an ability to keep track of an object over time and/or space3* 
(and this may require, as it does in my story, that the subject keep track of 
his own position in space as he moves around). It is important to emphasize that 
the condition stated is not to be taken as a condition imposed on attitude- 
retention tout court, but only on that particular species of attitude-retention In 
which given agents re-express prepositional attitudes formerly held by means 
of perceptual demonstratives (i.e. expressions such as 'this' and 'that', 'here', 
'there' and 'over there', 'he' and 'you', etc., taken in certain uses). At the level 
of thought, one might express this by saying that the condition in question only 
holds with respect to cases where a subject retains an attitude previously taken 
towards a certain demonstrative content by employing a type of way of thinking 
of an object based on perception39 . Let us call this particular sort of attitude- 
retention perception-based retention (in short, P-retention). Clearly, P-retention
38 The general idea is due to Evans and is expounded in his article 1980. A more 
recent and very interesting development may be found in John Campbell's paper 
1987/1988.
3' The reason why the condition should not be seen as holding with respect to the 
notion of attitude-retention in general is that, as pointed out before, one 
should make room for the possibility of a subject's retaining on a later 
occasion and on the basis of memory a token attitude previously taken towards 
a demonstrative content on the basis of perception. On the other hand, the 
notion of perception-based retention just sketched should have to be tightened 
up; the reason is that certain non-intended cases, particularly those involving 
recognition-based ways of thinking of perceptually presented items, turn out to 
be covered by it. I ignore the complication here.
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hold. In effect, one may succeed in keeping track of an object for a certain 
period of time and yet not P-retaln a prepositional attitude previously taken; for 
there is always the possibility that meanwhile one has changed one's mind 
concerning the content of that attitude. Thus, consider the following case. At a 
certain time t Bernard, looking at a suitcase in his room and considering its 
size, asserts 'It is heavy'. Then he moves around and at a later time t', looking 
at the same suitcase and forming a mental picture of its content, assertively 
says 'I wonder whether it is heavy'. Finally, at a still later time t", and after 
trying to lift the suitcase, Bernard comes to assert 'It is heavy'. It is clear - 
or at least one might suppose - that in this sort of situation our subject has 
(successfully) kept track of an object (the suitcase) from t to t" (and from 
sensory modality to sensory modality). Yet, I guess it would be wrong to 
describe Bernard as having P-retained at t" the particular belief he had at t. 
Although Bernard's assertion at t" gives voice to a token belief which has 
exactly the same particular.content (one may safely assume) as the token belief 
he held at t, that assertion should not be seen as manifesting a persistence of 
his former belief; for meanwhile, at tf, he has undoubtedly changed his mind by 
suspending judgement concerning the content of such a belief. And if at t" our 
subject has not retained tout court his previous belief then he has not P- 
retained it either.
Another general result one could extract from the above sort of example 
Is that preservation of content is not a sufficient condition for attitude-retention 
(as one would expect it not to be). As we have seen, the particular thought 
believed by Bernard at t is presumably the same as the particular thought he 
believes at t" (at least one could not discriminate between such thoughts on the 
basis of something like the minimal principle of individuation stated earlier on). 
Yet, there Is no retention of belief going on here.
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Notice further that one could not be In a position to apply the diachronic 
principle to Bernard's case in order to obtain the patently absurd result that 
the thought he believes at t is distinct from the one concerning which he 
suspends judgement at t' (such a result would obviously constitute a reductio 
of our principle (DIG)). Thus, although the token attitudes Bernard forms at t 
and t' may be said to belong to antagonistic types, it is clear that the condition 
about retention stated in (DIG) is not satisfied with respect to Bernard's story; 
for the fact that at t' Bernard changes his mind about the content of the 
particular belief he had at t - and he clearly takes the objects thought about 
on both occasions as being one and the same - is sufficient to show that such 
a belief has not been retained (it is deliberately interrupted at t').
4.8 I turn now my attention to a certain class of cases which are worth 
examining in the light of our diachronic principle, especially when one tries to 
figure out what sort of con.sequence could be drawn from a possible application 
of the principle to such cases.
I shall take the following situation as representative of the envisaged 
class of cases. Suppose that Mary is attending a party and on a certain occasion 
(say at t), looking at a certain man in the room, she says 'He is a brilliant chess 
player' (believing it). Then she moves around and a little while later (say at tf ), 
looking at apparently the same man, she says 'He is not a brilliant chess player' 
(also believing it). Now suppose that supporting Mary's latter assertion is the 
well-known fact that the man in question (who is indeed very good at chess) 
has a twin brother (who happens to be very bad at chess), and they both have 
the habit of amusing themselves at deceiving other people at parties by taking 
the place of one another. Yet, unbeknownst to Mary, what actually goes on is 
that this time such a replacement has not occurred so that on the later occasion
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the man she is looking at is still the talented chess player.
The problem I would like to take up is whether an application of the 
proposed dlachronic principle to such a sort of case would yield the result that 
the particular thought believed by Mary at t should be distinguished from the 
particular thought she disbelieves at tf . Notice that prima facie there are 
grounds to think that such a consequence would be forthcoming. First, Mary's 
particular prepositional attitudes at t and t1 exemplify mutually conflicting 
attitude-types. Secondly, one might perhaps say that at t' Mary has retained her 
former belief (held at t) that the man she looked at is a brilliant chess player. 
Indeed, there appears to be no sense in which Mary might be described as 
having changed her mind concerning the content she believed at t. And, on the 
other hand, it seems that in fact Mary has kept track of the man thought about 
from t to t' (though she wrongly thinks that meanwhile she has lost track of 
him). Thus, it looks as though continuity of belief is secured in this case, and 
hence nothing prevents us. from getting the conclusion above mentioned by 
means of the diachronic principle.
Such a conclusion is surely not an absurd one: our subject would picture 
herself as having been perceptually presented with two distinct people, and one 
could presumably exploit this fact with a view to construing the particular 
contents believed and disbelieved by her as involving different (perceptual) 
modes of presentation of what turns out to be the same individual.
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to believe that our diachronic 
principle would not enable us to establish the distinctness of those thoughts; 
and so a different sort of consideration would have to be employed if one still 
wished to stick to such a result. Thus, consider the following argument to that 
effect. Contrary to what has been suggested above, it is reasonable to maintain 
that the condition about attitude-retention is not satisfied with respect to Mary's
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story. I have claimed before that the notion of keeping track of an object is not 
purely internal, where such a claim should be read as follows: it Is not the case 
that, necessarily, if a subject thinks that she has kept track of a given object 
from one occasion to another then she has kept track of the object throughout 
the period of time in question. But it does not follow that our notion should be 
taken as lacking any sort of internal component. In effect, I am inclined to think 
that the converse of the conditional just stated holds; that is to say, the 
following principle should be seen as obtaining:
(T) Necessarily, if a reflective subject has kept track of a given object 
for a certain period of time then throughout such a period it must seem 
to her that she has kept track of the object in question.
Now the consequent of principle (T) turns out to be false with respect to Mary's 
case: clearly, she does not ,think that she has kept track of the brilliant chess 
player from t to t'. Therefore, assuming that principle (T) is sound and taking 
it in conjunction with Principle (K), one gets the conclusion that at tf Mary has 
not P-retained the particular belief she formed at t. Hence, it seems that no 
consequence concerning the identity or distinctness of the demonstrative 
contents believed and disbelieved by her at t and t' (respectively) would be 
available in the light of the diachronic principle; of course, this would still leave 
the way open to discriminate between those contents on a different basis, or to 
hold the view that at t1 Mary is not actually entertaining any thought at all (on 
the grounds that at t' she has lost track of the man thought about at t).
However, the argument just outlined contains a fallacious step. In order 
to be applicable our diachronic principle requires Indeed that a subject retain 
on later occasions the token attitudes formerly held. But, as claimed before, from
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the fact that at t' Mary has not P-retained her previous belief about the chess 
player it does not follow that at t' she has not retained tout court such a belief. 
Moreover, there are reasons to think that such a retention might still hold in 
Mary's case. It seems plausible to say that Mary's original belief, to the effect 
that the man seen at t is a brilliant chess player, is not interrupted at any time 
in the interval from t to t'. Of course, at t' Mary comes to disbelieve that the 
man she sees then has such a property; but that does not generate any 
interruption of her former belief. Thus, the idea that, even though the man the 
belief held at t is about is no longer perceptually accessible to Mary at t', she 
might still retain then such a belief, seems to be an intuitively plausible idea. 
And one might claim that Mary would be able to retain at t' her previous belief 
by means of a memory of the person seen earlier on as possessing a certain 
quality. In other words, the claim would be to the effect that if Mary remembers 
at t' that the man she saw at t is a brilliant chess player, then one is entitled 
to say that at t' she continl:les to hold her former belie~1. Mary's demonstrative 
belief at t, a belief based on a visual perception of the person thought about, 
could be in this way regarded as being readjusted at t' into a belief based on 
a memory demonstration of that person; and one might perhaps adopt a causal 
account of memory to explain why the thought retained at t' is a thought about 
the person In question (and not about someone else): It is a thought about that 
person because such a person is the origin of a causal chain which leads to 
Mary's memory. 
Now if the preceding reflection Is along the right lines then our 
diachronic principle might after all be used to obtain the conclusion that the 
content of Mary's belief at t and the content of her disbelief at t' should be 
tIThe claim that propositional memory entails attitude-retention was advanced as 
principle (M) at the end of Section 3. 
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construed as being distinct particular thoughts (a result which we have already 
taken as being plausible).
4.9 Let us briefly consider now another kind of case, a case which might 
apparently provide us with a counter-example to our diachronic principle (DIG). 
Suppose that, on the basis of a certain amount of Information about the conflict 
in the Gulf gathered from the media, I come to believe on the 20th December 
1990 that Saddam Hussein will be overthrown by the 15th January 1991. And 
suppose that two days later - on the basis of precisely the same information, 
which I now evaluate in a different way - I come to doubt that Saddam Hussein 
will be overthrown by the 15th January 1991. Could one use (DIG) to infer that 
the thought I believe on the 20th December is not the same as the one I doubt 
on the 22nd December? If so then this would have to be viewed as a reductio 
of our principle, since it would be manifestly wrong to discern any difference 
in content here.
However, the presented situation does not constitute a genuine counter- 
example to (DIG); for it is intuitively evident that one could not speak of 
attitude-retention with respect to such a case. Indeed, on the 22nd I have 
undoubtedly changed my mind about the content of the belief I had on the 20th, 
although such a change of mind is not caused by my considering a piece of 
evidence hitherto unavailable. What this suggests is that the notion of a change 
of mind concerning a given content p should be seen as involving not only the 
subject's coming across new evidence which she takes as undermining p, but 
also the subject's giving a different weight to the same evidence, I.e. to 
evidence he already possesses.
4.10 Finally, I want to re-examine Jones's case - introduced at the beginning
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of this Section and involving his visual encounters with the Morning Star and 
the Evening Star - in the light of the preceding discussion about attitude- 
retention. Earlier on I made the claim that when Jones (pointing to Venus) 
asserts 'That is not a planet1 at dusk we may assume that on such an occasion 
he still believes that the heavenly body he pointed to at dawn is a planet; i.e., 
we may assume that Jones has retained this particular belief from dawn to dusk.
I would like to raise the following issue concerning the supposition that 
attitude-retention is secured in Jones's case (and In similar cases). The problem 
is whether or not such an assumption is consistent with the requirement on 
attitude-retention expressed in our principle (K). In other words, the problem 
is whether it would be plausible to argue that since Jones has not kept track 
of Venus from dawn to dusk, he might not be said (according to the above 
principle) to have retained at dusk the belief held at dawn. If this were right 
then one could not be in a position to obtain - by means of the diachronic 
principle - the (intuitively .acceptable) result that the thoughts believed and 
disbelieved by Jones at dawn and dusk (respectively) are distinct from each 
other; hence, it seems that the range of application of our principle is in fact 
narrower than one would wish: it does not discriminate between contents where 
it should.
However, if principle (K) were taken as being applicable to Jones's story 
then the conclusion one would be entitled to derive is only that Jones has not 
P-retained at dusk his previous belief; and, again, it does not follow from this 
that he has not retained then such a belief. Therefore, our treatment of cases 
of such a sort is clearly consistent with principle (K). On the other hand, one 
might perhaps hold the view that the notion of keeping track of an object which 
is required by Principle (K) Is simply inapplicable to Jones's case. One might 
concede that there is presumably a sense in which one could say that It would
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be possible for a subject (located on Earth) to keep track of an object such as 
the planet Venus from dawn to dusk (as it and Earth orbit the Sun and revolve 
around their axis). But this would be a highly sophisticated conceptual skill, a 
skill which would involve a great deal of astronomical knowledge and the 
employment of rather complex methods of observation and calculation. It is 
definitely not something one would able to do by means of ordinary perception; 
actually, one would not even be able to do it by means of augmented perception 
(backed up by auxiliary devices such as telescopes, etc.). Thus, even granting 
that the notion of tracking has such a (surely very special) sense, it is 
obviously not the sense one intends when one employs the notion in connection 
with Principle (K). In effect, what is meant here is a much more basic (non- 
conceptual) skill, an ability we exercise all the time in our ordinary transactions 
(visual, tactual, aural, etc.) with objects in our surroundings. Hence, one might 
maintain that it does not make sense to apply the relevant notion of keeping 
track of an object over time to such a sort of case, in which case even the 
conclusion that at dusk Jones has not P-retained his former belief would not be 
available on the basis of principle (K).
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SECTION 5 - THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE DYNAMICS
This closing Section Is devoted to a concise examination of the Interesting 
topic of Cognitive Dynamics as It has been Introduced by David Kaplan In his 
seminal essay 'Demonstratives' 42 . Having in mind the central theme of the 
present essay, I focus once more upon upon two different sorts of approach to 
Cognitive Dynamics, viz. the Millian account proposed by Kaplan and others and 
the neo-Fregean account proposed by Evans and others. The ensuing discussion 
should be seen as a continuation of the reflection undertaken in Chapter III 
when we dealt with certain "notational variance" claims in connection with the 
issue of indexical reference; and the upshot is not, in this respect, different 
from the sort of result we have obtained before: the claims in question should 
also be regarded as unwarranted in the area of Cognitive Dynamics.
5.1 Cognitive Dynamics is in essence the study of attitude-retention. It is thus 
a discipline concerned with the conditions under which prepositional attitudes 
can be said to persist over time. Prepositional attitudes have been here assumed 
to be certain relational mental states which hold between given agents, on the 
one hand, and thoughts or propositions, on the other. The latter are said to be 
the contents of the attitudes and, especially in the case of attitudes which have 
singular thoughts as their contents, we have been developing a view on which 
questions concerning the conditions under which such attitudes might be 
retained are not, in general, independent of questions about how such thoughts 
are to be construed and individuated; one of the directions of such a link can 
be appreciated from the way we have formulated our dlachronic principle of 
individuation for contents.
D.Kaplan 1988a (especially 537-8).
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Let me introduce what might perhaps be seen as the most challenging and 
delicate issue of Cognitive Dynamics. As formulated by Kaplan, the problem is 
mainly related to the phenomena of retention and change in those prepositional 
attitudes which have indexical thoughts as their contents, i.e. thoughts which 
might be expressed by utterances (in given contexts) of sentences containing 
at least one occurrence of an indexical expression. It is assumed that attitudes 
with non-indexical contents, e.g. my fear that planes are likely to crash during 
take-offs, do not present any serious difficulties. And the species of indexicality 
whose investigation appears to be more interesting - relative to the issue under 
consideration - are mainly those which are given in temporal indexical thoughts 
(indexical thoughts about particular times), spatial indexical thoughts (indexical 
thoughts about particular places), and perception-dependent indexical thoughts 
(indexical thoughts about spatio-temporal particulars demonstratively identified 
by means of the several sensory modalities).
Accordingly, let us restrict ourselves to cases where one is dealing with 
indexical contents, especially those of the above sorts. Such cases are 
problematic and worth investigating because they often involve what might be 
called a realignment in the linguistic means of expression of an indexical thought 
- on the part of a given thinker - as time goes by. In other words, there are 
situations in which the verbal expression of an indexical thought entertained by 
a thinker at a certain time must, at a later time, be readjusted in a certain way 
by the thinker in order for the thought in question to be then entertained; so 
that one could presumably say that a certain particular attitude taken at the 
earlier time towards the thought in question has been retained by the thinker 
at the later time (the very same thought being the object of the attitude on 
both occasions).
Naturally, such readjustments are to be thought of as being operated in
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the linguistic means employed for the expression of the thoughts; in effect, it 
does not make much sense - at least in the light of the general conception of 
content we have been assuming - to think of the thoughts, or of the proposi- 
tions, as being themselves subjected to any sort of change or realignment. As 
we shall see, the problem is that certain linguistic means which prima facie 
suggest themselves as appropriate to the effect do not seem to capture, at least 
according to some views, certain apparently intuitive facts about the cognitive 
structure of a given thinker.
A general formulation of the problem with which I shall be mainly 
concerned here, and which I label the central problem of Cognitive Dynamics, 
might be given as follows. Suppose that at a certain time t a given subject x 
holds a particular belief b with content p, where p is a singular thought 
containing at least one indexical ingredient. For example, suppose that, at t, x 
sincerely and assertively utters (or assents to) a token of a sentence-type S 
containing some indexical expression i and expressing (with respect to the 
context of use) the thought that p. We are then invited to consider the following 
questions. Under what circumstances should we say that, at a later time t', x 
has retained her particular belief b? And this question, taken as a question in 
philosophical logic (and that is how I shall take it), is to be intended in the 
following sense. What sentence or sentences (if any) Sf - presumably containing 
some indexical expression I'* i - must x be disposed to assent to (or to assert) 
at t' so that we would be entitled to say that her particular belief b has been 
retained at t'? Obviously, a natural (and minimal) requirement one should make 
here is that S* must have the same content as S, i.e. it must have the thought 
that p as its content (relative to the context of use); indeed, as argued In 
Section 4, identity of content over time is to be taken as necessary for attitude- 
retention.
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And the related question would be the following one. Under what sort of 
conditions should we say that, at t', x has not retained her former belief b and 
has (for Instance) changed her mind with respect to (the content of) such a 
belief? That is to say, what sentence or sentences (if any) S' must x be 
disposed to assent to (or to dissent from) at t' so that one could say that she 
no longer holds at that time her belief b? As to this question, one should notice 
at once that there could be several ways by means of which one could say that, 
at tf , x has changed her mind about her original belief. For instance, she could 
at t1 suspend judgement about the content p of b, by neither believing p nor 
believing the negation of p. Or she could at t1 disbelieve the content p of b, 
which would be (we might assume) tantamount to believing the negation of p. Or 
she could find herself at t' in a position in which she simply does not believe 
p at all (or fails to believe that p). In all these cases one would say that x has 
not retained at t' the particular belief b she held at t; for in all such cases she 
takes towards p at t* an attitude which is in some way antagonistic to the one 
she took towards the same thought at t. (Of course, all that has been said about 
belief could be easily extended to the other attitudes).
Let me illustrate this by considering the following sort of case; I focus 
again on cases involving temporal thoughts, resuming thus the discussion 
initiated in Chapter III. Suppose that, at a certain time t, I sincerely and 
assertively utter (or assent to) a token of the sentence-type
(1) This room Is hot now.
One would then say that at t I hold a particular belief about the temperature 
in the room where I happen to be at t. Now what sentence (or sentences) should 
I be prepared to assert (or to assent to) at a later time t', say three minutes 
later, In order to retain the particular belief I formed at t? How should I 
readjust at t1 the thought - relative to its verbal expression, of course - I
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entertained and believed at t? Well, assuming that at t' I am still in the same 
room, a natural candidate would be (a token of) the sentence(-type)
(2) This room was hot three minutes ago;
or, allowing for a certain degree of vagueness, perhaps (a token of) the 
sentence(-type)
(3) This room was hot a moment ago.
To take another example, consider once more the 'today'/'yesterday' case. 
Suppose that on a certain day, say d, Jones says
(4) Today is fine,
and believes it. What sentence (or sentences) should he be disposed to assert 
(or to accept) on the following day, d+1, so that one could say that he has then 
retained his belief about the weather on d? Again, a plausible choice would 
apparently be given in the sentence
(5) Yesterday was fine.
(And analogous questions might be naturally raised with respect to sentences 
containing other categories of indexicals, such as spatial indexicals or perceptual 
demonstratives).
5.2 For convenience, let us call the above - prima facie intuitively sound - 
claim to the effect that sentences such as (2) (or (3)) and (5), taken with 
respect to the envisaged contexts, constitute choices which are appropriate for 
attitude-retention the Natural Realignment Claim. It Is important to begin our 
reflection by noticing that such a claim might be given the following two 
different readings. Take Jones's case, for instance. On the one hand, it might 
be held that Jones may be said to have retained on d+1 the particular belief he 
held on d (by accepting then (4)) only if he would be disposed to accept (5) on 
d+1. That Is to say, the claim is that a disposition to accept (a token of) the
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sentence in question on the later occasion is necessary for retention (or re- 
expression) of the belief had on the earlier occasion. Of course, it is assumed - 
and I shall keep this assumption throughout our coming discussion - that Jones 
is an articulate speaker of English eager to give voice to his beliefs; otherwise 
such a claim would be manifestly false. On the other hand, it might be held that 
Jones's disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is sufficient for retention of the belief 
he held on d (by accepting then (4)). For simplicity of exposition, I shall refer 
to those two distinct versions of the Natural Realignment Claim as the Necessity 
Claim and the Unqualified Sufficiency Claim (respectively).
Now I argue below towards the conclusion that the Unqualified Sufficiency 
Claim is unsound, i.e. towards the result that e.g. Jones's disposition to accept 
(5) on d+1 is not sufficient for belief-retention. And from such an argument a 
different and stronger claim will emerge, viz. the claim that such a disposition - 
taken in conjunction with a certain set of additional suppositions - is sufficient 
for belief-retention. Let us call this claim the Qualified Sufficiency Claim.
With a view to identifying the supplementary suppositions required by the 
Qualified Sufficiency Claim, let us then see why the Unqualified Sufficiency Claim 
does not hold, e.g. why Jones's propensity to accept (5) on d+1 is not - taken 
per se - sufficient for belief-retention. In what follows I mention three different 
ways by means of which such an insufficiency could be displayed.
First, suppose that on d+1 - e.g. as a result of a blow in the head - 
Jones forgets everything about the preceding day (what the weather was like, 
etc.). Suppose further that on d+1 - being aware of Jones's condition - a 
reliable friend gives him some information about d, including the information that 
it was a fine day (and assume that this was indeed the case); and suppose that 
Jones accepts this testimony without any reluctance. Then one might surely 
conclude that on d+1 Jones would be disposed to assert (or to assent to) a
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token of (5). Yet, under such circumstances, one would hardly say that he has 
retained on d+1 the particular belief he held on d (by accepting then (4)). In 
order to secure belief-retention Jones's disposition to accept (5) on d+1 must be 
causally connected In some way or other with his acceptance of (4) on d; Indeed, 
one would have to say that he Is disposed to accept (5) on d+1 because he 
accepted (4) on d (or that he believes today - i.e. d+1 - that yesterday - i.e. 
d - was fine because he believed yesterday that yesterday was fine). And in the 
above sort of circumstance such a causal connection - which, as the case 
suggests, may be guaranteed by memory - is clearly absent.
Another way of establishing the same point - i.e. the unsoundness of the 
Unqualified Sufficiency Claim - might be given as follows. Suppose that Jones 
asserts (or assents to) a token of (4) at 11:58 p.m. on d, and that three minutes 
later, being unaware that midnight has already passed, he comes to accept (a 
token of) (5). Of course, under such circumstances, with 'yesterday' he intends 
to refer to d-1, a day on which - he remembers (let us suppose) - the weather 
was also fine (and one might also assume that he correctly remembers the 
weather on d). So it seems that Jones accepts (5) on d+1 (though he would 
reject such a description of his situation). However, it is obvious that one could 
not claim that he has thereby retained (or re-expressed) the belief he held on 
d; at most, and even this is rather problematic, one could perhaps claim that he 
has thereby retained a certain belief held on d-1 about the weather on that day. 
Again, there is some sort of causal connection which appears to be required for 
attitude-retention and which is missing here: in the envisioned situation one 
would not say that Jones accepts (5) on d+1 in virtue of his previous acceptance 
of (4) on d. Now in Section 4 we subscribed to the principle according to which, 
necessarily, if a subject retains a certain attitude for a certain period of time 
then throughout the period in question she thinks that she is having the same
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attitude towards the same content (or, at least, she does not think that she is 
not having the same attitude towards the same content). And this kind of 
internal continuity is not present in the above sort of case. When Jones comes 
to accept (5) on d+1 it certainly does not seem to him that he is believing then 
the same thing he believed on d when he accepted (4); and, in particular, it 
certainly does not seem to him that he accepts (5) on d+1 because he accepted 
(4) on d (for the simple reason that it does not seem to him that he accepts (5) 
on d+1 at all). One might add that Jones thinks that he is believing a different 
thing - when he accepts (5) - in virtue of the fact that he thinks that he has 
correctly kept track of time, whereas in fact he has mistracked the days; thus, 
the case suggests that a continued exercise of an ability to keep track of an 
object (viz. a day) as time passes may also provide us with a causal connection 
of the kind needed for attitude-retention.
Recall that, in the preceding Section, an exercised ability to track an 
object over time and/or space was in general taken as necessary for what we 
called then P-retention, i.e. fora subject's re-expressing by means of perceptual 
demonstratives token attitudes previously taken towards perception-dependent 
thoughts (e.g. perceptual beliefs). This claim was then represented as principle 
(K); and what the foregoing considerations suggest is a certain extension of 
principle (K) to cases of attitude-retention in which given subjects are able to 
re-express by means of temporal indexicals (e.g. 'yesterday' and 'a moment ago') 
token attitudes formerly held towards temporal indexical thoughts (e.g. temporal 
beliefs involving 'today'-thoughts or 'now'-thoughts). Let us refer to such a 
sort of attitude-retention as T-retention. Then one might formulate as follows the 
envisaged temporal analogue of principle (K). Let r be a temporal indexical 
thought about a certain time u. Then the following holds:
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(K)* Necessarily, if a subject x T-retains a token attitude a, of type m 
and content r, throughout an interval of time from tj to tj,, then x keeps 
track of u from tg to t,.
Thus, for instance, in order for Jones to be able to T-retain on d+1 - or to re- 
express on d+1 by using a temporal indexical - the particular belief he held on 
d about d (by accepting then a token of (4)), he must keep track of d from d 
to d+1. And an analogue of principle (K) could also be formulated to cover cases 
in which a subject re-expresses by means of spatial indexicals (e.g. 'here') token 
attitudes formerly taken towards spatial indexical thoughts (e.g. spatial beliefs 
involving 'there'-thoughts).
Finally, a third way of displaying the inadequacy of the Unqualified Suffi- 
ciency Claim is this. One might imagine a situation in which our subject Jones 
simply changes his mind on a certain occasion between his acceptance of (4) on 
d and his acceptance of (5) on d+1. Suppose that Jones accepts (4) at some time 
t during the afternoon of d, and that in the evening of d the weather gets 
temporarily pretty miserable so that at tf he comes to doubt that the weather 
is fine on d. Then at some time t" on d+1, after having given some reflection 
to the topic of the weather on the preceding day, he ends up accepting (5). One 
may assume that at t" Jones remembers what the weather was like on d and that 
he has successfully kept track of the days from t to t". However, I guess that 
in such circumstances one would not be entitled to say that Jones has retained 
at t" the particular belief he formed at t, or that this belief persists throughout 
the period which goes from t to t". (Maybe there is a sense in which one could 
say that such a belief is resumed at t"; at least such a description would not 
be inconsistent with any of the general principles making up the minimal account 
of token attitudes proposed in Section 2).
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From the above sort of consideration one could extract the following 
general conclusion with respect to the 'today'/'yesterday' case; and parallel 
results would surely hold for other pairs of temporal indexicals such as e.g. 
'now'/'three minutes ago' and spatial indexicals such as e.g. 'here'/'there'. Given 
an acceptance of a token of (4) on a day d, a subject's disposition to accept a 
token of (5) on d+1 would not by itself guarantee the persistence of the belief 
held on d. The reason is that at least one of the following conditions might not 
be satisfied: (i)- the subject remembers the weather on d; (ii)- he keeps track 
of the days from d to d+1; (hi)- he does not change his mind about his earlier 
belief. Therefore, what I take to be the Qualified Sufficiency Claim might now be 
given the following formulation: the conjunction of the above sort of disposition 
with such conditions as (i), (ii) and (iii) would be sufficient for attitude-reten- 
tion.
Now the questions I would like to address in the remainder of the present 
Section are these. Is the Natural Realignment Claim - construed as the Qualified 
Sufficiency Claim - a sound claim? And is the Natural Realignment Claim - 
construed as the Necessity Claim - a sound claim?
5.3 Let us begin by considering the latter question. It is worth observing 
that the Necessity Claim - i.e. the claim that, given an acceptance of a token of 
(4) on d, a propensity to accept a token of (5) on d+1 would be necessary to 
retain then the belief held on d - would presumably be in general subscribed 
to, though on disparate grounds, either by an advocate of (certain versions of) 
a directly referential account of indexical content (such as e.g. Perry) or by an 
advocate of (certain versions of) a neo-Fregean account (such as e.g. Evans). 
Indeed, under normal circumstances, by being disposed to accept (5) on d+1 our 
subject would be regarded on either view as retaining the particular content
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believed on d; and retention of content believed is, as we have claimed, required 
for retention of belief. And both accounts might be seen as yielding the result 
that an utterance of (5) on d+1 should be assigned the same content, or would 
express the same proposition, as an utterance of (4) on d (with respect to the 
envisaged contexts of use); in spite of the fact that the premisses employed to 
reach such a conclusion would be - as shown below - substantially different in 
each case.
The direct reference theorist would construe the common content in 
question as being the neo-Russellian proposition consisting of the day d itself 
and the property of Fineness. And he would perhaps add the remark that on d 
that proposition is believed by Jones under the character (Kaplan) or role 
(Perry) of the sentence-type 'today is fine', the character or role of the word- 
type 'today' being roughly given in the following sort of rule of reference: an 
utterance of 'today' refers to the day on which the utterance is produced; 
whereas on d+1 that proposition would be believed by Jones under a new 
character or role, viz. that of the sentence-type 'yesterday was fine', the 
character or role of the word-type 'yesterday' being roughly given in the 
following sort of rule of reference: an utterance of 'yesterday' refers to the day 
which immediately precedes the day on which the utterance is made. But, since 
on the view in question a character (or a role) is never a part of propositional 
content (rather, it determines propositional content from a given context of 
utterance), Jones would be said to believe the same content on both occasions. 
Of course, the sort of preservation of content envisaged by the direct reference 
theorist falls short of providing us with the kind of internal continuity noticed 
before and apparently required for belief-retention; in effect, neo-Russellian 
propositions are by definition something which is wholly external to their 
thinkers or believers. And, on the other hand, it is unlikely that the notion of
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character (or role) could be used so as to provide us with such a continuity. 
Thus, on d+1 Jones believes the same content under a different character, and 
it is unclear what relation should obtain between the old and the new character 
so that it could yield the sort of internal (or causal) connection necessary for 
attitude-retention*3 . Hence, lacking the appropriate kind of conceptual apparatus 
(at least at the strictly semantic level), the direct reference theorist seems to 
be left with the problem of accounting in some way or other for such a 
connection.**
On the other side, this would not constitute any problem for certain neo- 
Fregean approaches to indexical thought, e.g. the particular account advanced 
by Evans. The reason is that the sort of consideration usually employed on such 
an account to establish the result that Jones's acceptance of (5) on d+1 would, 
under normal circumstances, manifest the persistence of the particular content 
believed by him on d (when he accepts (4)), are such that they provide us at 
once with a certain kind of interior continuity. In effect, on that sort of view,
This is Kaplan's point in 1988a, footnote 64.
In his recent book 1990, Mark Richard makes an interesting suggestion along the 
following lines (Cf. p. 228). When Jones accepts (4) on d he might be seen as 
also accepting the sentence 'A-certain-dayj is fine', where 'a-certain-day^' is 
construed as being a non-indexical device by means of which Jones would be able 
to refer to d when this day becomes "indexically inaccessible". Thus, on d+1 he 
could either accept (5) or 'A-certain-day^ is fine'; and this would apparently 
provide us with the sort of continuity required for retention: our subject 
employs either distinct tokens of the same name of the object thought about 
(viz. d) or a "chain" of tokens of distinct names of the object, where the 
connection between such tokens is secured by memory (one either has "memory 
traces" of earlier tokens or groups tokens with such traces). The problem is 
that on Richard's view the objects of belief (and other attitudes) are not, 
strictly speaking, Russellian propositions since they include not only the 
objects and properties thought about but also the linguistic expressions which 
determine them; thus, the object of Jones's belief on d would be something like 
the ordered pair «'is fine',being fine>, <* today' ,d» (or the pair «'is 
fine',being fine>,<'a-certain-day(j',d» ). And, given the sort of (interior) 
connection between names appealed to above, one might have reasons to suspect 
that such a view turns out to be rather similar to a neo-Fregean account of 
retention (such as the one outlined below).
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It Is claimed that the particular Fregean thought Jones believes by accepting (4) 
on d is identical to the one he believes by being disposed to accept (5) on d+1 
because both thoughts are composed out of the very same particular way of 
thinking of an object (viz. a day); and such a way of thinking is taken to be 
a temporally extended mode of presentation of d, one which consists in a way 
of keeping track of d from d to d+1 which Jones employs in thought. Thus, a 
certain kind of internal continuity, namely that which is given in an exercise of 
an ability to keep track of a time as it recedes into the past, is in this manner 
incorporated into (Fregean) propositional content itself.
And the neo-Fregean theorist would be able to conclude that a subject's 
disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is necessary for her to retain the content 
believed on d; for, on his view, if the subject keeps track of the day d from 
d to d+1 then she is bound to have such a disposition on d+1, and if she wants 
to retain then the content of her earlier belief, then she must exercise such an 
ability. Moreover, an argument along the following lines could then be mounted 
with a view to establishing the Necessity Claim. If the above result holds, i.e. 
if a disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is necessary for preservation of content, 
then such a disposition is necessary for belief-retention; since, in general, 
belief-retention requires identity of content believed. (It should be noted that 
this latter argument, but not the former one, might perhaps be endorsed by the 
direct reference theorist as well). Alternatively, a different argument towards 
the same conclusion could be set out in the following way. One might claim that, 
in general, retention of certain demonstrative or indexlcal beliefs about 
particular objects requires that the subject keep track of the objects thought 
about throughout certain periods of times. Thus, in particular, Jones retains on 
d+1 his belief held on d about d only if he keeps track of d from d to d+1. On 
the other hand, as claimed above, in order to be able to keep track of d from
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d to d+1 he must be disposed to accept (5) on d+1. Therefore, the conclusion is 
forthcoming that such a disposition would be necessary for belief-retention.
5.4 The strongest objection I know to the Natural Realignment Claim - or at 
least to its construal as the Necessity Claim - Is Kaplan's criticism in 'Demons- 
tratives'. Kaplan dismisses as unsatisfactory such a sort of answer to the 
problem of Cognitive Dynamics; and he does not provide us with any alternative 
solution to the problem, leaving it open. His argument might be represented as 
the following sort of reductlo. If, in order to be able to retain on d+1 his former 
belief, Jones must replace 'today* with 'yesterday' and accept (5), then if he 
were someone like Rip Van Winkle - someone who systematically loses track of 
time and never knows his own position in time - it would be utterly impossible 
for him to retain that belief; for the simple reason that he could never be in a 
position to accept (or to be disposed to accept) a sentence such as (5). Of 
course, Kaplan takes this as a rather implausible consequence of the claim under 
discussion. Thus, what Kaplan seems to reject is some such general claim as the 
claim that in order to retain certain demonstrative or indexical beliefs about a 
given object for a certain period of time a subject must keep track of the 
object in question throughout that period of time.
And the strongest rejoinder I know to Kaplan's argument is Evans's in his 
influential essay 'Understanding Demonstratives'*5 . Evans rejects Kaplan's 
verdict and takes the above sort of consequence as being perfectly acceptable. 
He argues that an ability to keep track of time - which manifests itself in a 
propensity to accept (5) on d+1 - necessarily underlies Jones's retention of his 
original belief. If Jones were like Rip Van Winkle and that ability were missing, 
there would be no belief-retention; rather, the subject would be under the
*' Evans 1981; see especially footnote 21 on page 311.
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illusion of having retained a certain belief.
How should one assess such a dispute? First, notice that the case 
presented by Kaplan is an extreme one. And I am inclined to think that Evans 
is probably right when he holds that a subject who systematically and massively 
mistracks time - e.g. by sleeping for too many consecutive days - could hardly 
be in a position to retain temporal beliefs. However, there is no need for such 
an extreme case. Indeed, an analogous point could be made with respect to cases 
in which we deal with subjects who only locally or temporarily lose track of 
time. Thus, suppose again that Jones accepts (4) at 11:58 p.m. on d and that 
three minutes later he is unsure whether midnight has passed (imagine that he 
has no means to check the time). Hence, Jones would not be in a position to be 
disposed to accept (5) at 00:01 a.m. on d+1, such a disposition being grounded 
on an ability to keep track of a day which he happens not to exercise in the 
situation described. So, according to the Necessity Claim, it seems that Jones 
would be prevented from retaining at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 the belief he held at 
11:58 p.m. on d (even assuming that he does not misremember the weather condi- 
tions on d). Yet, I think that there apparently is - at least at a pre-theoretical 
level - a sense in which at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 Jones still continues to believe 
what he believed three minutes earlier; that is to say, it seems to me that there 
is an intuition to the effect that it should be possible for Jones to retain then 
the belief held on the day before about the weather on that day, even If he is 
ex hypothesi not able to think of the day in question as 'yesterday* or as 'the 
day which immediately precedes today' (or to identify it by means of knowledge 
of his own position in time).
The sort of approach to the central problem of Cognitive Dynamics I am 
willing to endorse, and whose main Ideas are subsequently sketched, is one 
which Is both in (partial) agreement with Evans's views and in (partial)
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agreement with Kaplan's views.
On the one hand, pace Evans, I have reasons to believe that the Necessity 
Claim is not In general sound; in particular, as pointed out, I would agree with 
Kaplan's verdict that In the above sort of circumstance - in spite of not being 
disposed to accept (5) on d+1, and hence in spite of not being in a position to 
keep track of d in a certain way, viz. as the preceding day - Jones might still 
be seen as having retained his earlier belief; what sort of retention would that 
be, and how might Jones manifest it, are questions I take up below.
On the other hand, I have reasons to believe that claims such as 
principles (K) and (K)* still impose a plausible constraint upon a subject's 
ability to re-express in a certain way prepositional attitudes with certain 
demonstrative or indexical contents. Thus, pace Kaplan, I think that the notion 
of keeping track of an object over time and/or space should still be seen as 
playing an important role in an adequate account of certain forms of attitude- 
retention. And our rejection of the Necessity Claim should not be regarded as 
being inconsistent with our acceptance of such principles as (K) or (K)*. Indeed, 
I think that there is more than a kernel of truth not only in Evans's doctrine 
that in order to re-express in a certain way a previous demonstrative or 
indexical belief a subject must keep track of the object thought about, but also 
in his doctrine that ways of tracking objects are themselves to be taken as 
component parts of certain demonstrative or indexical contents.
Nevertheless, I maintain that the Necessity Claim does not hold. As claimed 
before, the reason is that I accept the idea, which I see as being grounded to 
a large extent on sound intuitions, that it is possible for a subject to retain on 
d+1 a belief held on d by accepting (4) without having then any disposition to 
accept (5). And one might perhaps represent the basic mistake made by a 
proponent of the Necessity Claim as apparently consisting In a tacit endorsement
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of certain strengthened and unrestricted forms of principles such as (K) and 
(K)*. According to the stronger principles in question, a subject's exercise of 
an ability to track a certain object over time and/or space would be required 
for the subject to retain tout court certain perceptual or temporal beliefs 
previously held about the object In question; whereas, according to the formula- 
tions proposed and which I take as plausible, the weaker principles (K) and (K)* 
are restricted respectively to cases of P-retention, i.e. re-expression of former 
perceptual beliefs by means of perceptual demonstratives, and to cases of T- 
retention, i.e. re-expression of former temporal beliefs by means of temporal 
Indexicals. So one might perhaps view the Necessity Claim as resting upon an 
assimilation of attitude-retention in general to T-retention, in the temporal case, 
and to P-retention, in the perceptual case.
Sed Contra such an assimilation, I am prepared to hold the view that not 
every instance of retention tout court is to be taken, for example, as an 
instance of T-retention (though the converse result is obviously false). Thus, 
if Jones mistracked time in the way mentioned before, then - in the light of 
principle (K)* - what he would not be in a position to do at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 
is to T-retain the particular belief he held at 11:58 p.m. on d+1 (by accepting 
then (4)); that is to say, he would not be able to re-express then such a belief 
by using a temporal indexical such as 'yesterday'. But it does not follow that 
it would be impossible for him to retain (tout court) that particular belief.
The account we have developed so far already provides us with the sort 
of result we need to make sense of such a possibility; and I shall follow here 
the policy adopted in Section 4 when we dealt with perceptual cases. Indeed, 
there surely is an intimate connection between attitude-retention and memory. 
In particular, we have subscribed to the general principle according to which
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prepositional memory entails attitude-retention*8 . Thus, with respect to Jones's 
case and assuming that on d+1 he remembers what the weather was like on d, 
one might say that he would be then in a position to retain the belief had on 
d, such a retention being secured by memory. Accordingly, what one should take 
as being the extreme case here is not the case of a massive loss of a capacity 
to keep track of time (Rip van Winkle's situation), but rather that of a massive 
loss of memory, i.e. the case of amnesia; thus, what one ought to say is that 
temporal beliefs such as the ones we have been discussing could hardly be 
retained by an amnesiac.
If the foregoing reflection is along the right lines then one may claim 
that, although Jones is ex hypothesi unable on d+1 to keep track of d (as 
'yesterday'), he still might be said to have retained on d+1 his former belief 
about d in a certain way, viz. by means of memory (and not in virtue of the 
particular position he occupies in time or of his knowledge of such a position). 
Hence, I conclude that there are grounds on which one might regard as 
unacceptable the claim according to which a disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is 
necessary for a thinker to retain then a belief she had on d by accepting (4); 
in the light of the above kind of consideration, the existence of such a disposi- 
tion is not necessary for belief-retention; and it is not sufficient either (for 
different but rather obvious reasons).
Assuming thus that what I have called the Natural Realignment does not 
constitute a necessary condition for belief-retention, one is still left with the 
problem of specifying what sort of linguistic readjustment (if any) could Jones 
make on d+1 with a view to expressing then the persistence of the particular 
belief he had on d. A tentative proposal, suggested by the preceding remarks, 
might be sketched in the following way. When Jones accepts (4) on d, he might
See principle (M) at the end of Section 3.
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as well accept a token of a sentence such as
(6) This day is fine,
where the demonstrative 'this day' expresses a perceptual mode of presentation 
of the day thought about, viz. d. In effect, it seems plausible to regard 'today' 
- taken in its pronominal use - as having a genuinely demonstrative sense, so 
that an utterance of (4) on a certain day might be seen as expressing the same 
thought as an utterance of (6) on the same day. And if such a suggestion is 
reasonable, then a way by means of which a thinker like Jones could retain on 
d+1 the belief he held on d by accepting (4) would be to accept (or to have a 
disposition to accept) on d+1 a token of a sentence such as
(7) That day was fine,
where the demonstrative 'that day' would be taken as expressing a memory- 
based demonstrative mode of presentation of d, i.e. a way of thinking of a 
certain day anchored upon a memory demonstration of the day in question. 
Reference to a particular day would be in this way secured by memory; and one 
might still say that the thinker knows which day is in question, or that he is 
in a certain sense acquainted with the object thought about, since he thinks of 
that day as the day on which certain remembered events took place.
Finally, let us turn our attention to that reading of the Natural 
Realignment Claim which we have labelled the Qualified Sufficiency Claim. Recall 
that this claim is to the effect that if a subject (who accepts (4) on d) is 
disposed to accept (5) on d+1 - by keeping track of d in the "canonical" way - 
then she retains on d+1 the belief held on d, provided that the following 
conditions are also satisfied: (i)- she remembers that the weather was fine on 
d; and (ii)- she does not change her mind about her former belief. What should 
one say about such a claim? Well, I take it as a perfectly acceptable (and also 
innocuous) one. In effect, it turns out to be a simple logical consequence of our
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principle (M) (by means of the rule of addition of premisses). So there seems to 
be no reason to reject the view that, by being disposed to accept (5) on d+1, 
the subject does not form a new belief, different from the one held on d by 
accepting (4) (assuming that the above conditions are fulfilled). The basic idea 
we have tried to introduce is Just that such a belief might be retained by the 
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